Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 154
Prime Minister Nu to President Eisenhower1
My Dear Mr. President: The American Ambassador has recently seen the Foreign Minister2 and has given him a résumé of the reaction in the USA to the situation that has developed in connection with the Kuomintang troops in Burma. On our part we would like to keep you informed of the real situation in order that you will have a correct perspective.
It has distressed us to learn that one reaction in America in regard to the offensive the Burmese Army has taken against these troops, is that the Burmese position among the United Nations might be impaired. Such talk began, as we expected, in Formosa and we do not pay much attention to what emanates there. But when the Premier of a country adjacent to Burma, and friendly to Formosa echoes these sentiments we begin to wonder if it is the beginning [Page 211] of a campaign of malice inspired by interested parties. In the USA such interested parties may have resorted to tactics which would give the impression that Burmese behaviour in regard to these troops has become unreasonable but we do hope that the US Government does not share these views.
It will be realised that the Burmese have given ample time and opportunity for these troops to evacuate. Negotiations have been protracted and tedious. They have been living on the land and committing atrocities for the past four years. Despite promise after promise of evacuation they did nothing until the approach of the seventh Assembly of the United Nations. And even that limited evacuation was farcical in that no arms were surrendered. When the Burmese threatened military action they were told to hold their hand not to disturb the flow of evacuation and the chances of a peaceful settlement. Concession after concession has been afforded to these people. They have been even allowed to take away their arms, but on their part they have not kept to their promises. With a show of evacuation they have consolidated their position in Burma joining openly with subversive elements and taking every possible step to make their stay permanent.
Even if they have thoughts of going they apparently desire to do so at their convenience. In the meantime public opinion in Burma has become more violent and an army that was poised for action had to be held back for a long time. After all, the Chinese troops have been here for four years and the Burmese could not but feel that they would have to dislodge them by force of arms since a negotiated evacuation has proved ineffective. And so after mature deliberation we acceded for the last time for a cease fire to remain effective till March the 15th, 1954, in respect of certain areas and March the 31st in respect of one area which would be the gateway out of Burma, if these troops really mean to go.
We are alive to the danger that this offensive might be taken as an excuse by the authorities at Formosa to break off the evacuation proceedings but in launching the offensive we had to risk such an outcome. In any event we have been repeatedly told and we have no illusions that some at least of the Generals and their followers would not leave. This being the case, at some stage there would have to be a resort to arms and this is being done while it is still possible before the rains set in.
The action of the Burmese army, for the present is a limited one meant solely to persuade these unwanted people into the safety zones where it is hoped that they will see reason and leave this country. The offensive has been instrumental in keeping up a steady flow of evacuation for the past few days even if the ratio of arms taken out is so ridiculously small. In leaving Burma and in [Page 212] abandoning a senseless adventure they do so with bad grace and as a final and unfriendly act they dispose of their arms to the Karen rebels, and this is an added reason why the Burmese feel that their departure must be hastened. I might add that even this phase of negotiated evacuation is about to end solely for the reason that the number meant to be evacuated has been reached, and there is no likelihood that those still left would leave of their own accord, and hence our resort to military action.
These remarks, I hope, will give you a clear picture of the position prevailing. We find it difficult to understand how an action in defence of our security and one meant to afford relief to our nationals can justify an unfavorable reaction against us, unless of course it is maliciously inspired and deliberately fostered. The whole world knows of the patience and tolerance that the Burmese have displayed and we do hope that at least the Government of the USA will understand our action, and that they will continue to give us their sympathy and help.
We do not doubt for a moment that the Government of the USA desires to bring about a maximum evacuation of these troops even if there are influential sections of the American public who in their abhorrence of communism can forgive anything that proclaims to be anti-communist. We can appreciate that there would be many who would look upon the people of Formosa as a likely spearhead for a return to the mainland of China, and if in that belief, aid and succour is given to them, we have no right to protest. But we deplore the fact that the authorities at Formosa are permitted to commit aggression in this country under the guise, so blatantly false, that they are crusaders against the menace of communism in the East.
Our request is that the USA would continue to exert the utmost pressure on Formosa. It is lamentable that even up to now no person in authority in Formosa has thought it fit to recall them publicly and to make them understand that they are pursuing a course which has brought not only discredit to Formosa but which has also embarrassed her friends.
It will be ungrateful of the Burmese if they forget that the USA has rendered great help in the matter and if further assurance of our gratitude is necessary I take the opportunity of expressing it once again on behalf of the people of Burma.
I remain,
Yours sincerely,
- This letter was handed to Assistant Secretary Robertson by Ambassador Barrington. A copy is filed with a memorandum from Secretary Dulles to the President. (690B.9321/4–554)↩
- See Document 151.↩