756D.11/6–1154: Telegram
No. 271
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State
1467. Limit distribution. Mytel 1441, June 8.1 Pringgodigdo lunched with me yesterday. He confirmed impression I gained in conversation with President last Sunday that Sukarno welcomed opportunity for private talk with me. Pringgodigdo said that he wanted to warn me however that, having consulted with some of his other advisers, President was now of opinion that he neither could nor should visit the US until after the elections and then only if “the election showed a good result”.
He said that any presidential trips abroad in the meantime would probably have to be confined to Asian countries and he hinted that a suggestion had recently come from Pakistan that the President visit that country, such a visit would have to include India and perhaps Ceylon.
Replying to my question as to meaning of “a good result”, Pringgodigdo said that the President, who has been progressively isolating himself from nearly all political leaders and factions except [Page 428] PNI and leftist groups associated with PNI, was convinced that there was very little chance of Masjumi supporting him personally under any circumstances; that “good result” therefore meant, speaking broadly, a PNI victory; that, in other words, the President felt that Masjumi, if they came into power singlehandedly or with support of PSI, would oppose him in the presidential elections scheduled to follow the adoption of the new constitution. Pringgodigdo said that the President had now so closely identified himself with the PNI that it was impossible for him to visualize his own continuance in office without a PNI victory. He said that the President also related his continuance in office to the success of democracy in Indonesia “as the President now conceives democracy”. He did not elucidate. The Masjumi have greatly strengthened and extended their party organization in the rural areas and this in turn had within the past few weeks led the President to condone and even encourage the “brutality” with which PNI were removing officials of all grades from office and supplementing them with their own people. Pringgodigdo felt that practically the only person in PNI who can exercise a moderating influence on the President is Abdul Gani who he said the President had personally ordered appointed Secretary General of the Foreign Office. He thought that Abdul Gani especially and perhaps a few others including Sunario (despite the latter’s close association with Prime Minister Ali) might under favorable conditions be able to participate in a working agreement between PNI and the moderate Masjumi, but he added “at the present time I see little likelihood of such an arrangement being brought about. The President and his PNI advisers are determined upon a PNI victory without seeking Masjumi collaboration”.
Reverting to his use of the word “brutality” in connection with PNI removal of opponents from office, he said that PNI preparations for the elections were very thorough and far reaching. He had heard the estimate made by a PNI leader in an unguarded moment that through control of the electoral and administrative machinery they could keep the vote down to 30 percent of the qualified electoral lists (my note: these are not yet drawn up) and, if so, could win the elections. He said that perhaps I was aware that the PNI “preparations” included the solicitation under pressure of funds from not only the Chinese element of the Indonesian population but also from foreign firms (see mytel 1385).2 I said that [Page 429] I had heard such rumors and that I was fully determined to do every proper thing within my power to protect any American interests from compulsory contribution to any political party in Indonesia. (Quite frankly I said that with emphasis in the hope that Pringgodigdo might repeat my remarks to the proper quarters.) Pringgodigdo shrugged his shoulders and said he could understand my point of view but perhaps the only result of any such action would be obtaining of advantages by British and Dutch firms at the expense of the American firms. I dropped the subject.
Pringgodigdo also asked me if I was aware of the assistance the US was giving PNI through technical assistance in improving the facilities of the RRI (state radio). I said I had not thought of technical assistance in that light but that I had wondered a little at the government statement sometime ago that the state radio system could not be used for criticism of the government even to the point of forbidding the reading over the radio of published newspaper articles critical of governmental policy. Pringgodigdo observed that this was only one of a number of measures adopted at one of the first meetings of the present cabinet to exercise restraint over public opinion to the advantage of PNI and its supporters. (For Department’s information, the acting director of USOM mission and I had already agreed upon the preparation of a telegram recommending a reduction insofar as legally possible in the funds allocated for improvement of the Djakarta broadcasting station.)
Pringgodigdo said that in his opinion Vice President Hatta was the only political personage in Indonesia who could in the long run pull the country together unless, of course, Sukarno should himself resume direct personal contacts with leaders of the several non-and anti-Communist parties, and this latter possibility he thought unlikely since Sukarno more and more tended to rely upon his personal prestige with the body of the Indonesian people. He said, however, that it was now over a year since Hatta had had a real talk with the President and that Hatta himself felt that the breach between the two was probably irreparable, although Hatta’s loyalty was such that it was unlikely he would take the initiative in any move against the President. He went on to say that whereas up to 18 months or two years ago the President in private conversation was outspoken against the Communists, he now tended in private circles to be more moderate in his criticisms and went out of his way to receive fellow travellers from abroad. (This is true.) He hastened to say that this did not mean that the President had become pro-Communist but only that the Communists, by exercising restraint [Page 430] and refraining from personal attacks on Sukarno and diverting such attacks to Hatta, had “somewhat weakened the President’s mental defenses against the Communist infiltrators” as distinguished from what the President had described as “the extremist Communists” deriving direct support from abroad. He added that the principal support of democracy in Indonesia aside from Hatta “was now the Siliwangi division” and that it was the patriotism of such military leaders as Colonels Simbolon, Kawilarang and Bachrun which provided such balance as presently exists in Indonesia.
Comment: I think Department will agree that, even granting Pringgodigdo’s gossipy nature, the foregoing is an extraordinary conversation considering Pringgodigdo’s position as chief of the presidential secretariat. Conversation gives nothing especially new but does confirm … other sources and isolated conversations which members of my staff have had with their contacts. Not knowing exactly why Pringgodigdo should unbosom himself so freely to me, I exercised greatest possible restraint in my share of conversation and except as indicated in the body of this telegram, made no comment except such as were necessary to draw Pringgodigdo out further and also the following: At one point I asked Pringgodigdo whether he realized that what he was telling me of the President’s personality, character and present political orientation was of the greatest importance in the light of his leadership of a key country in SE Asia during this critical period. I did this partly to give him an opportunity to reconsider his remarks if he so chose. He seemed to understand fully, agreed with me and expressed his own concern and those of his friends (whom he did not identify) over (1) the manner in which PKI had gotten behind the guard of many Indonesian leaders, (2) possibility of some agreement at Geneva which would end up by opening way to Communist control of all Indochina, (3) immediate danger this would pose to Indonesia, (4) tendency of some PNI personalities to be blind to three.
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The text reads as follows:
“At President’s birthday reception Sunday [June 6] Sukarno told me he had instructed Pringgodigdo arrange for audience with me on June 14. Of passing interest is fact President engaged me in friendly conversation for longer period than any other chief of mission present including Red Chinese. Nothing of importance was said, but incident was commented on by colleagues.” (123 Cumming, Hugh S., Jr.)
↩ - This message, dated May 25, reported at some length on two recently discernible trends in the economic scene: First, an increase in pressure on American and other foreign firms for “Indonesianization” of their operations at an accelerated and “unreasonable” rate; second, “the increasing evidence of political graft, partly for individual enrichment but mainly as a means of filling party election campaign chests.” (811.05156D/5–2554)↩