Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/12–1753: Telegram

No. 136
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Rangoon, December 17, 1953—1 p.m.

581. Taipei’s 349.² I am certain Department realizes that Chinese Government makes no commitment in reference telegram and that experience has proven that any large scale commitment by jungle generals is worthless. Should this proposal be seriously urged upon GUB it is certain that some embarrassing questions will have to be answered. They might well ask:

1. “Why has hard core not been evacuated although presumably under greatest control by Chinese Government?”

2. “Why have arms not been surrendered?”

3. “Why have troops failed turn over all or some of 6 bases?”

4. “Why has no concrete action been taken during latest extension cease fire?”

I also hope Department will not overlook inescapable fact that US integrity and good will are mortgaged up to hilt in this matter. In consequence each time we urge Burmese to course of action which does not pay off we lessen probability Burma will continue its orientation toward free world. I need hardly repeat that KMT problem in Burmese eyes has always been one which only Chinese Nationalist Government can solve. Idea that latest proposal originates in MND of Chinese Government and is advocated by Foreign Minister appears support Burmese contention.

Burmese are essentially simple and inexperienced people but should they suspect that they are being victimized they could irrespective of consequences I believe make volte-face to redeem themselves in their own conscience. In present situation new direction could only lead toward Communist bloc.

For above reasons I am reluctant use forceful approach (Deptel 521)³ as to do so places US in position urging courses of action which GUB would interpret as accomplishing following Chinese objectives: (a) To prolong cease fire until end of dry season (my telegram 558)⁴ and (b) to assure safe passage hard core troops and equipment moving southward to join Karen rebels (my telegram 579).⁵ I am deeply apprehensive that if US lends support to this gambit by urging acceptance latest proposal and Chinese again fail produce results effects on our relations with Burma would be disastrous.

I, therefore, recommend following course of action:

1. Chinese Government make its proposal directly to GUB, to this end using Embassies Taipei and Rangoon as communications channel but that GUB be allowed make its own decisions without pressure from US Government.

2. Concomitant with above if affirmative response GUB be urged rejoin joint committee (Bangkok 1222)⁶ for formulation plans but that care be taken prevent recurrence frustrating delays which occurred prior to “first phase” evacuation.

3. That notwithstanding US Government commitment by UN resolution assist solving problem, care be taken US not be in position endorsing good faith of jungle generals.

My telegram 574.⁷ Comment was predicated on optimism conveyed Taipei’s 328, 334, 337, 340, 343 (last sentence)⁸ which collectively gave distinct impression further evacuation from Monghsat area imminent. Reference telegram concerns entirely new proposal which negates premise previous optimism.

Sebald

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.
2. Supra.
3. Dated Dec. 15; the Embassy was requested to put the problem as forcefully as possible to the Burmese Government for a decision whether it would accept the Chinese proposition. (690B.9321/12–1453)
4. Dated Dec. 8; Sebald stated that the Burmese would probably consider any new request to prolong the ceasefire as evidence that the Chinese were delaying the evacuation until the monsoon made military operations impossible. (690B.9321/12853)
5. Dated Dec. 16; the Embassy reported that it had learned of the construction of a 4,000-foot airstrip near Mawkhi, in an area which was largely Karen-occupied and into which, according to previous reports, Chinese troops from the Shan states had been moving. (690B.9321/12–1653)
6. Dated Dec. 16; it reported that Thailand insisted that, if there was to be any further evacuation, the Joint Military Committee would have to agree upon a new evacuation plan. (690B.9321/12–1653)
7. Dated Dec. 14; it reported that the Burmese Government had extended the ceasefire through Dec. 21 and commented, “This appears propitious occasion for handling KMT problem with broad strokes.” (690B.9321/12–1453)
8. For text of telegram 328, see Document 132; the other telegrams are not printed.