Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.5 MSP/2–1252: Telegram

No. 187
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

secret
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Djakarta, February 12, 1952—4 p.m.

1174. Djuanda dropped by 8 a.m. today. Said special Cabinet mtg called for 9 a.m. to prepare new instrs for Yamin returning Hague, and to discuss MSA question. I reviewed with Djuanda my conversations of yesterday with Subardjo (Embtel 1165)¹ and discussed lines on which Djuanda cld most helpfully support Subardjo in Cabinet.

Recd 10 a.m. by Pres Sukarno, his request. He said Sukiman govt in trouble. Said this came in part from technical error of Subardjo in not consulting other members Cabinet particularly Defense Min Sewaka, and from Indo concern over Amer policy towards Indo.

I reviewed negots with Subardjo up to and incl delivery of ltr explaining visit of my mil officers to Ministry Def. Sukarno said Subardjo had shown him this yesterday eve. I told Pres I had taken up matter MSA assurances early in Dec and had only obtained action thereon shortly before deadline. I said my dealings had been directly with FonMin. I was aware he had consulted PriMin but did not know to what extent other Cabinet Ministers had been informed. I thought most unfortunate Subardjo shld now become victim internal polit attack. I said I had indicated willingness my govt make sufficient concessions in exchange of notes to meet reasonably Indo special position.

Pres then said great suspicion in Indo of Amer policy toward Indo. I said I was deeply conscious sentiment in Indo and had been unable thru my own efforts rectify it. I said I had frequently thought of various measures to suggest to my govt or to take on my own initiative. Among latter were speeches that might be made by myself or members my organization. Appreciating Indo’s tendency to doubt anything, however, that might smack of propaganda, I had refrained from public addresses. I thought Amer foreign policies made amply clear to world thru statements Pres, Secy State, USIS bulletins, etc.

Sukarno insisted something shld be done to improve relations. I reminded Pres this was birthday great Amer for whom he professed admiration. I thought on this anniversary of Lincoln we shld be very honest with each other. I said that since my return to Indo as first Amer Amb I had never heard one friendly reference in statement by any official of Indo Govt towards USA, which had been so importantly responsible for Indo achieving sovereignty and which had been one nation take leadership in aiding young sovereign state. I said I thought relations cld be much improved if one such statement cld now be made.

Pres said he cld name “weapon” which cld be used effectively against all misunderstanding. I said I assumed he meant public statement by US Govt favoring Indo position on Irian. He said that was it exactly. I said he shld know by reports from his dipl officers abroad and from his own FonMin that I have been criticized by more than one govt close to that of US for allegedly assuming unneutral attitude on Irian question and for inciting Indo to press claim therefor. I said this cld easily become matter of concern to my govt. I said I cld not go beyond certain line without violating responsibility imposed on me and without destroying trust in my judgment on part superior officers in Washington. Pres said he and Indo Govt entirely cognizant and most appreciative of friendship and support I have extended Indo from my first arrival. He said fault was, however, lack of clear official Amer policy toward Indo.

I said I hoped I cld clarify this a little by a few frank statements. I said we were appreciative of Indo desire to follow independent policy and we try in every way respect Indo position. I recalled, however, that my country had also become independent long before Indo. In my independent country Congress had right to determine how our tax payers’ money shld be spent and what conditions shld be prescribed therefor. I said we did not oblige or insist that anyone accept our aid. I said there were many demands thereon by our Allies in addition to keeping our own heavy program of production and defensive effort going. I said it wld be most unclear to my govt if in turn for support we have consistently given new Repub we shld be suspected of endeavoring undermine Indo’s independence. I said I had never once approached Indo Govt on question bases or Mutual Security Pact. I said my govt understood any initiation on Mutual Defense Pact must come from Indo side alone.

I recalled visit of Melby mission.² I said Pres himself had realized then great opportunity afforded Indo acquire sorely needed material. I recalled Pres had expressed to me his keen regret Natsir govt had not had temerity accept mil aid program. I said I aware now of actual needs Indo for foreign equip. With this knowledge I had worked with Subardjo toward getting assurances which wld permit any kind of aid. I thought it wld be ridiculous if Indo shld now think of withdrawing from those assurances in favor those under 511 (b) of MSA Act which wld cover only econ matters. I mentioned particularly embarrassment might come to Hatta and others if Indo wld now forfeit mil constabulary aid and details have to be made public of pact which Hatta and I consummated. Again I insisted that decision as to whether Indo wants any type Amer aid must rest entirely with Indo Govt.

I told Pres I regretted exceedingly FonMin Subardjo shld be suspected and maligned for consummating arrangement with me which was intended be mutually beneficial. I was sorry this country seemingly reluctant recognize any mutuality of interests. I said I had given much thought to what action I shld take if Subardjo shld be repudiated. I said I had returned to Indo last fall at my own request with purpose serving here long as I cld be helpful to Indo well as my own country. I said I had not to date met with success in protecting interests Amer private investors here. I said my motives in seeking mutual security assurances had been questioned. I said furthermore he appeared dissatisfied because failure my govt to go as far in support this position on NNG as he desired. I said in circumstances there is serious doubt whether I am serving either country satisfactorily by remaining here.

Sukarno said I had used strong words in our conversation. He wanted me to know how serious “hurt” wld be to Indo if my govt shld withdraw me. I said I did not know that this issue wld arise, but that while I am here only way he and I cld work together wld be thru frank exchange of views such as we had just had, with each recognizing that other represents truly sovereign and independent state.

Pres said he was next receiving Hatta. Asked if I wld be willing talk with Sewaka or other PIR Mins. I said I cld not properly appear before Cabinet but that if anyone in his govt wanted call at my home I wld be glad discuss frankly issue presently under consideration.³

Cochran

1. Document 184.
2. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 155 ff.

3. In telegram 1175, Ambassador Cochran reported on the following conversation held later on Feb. 12:

   “Djuanda came 3 p.m. Said Cabinet mtg lasted from 9 to 1:30 (ref Embtel 1174). He said Subardjo reviewed MSA negots and dealt particularly with his conversations of past three days with me and support I had given thru providing ltr on contact with Ministry Defense, and thru offering accept interpretative note on ‘free world’. Djuanda said in lengthy discussion which followed, Ministers became conscious of possibility if they caused fall govt on present issue they wld probably be succeeded by group from other parties which wld follow same policy as Sukiman govt. There was consequent tendency toward moderation with no one wanting precipitate govt collapse. Issue not solved but no further mention of resignation by Subardjo made. Agreed Cabinet members shld consult further with their respective parties and matter then be considered at next Cabinet mtg Friday or Sat [Feb. 1516].” (756D.5 MSP/2–1252)