Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.00/7–1354: Telegram

No. 171
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

secret

Rangoon, July 13, 1954—2 p.m.

31. Following summarizes [name deleted] remarks during my farewell call.

1. GUB has no illusions re permanency Chou–Nu statement² but believes declaration of principles will give Burma several years reprieve from CPR aggression. GUB will utilize statement as internal propaganda weapon against Burmese Communist insurgents, proving they do not have support CPR. [Name deleted] believes political demoralization insurgents will result, facilitating military destruction.

2. U Nu told Chou flatly CUG does not trust CPR and believes latter attempting undermine GUB. Also told Nehru GUB suspicious CPR, with result latter warned Chou small countries fear motives CPR.

3. In two years time GUB planning through national service train 200,000 men and women yearly, strengthening backbone Burmese people. Economic service similar that practiced Israel, and democratic indoctrination will be part national service scheme. Hope eventually thereby instill “real hatred Communism” especially against aggressive Chinese.

4. GUB will not join SEATO but will adopt benevolent neutral attitude. Comment: He felt GUB must not get too far ahead Burmese public opinion which still thinking in terms colonialism.

5. GUB has confidentially promised Thais full support their appeal to UN.³ Comment: [name deleted] said frankly “We might find ourselves in same position before too long”.

6. GUB proposed visit of King of Cambodia “whether CPR likes it or not”.

7. Expressed hope US leaders would not “embarrass GUB by public associating Burma with American policies” as local considerations make it inexpedient GUB publicly become too friendly with west at this time.

Comment: In lengthy, surprisingly frank conversations with Burmese leaders during past week, it apparent they fighting communism their own manner and methods as have done during past five years. They presently wish from US nothing more than sympathetic understanding their situation and problems. They seeking respite several years for liquidation insurgency, continuing development economy, social reforms, raising standard of living. May require IBRD loan such projects as hydroelectric development and hope US would give sympathetic support their application. Leaders have voluntarily told me free American aid would not be welcome nor accepted under present conditions. They believe it almost inevitable Burma will eventually become target for Chinese aggression but do not at this time fear internal subversion, which believe can handle without too much difficulty. They convinced external aggression, barring world war, will not come until CPR fully integrated, best guess about five years hence. President Ba U and Prime Minister during past three days have separately told me US need not worry Burma when chips are down. In any event GUB would resist aggression of any kind with whatever power at their disposal. Prime Minister said “We would fight against any invasion but would appeal UN which we believe would come our assistance”.

Sebald

1. Repeated by the Department to Geneva for the U.S. Delegation at the Geneva Conference.
2. Chou En-lai visited Burma June 28–30 after a visit in New Delhi on his way back to Peking from the Geneva Conference. The statement under reference, issued by Chou and Nu on June 29, declared that mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence should be the principles of the relationship between China and Burma. The text of the statement is in Documents on International Affairs, 1954 (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1957).
3. Reference is to Thailand’s request to the General Assembly for the dispatch of observers under the Peace Observation Commission because of the Thai Government’s concern that fighting in Indochina might spread into Thai territory; for documentation, see vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 1630 ff.