Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.5 MSP/5–852: Telegram

No. 201
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Djakarta, May 8, 1952—4 p.m.

1625. Ref Embtel 1618.¹ Was recd by FonMin Mukarto with SYG Darmasetiawan present 9:30 a.m. May 8. FonMin said he had given me informally on night 6th decision of Cabinet reached preceding evening. He now desired I be formally advised thereof. He asked Darma explain this. Darma said Cabinet had decided 511 (a) agreement entered into by Subardjo and Cochran was binding but that Wilopo Govt not willing support it. I asked if this was formal approach to me for amendment 511 (a) agreement. Answer was negative.

Minister said he and Darma desired discuss situation frankly with me. Minister said some members Cabinet hoped amendment cld be obtained for 511 (b) assistance in terms similar Burma agreement. He said Ali had been informed of Cabinet decision and instructed seek sentiment of State Department on possible amendment. I recalled FonMin had told me this on previous occasion and I had been surprised Indo Govt appeared desire transfer MSA discussions to Wash. I said Indos of course at liberty approach my govt on any subj they wished through their own Amb. I made point, however, that Dept had seen fit entrust to chiefs of missions abroad negots of all agreements under MSA so far as I aware. Darma said he shld tell me frankly decision resulted in part from story reaching Cabinet that I opposed change from 511 (a).

I reminded Darma I had given Indo Govt through Subardjo choice of 511 (a) or (b) when negots started. Subardjo had chosen 511 (a) and my govt agreed this was type of agreement most suitable. I had of course regretted difficulties resulting from this choice but I still thought it was most advantageous arrangement conceivable. I insisted I always reported and wld continue to submit accurately any request that might be made to or through me by Indo Govt. I recalled that on reaching 511 (a) agreement my govt had made every amendment or accepted every interpretation Indo Govt sought. I said it was for Indo Govt decide whether it desired endeavor maintain 511 (a) agreement. Mukarto said report was being awaited from Ali as to results his talks with State Dept before determining wording with respect to Indo Govt’s attitude on MSA to be included in statement to Parl.

Mukarto said that with elections coming on his govt wld find itself embarrassed to meet such opposition as was likely to be encountered in Parl if it submitted 511 (a) for ratification. I deplored criticism that had been made of this agreement both in govt circles and in press. I thought this resulted largely from lack of info in regard to arrangement. I pointed out no good account thereof had been made to Indo public until Wibisono’s² recent press statement. I hoped Indos wld weigh seriously advantages accruing to them through 511 (a) and disadvantages and losses that wld result from giving up or amending this in favor any other possible arrangement.

I asked if idea had occurred to Indos of simply stating to Parl that new govt is reviewing entire field of internatl relations including such problems as those of Jap Treaty, union statute and MSA with purpose obtaining exact facts and eliminating any misconceptions. I thought such statement might appropriately be made and carry assurance that new govt cld be counted upon in implementation of existing undertakings not to infringe sovereignty or detract from independent policy of Indo. Mukarto said there was no intention to tell Parl 511 (a) must be eliminated. He repeated that statement wld likely be eliminated [limited?] to explanation that question of MSA was being studied. Any addition to this statement wld depend upon report from Ali.

I told Mukarto I was glad he had opportunity meet Secretary Acheson well as Lacy and Coerr who worked directly on Indo matters. I said these three well as Asst Secy Allison on whom Ali had called to give Cabinet decision, were entirely familiar with all my negots and they in turn kept me fully informed as to official conversations carried on in Wash with Indo auths there. I said this was to everyone’s advantage. I told Mukarto I was glad he had lived in my country and had learned our habits and that Darma also knew us rather well. I said both shld know that we are inclined to be absolutely frank in our contact with friendly foreigners and that Indo has always had such a warm spot in our hearts that we frequently overstep bounds of normal diplomacy in our efforts be of genuine assistance to this new state. I reminded them however that they shld not let any of their colleagues or assistants gain impression from our attitude that there is any lack of cohesion amongst us or that there is any way of splitting our intent loyally to serve our govt toward common end. I said we do not resort to bluffing our friends and they understand in turn it is futile to endeavor trick, bluff or blackmail us. I called upon Darma to testify to his chief that my word had always been found absolutely good by Indo and that I had never let this country down. Darma quickly agreed.

I said that with change in govt, and particularly as Indos move on MSA, my govt will expect me to report developments and my opinion thereof. I assured them my recommendations were regularly sought on all matters under consideration between our two govts and particularly on such questions as financial and econ aid, whether under ECA, Exim Bank or otherwise, export licenses, priorities, etc. I said overthrow Sukiman govt on pretext secret Subardjo-Cochran agreement had resulted in campaign of criticism against my govt and my Emb which was far from pleasant. I said my govt wld watch with interest to see whether this attitude continues or changes under new regime. I stated frankly that Mukarto’s public statements with respect desire build up relationships with Commie countries and criticism by Sumitro and other Ministers of alleged failure US give Indo helpful econ support naturally have attracted attention in my country. It will be my duty keep my govt informed as to what trends may follow in govt policy and public reaction thereto.

I asked Mukarto whether it was his impression following his return here that Indo genuinely wants MSA aid and that this is contributing to gen welfare of country. He replied affirmatively but said polit considerations made it necessary be cautious in regard to terms under which such aid cld be accepted. I reiterated US desire to help Indo in every appropriate and possible manner that may be found acceptable and may be appreciated by this country. I strongly denied however any desire on our part to press aid upon Indo which wld be unwelcome or embarrassing. Darma referred to some statement in book by Geo Kennan to effect US practiced patronizing policy toward Far Eastern countries. Darma said we understood Cong and Govt must defend taxpayers but that our attitude sometimes worried Asians. I said we took every possible precaution to recognize and respect sensibilities of this area.

I then asked precisely what steps Indo Govt intends to take if it is learned from Ali that US does not oppose approach towards substitution 511 (b) for (a) but reserves decision as to acceptability such change until US Govt may canvass various opinions in the premises and weigh pertinent factors that may obtain. I asked whether Wilopo Govt would defend 511 (b) type agreement before Parl. Mukarto stated he wld do his part. He thought Parl wld ratify 511 (b) agreement of Burmese type. I asked if there was any prospect of Pres Sukarno or VP Hatta making public statement appreciation US aid following example Nehru. Darma intervened to state I shld know their sentiments so well that such statement not necessary. I told him I had vouched personally for Indo sentiments over several years. I now thought it devolved upon Indo, particularly in light congressional legis and Indo attitude on Subardjo-Cochran agreement, to act and speak in such manner as to convince US that continuing aid is desired and warranted.

I asked what consideration if any was being given to seeking ratification basic agreements referred to in MSA exchange of types. Mukarto and Darma explained that whole question of what agreements and notes to be regularly submitted by FonOff for ratification was being studied urgently by Min of Justice and legal section FonOff. Upon pressing this point I found that Indos cld not say that they intended to seek ratification of basic agreements or of MSA assurances in whatever type latter might be formulated. They cld not tell me when definite legal opinion wld be given which wld control their acts.

After delivering letter on counterpart to Mukarto (Embtel 1622)³ I left FonOff at 10:15. Cabinet was to meet at that hour. Darma planned tell press FonMin had called me in to advise me formally of Cabinet decision on MSA.

From foregoing Dept shld understand Indo Govt wants retain MSA on cheapest terms obtainable. Thru direct informal approach to Wash they seek private assurances that can be worked locally into official statement to Parl that will safeguard Govt’s polit position. In meantime they will try get legal interpretation against submitting agreements for ratification that may cause them such polit difficulties as wld any arrangement involving US aid.

Before keeping this morning’s appt I learned positively that Mukarto has alleged to Cabinet members there is split among high State Dept officers on MSA question and that at least one thereof in addition to Decker of MSA⁴ encouraged Indos shift negots to Wash for 511 (b) amendment.

Resenting Indo tactics, I made certain pertinent and forceful statements above reported. If Indo genuinely wants any help from US it shld be up to Indo to approach US frankly and honorably with clear-cut proposal. I shld regret exceedingly to see Indos succeed in achieving their ends without committing themselves responsibly as required by US legis and internatl practice. I cannot stress too strongly unfortunate repercussions that will come if we naively permit new leftist govt trick or divide us. I confidently expect (see final para Embtel 1618)⁵ Dept’s support in maintaining firm front and obliging Indos think things over, make up their presently confused minds without unfairly asking us for prior commitments, and then approach us through this Emb for any revision that may be sought in existing valid MSA agreement.

Cochran

1. In telegram 1618, May 7, Ambassador Cochran reported to the Department that during a social gathering on May 6 the Foreign Minister had informally told him that the Indonesian Government could not accept the 511 (a) Agreement and would instruct Ambassador Ali in Washington to request substitution of a 511 (b) Agreement instead. He went on to say that he expected the Department to tell Ali that the MSA Agreement negotiations would be handled in Djakarta. (756D.5 MSP/5–752)
2. Jusuf Wibisono, former Minister of Finance.
3. Telegram 1622, May 8, transmitted the letter to the Embassy in Djakarta. The letter suggested possible Cabinet level review of a proposal put forward by the previous government in January 1952 for use of counterpart funds. (756D.5 MSP/5–852)
4. William M. Decker, Vice Consul at Surabaya.
5. See footnote 1, above.