Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.00/7–1654: Telegram

No. 172
The Chargé in Burma (Acly) to the Department of State¹

secret

Rangoon, July 16, 1954—5 p.m.

42. Before small “family” farewell luncheon for Ambassador July 14, Acting Foreign Minister Kyaw Nyein raised question arms procurement from US. Told Ambassador not thinking of gift but some arrangement enable “purchase arms at very reasonable price”. Obviously thinking of fiasco previous approach, said under impression US supporting policy of British maintain sphere of influence Burma. Added British promise anything but do not deliver.

He said agreement proposed by British representative [apparent omission] the Freeman–Letya Agreement made it clear British primary interest maintain “status quo and sphere influence” Burma. He thought we should have learned lesson supporting status quo Indochina and hoped would not repeat error Burma.

Ambassador reviewed briefly previous negotiations this matter and said Gore-Booth had told him GUB now receiving more arms some categories than wanted. Kyaw Nyein said thought not case.

Ambassador denied we backing British in sense suggested but said necessary coordinate supply arms throughout world. Said would look into matter on arrival Washington.

Comment: Changing situation SEA appears increase urgency real strengthening defensive position Burma. Believe attitude GUB toward Communism would assure use such strength in interests free world. Previous experience makes it clear British still wish use control arms supply as means exerting influence and that this important obstacle effective military aid. However, Burmese anti-colonial phobia and neutral policy would make it impossible GUB accept MSA commitments or any formal arrangement advice or training to overcome own general inefficiency. Therefore, believe following principles should govern any efforts on our part increase Burma’s strength:

(1) We cannot expect that matériel supplied will be used with full effectiveness according our standards;

(2) Increased supplies some categories arms and equipment would, however, improve Burma’s ability defend self;

(3) Wholehearted agreement of British or willingness disregard their wishes essential prerequisite any effective steps by US.

Acly

1. Repeated to London.