Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.00/2–254: Telegram

No. 259
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State

secret

Djakarta, February 2, 1954—3 p.m.

829. Deptel 551.¹ I confirm Department view that genuine efforts toward an eventual holding of first elections in Indonesia would have beneficial stabilizing effect on Indonesian political situation. Both from standpoint of principle and best estimates of outcome, democratic election should have open American support. Following are some observations which I believe pertinent in assessing situation and determining what US action should be:

1. All Indonesian parties officially committed to general elections at earliest possible date. This includes Ali Government and parties participating therein. In its policy statement to Parliament, August 1953, elections were set for spring 1955. Whether this unrealistic faraway, as some contend, important point is that Government is committed to program of free elections with a date to which they should be held by public opinion.

2. Government has in fact undertaken task of setting election machinery in order, appointed central and provincial election committees and some for provincial subdivisions. Considerable non-partisan propaganda in evidence both in Djakarta and outlying districts promoting participation in a free election. This is all good in helping hold present Government to commitment as mentioned in paragraph 1.

3. Although Embassy is in possession of no positive evidence indicating Ali Government is at present stalling or insincere in establishing target date, fact cannot be overlooked that PNI-PKI control over Government machinery places them in enviable position of establishing control over the election machinery and calling the election at date most suitable their purposes. Conduct of current PNI–PKI Government indicative they not above sacrificing principle for power, as, for instance, rigging of central election committee in manner detrimental to strong opposition parties. They will undoubtedly do everything possible remain in power through “democratic election” and for this reason efforts made to make armed forces politically oriented is danger signal which, if successful, would be most significant.

4. Strong nationalism will continue to be watchword of Government during preparation for elections, even white-washing Communist participation by emphasizing contribution to nationalism. Their interpretation of neutralism, which in many instances results in bald anti-Americanism, provides atmosphere very unreceptive for any overt American influence. Any direct effort other than that mentioned under paragraph 1 (and that discreetly done) could have counterproductive effects our interests. In my opinion, however, it would be feasible and desirable, in addition, to feed into Indonesia and disseminate abroad material which would have effect of holding Government to commitment of elections and lay groundwork for wide condemnation both internally and externally at any efforts at stalling or skullduggery.

Cumming

1. This telegram, Jan. 8, reads in part as follows:

   “As nearly as can be judged here, deterioration of Indonesian political situation with increased opportunities for Communist infiltration and subversive maneuvers is being furthered by absence of definite plans for national elections. Department would hope that if firm election date announced many current tensions would be relieved and political energies would be diverted into constructive channels.” (756D.00/1–754)