Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.11/5–154: Telegram

No. 270
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

secret

Washington, May 12, 1954—5:31 p.m.

974. Limited distribution. Your 1265.¹ We believe Pringgodigdo’s approach probably planned, indicative Sukarno’s wishes and therefore significant. We also believe Sukarno’s long-standing desire visit U.S. could, if properly developed, a) be symbolic his basic preference for free as opposed Communist countries and favorably influence followers, b) stimulate him to prepare atmosphere in which he could accept invitation and make visit, c) possibly expedite and favorably influence elections.

Suggest you keep discussions subject possible visit on general, personal, no-commitment level stressing importance informal planning confidentially between you and Sukarno until commitment possible both sides and emphasizing impossibility visit 1954. If Sukarno expresses desire receive invitation, suggest you secure his views probable timing elections making clear we would wish avoid timing possible visit which might imply U.S. attempt influence elections.

Department believes opportunity Ambassador discuss privately with Sukarno latter’s “current views on world situation and Indonesian role therein” should be taken and suggests you:

a) Attempt draw Sukarno out on meaning “benevolent neutrality” (Paris 4070)² and on his reaction to increased Communist danger Indochina and elsewhere Southeast Asia;

b) Be guided by our 930 and 936³ should subject New Guinea arise (points you made to Sunario—your 1153⁴—might also be effective disabusing Sukarno any idea he might have of gaining U.S. support on this issue connection visit);

c) If asked, express opinion high regard Indonesia’s adherence its agreements would be further enhanced by negotiation rather than by unilateral abrogation Dutch-Indonesian Union.

Department believes development invitation and visit will require patient handling as your personal relationship with Sukarno grows but that Indonesian approach on this subject now significant and not unrelated events Indochina and recent indications Indonesia reappraising foreign policy (your 1187).⁵

FYI Deputy Under Secretary Murphy calling in Indonesian Ambassador May 13 for general discussion Indochina and SEA developments.

Dulles

1. Supra.
2. See Part 1, p. 433.
3. These telegrams, dated Apr. 29 and May 1 respectively, expressed the Department of State’s view that it would be unwise for Indonesia to take the West Irian question to the U.N. General Assembly, since such action would only benefit the Communist propaganda machine at the expense of the free world. The Department felt that the question should be handled on an amicable, bilateral basis without any damaging airing of it in the forum of the United Nations. (756D.00/4–2954; 656D.00/4–854)
4. Dated Apr. 8; in it, Ambassador Cumming reported on a conversation with Foreign Minister Sunario in which Cumming at some length reiterated the U.S. policy of “hands off” on the West Irian question, while at the same time expressing the wish that the matter could be settled amicably and without a showdown. (656D.00/4–854)
5. Not printed.