Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.11/7–2854: Telegram

No. 287
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State

secret

Djakarta, July 28, 1954—2 p.m.

183. Mytel 161.¹ President received me very cordially this morning. Said he had heard I was going to US on leave and wanted to be sure of seeing me before I went. He was pleased that I had planned to stay Djakarta until after Independence Day celebrations August 17, remarking that my absence would have been noted by anti-American press, and adding “I personally am very sorry your British colleague is going on leave before August 17”.

Sukarno said he could not order American Ambassadors around but if I had been called home on consultation about this time, he would have found some means to suggest to me the advisability of trying to explain the Indonesian scene in person. He said that his job and he thought mine also was complicated by such items as appeared in the July 19 issue of Newsweek saying that Indonesia would be the next target of Communist aggression. He said that only foolish people or Communists could believe that the cease-fire in Indochina meant an end to Communist aggression in Southeast Asia or even more than a temporary halt in the development of such plans as the Communists might have for further advances in Asia. He said “We [sic] have now lost Indochina” but that it was not yet Indonesia which was in direct danger but rather all Southeast Asia, more especially Thailand.”

Sukarno said he felt that it was now more important than ever that US find some way to appeal to the bulk of Indonesian people and restore high regard Indonesian people had for US until past two or three years. Sukarno said he felt US and American people could be best and most influential friends that Indonesia could have. He wanted to assure me that he was doing all he could consistent with Indonesian independent policy and requirements of his office not only to combat tendencies to regard Communist countries as the real friends of Indonesia but also to explain in private conversations his understanding apparent inconsistencies between American action or rather as he put it, inaction with regard to Irian and American stated anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Accordingly he very sincerely hoped that we could make some gesture to recognize legitimacy of Indonesians’ claim in Irian. He said he thought he understood thoroughly, although yet he did not agree, the dilemma posed by our alliance with Netherlands and our friendly feelings toward Indonesia but his people, particularly in the rest of the country, did not understand and the Communists were carrying on most active campaign to prevent them from understanding. (Courtesy forbade me observing his own part in whipping-up of Irian campaign.)

He asked me bluntly whether we of US Government had ever given the Dutch any form of assurance our support of Dutch claims in Irian and also whether any individuals in American Government as distinguished from government itself advocated Dutch claims to Irian. To the first question I replied in the sense of first paragraph Deptel 846:² That while our neutral or hands-off attitude re Irian dispute certainly implied recognition of de facto Dutch administrative control of Irian, we had never so far as I knew ever informed either Dutch or Indonesians that we recognized Dutch sovereignty. To his second question I replied that obviously I could not give a comprehensive reply but that I could say that while both sides of question naturally were discussed from time to time in light of American interests, I had not heard any responsible person come out flatly with advocacy of Dutch or Indonesian sovereignty claims; that any persons with whom I talked over the problem felt that, properly handled, a settlement could be finally reached which would be satisfactory.

Referring to Communism in Indonesia, Sukarno said very much what Vice President Hatta said to me a week ago: That he was encouraged by the progress which was being slowly made toward countering the growth of domestic Communist influence; that for example whereas a year or two ago SOBSI was without question “the crowned king of Indonesian labor” he felt that SOBSI influence was now somewhat on the wane and that Masjumi and other non-Communist labor organizations had reason to be more hopeful now than formerly. (Comment: I think the President’s statement is overly optimistic but I think it worth noting that Hatta should in this respect make same assertion as Sukarno, Prime Minister Ali, Foreign Minister Sunario and some other PNI leaders.)

The conversation lasted nearly an hour and was friendly and calm, the President convincingly expressing his real friendship for US. He especially requested that the President and Vice President be informed of the essence of conversation³ which he summed up as an appeal to US to find some way—and he thought recognition of Indo-Irian claims the best way—to strike a response from the heart of Indonesian people and thus help him to combat Communist influence and promote understanding and friendship for US.

Cumming

1. In telegram 161, July 26, Cumming informed the Department of State that Sukarno, recently returned from a trip to the North Moluccas, had sent word that he wished to see the Ambassador on July 28. (756D.11/7–2654)
2. Dated Apr. 10, not printed.
3. The substance of this telegram was transmitted to Vice President Nixon in a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Thruston B. Morton, dated Aug. 6. (611.56D/8–654)