756D.11/5–154: Telegram
No. 269
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State
1265. Limited distribution. Mytel 949, February 27. At Dutch National Day party yesterday, Pringodigdo, Chief President Sukarno’s Secretariat, drew me to one side. He apologized for doing so but said he wanted to talk to me before leaving Monday1 with President on a trip to Lesser Sundas and Amboin. Pringo said that some time ago Sukarno had discussed with Ambassador Cochran the possibility of a visit to US; Sukarno had wanted to go and Ambassador Cochran thought arrangements could be worked out; trip however had not materialized because of attitude of the then Indonesian Government. Pringo said he thought time now ripe again to consider such a visit; that he had not discussed question with President (I doubt this) or Prime Minister but he knew that Foreign Minister and “some other Cabinet officer” would like to have Sukarno visit US: Sunario particularly anxious to accompany President himself. He repeatedly emphasized that he was not putting the idea to me officially but would be grateful if I could give him my personal opinion as to possibility of such a visit. In reply to my question he said he thought visit might not be practicable until some time in late winter or early spring of 1955—perhaps a little later but in any case should take place before the election, which he believed would not come before June or perhaps July 1955 (this coincides with statement made to me Friday by Masjumi leader Natsir). I remarked that that was a long time off; that much could happen in Indonesia, in US and in world in the next twelve months and suggested therefore that even though foreign visits of chiefs of state required much prior planning Pringo’s question might perhaps be premature. Pringo replied that President was leaning more and more towards US, partly because of real liking for Americans and [Page 425] American ways and partly because of distrust of PKI activities. Pringo hastily added that President’s “leaning” did not mean abandonment Indonesian independent policy. I asked him why he thought visit should take place before Indonesian elections. He said that “no matter what happened” Masjumi, who were the “most pro-American” of all Indonesian political parties, would win the elections; that he saw an advantage to US in having PNI, who after elections would be principal opposition party, gain credit for accomplishing Sukarno’s visit to US. He thought this would not adversely influence pro-US attitude of Masjumi and intimated vaguely they might be consulted privately at proper time.
Pringo went on to say that he thought time was approaching when I should have a private conversation with President Sukarno to ascertain for myself general trend of his current views on world situation and Indonesian role therein. He suggested that he and I meet after his return three weeks or so hence from his trip with the President and expressed hope that at that time I might be able to give him my personal views re Sukarno visit US. He said at that time we could also work out arrangements for me to see President privately, perhaps giving as an excuse presentation of some book to avoid undue public speculation over reason for American Ambassador having audience with President.
I told Pringo that I would reflect on our conversation and would try to develop some personal views to give him on his return.
As stated above, I doubt very much whether Pringo made this approach to me without foreknowledge of President, especially as its presentation seemed so thoroughly worked out. I venture to remind Department that Pringo has reputation being something of an intriguer—and I am wary of any effort to draw me into present confused currents of Indonesian politics unless I can be reasonably certain of the purpose and of the outcome from standpoint US objectives. I would welcome any guidance Department might wish to give me prior to my next talk with Pringo and as to attitude I should take with respect to Pringo’s suggestion that I should see the President. Subject to world and local developments next few weeks I am presently of opinion that it might be useful to have as thorough a talk with President as circumstances permitted even though he is certain to raise Irian.
- May 3.↩