Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/12–1553: Telegram

No. 135
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Taipei, December 15, 1953—5 p.m.

349. Re Embtel to Department 344 repeated Bangkok 80, Rangoon 76.² Foreign Minister showed Jones this morning copy of telegram received from General Liu Yuen-ling from Monghsat dated December 13 requesting that jungle generals be given one month for preparation so that next phase of evacuation may begin latter part of January. Program would be designed to remove 150 soldiers per day as reported reference telegram. When two-thirds of evacuees scheduled for first month had been processed committee would be informed number ready for second month evacuation.

General Liu pointed out in telegram that it would take nearly two months for troops to walk in from north and south locations which was reason for delay.

(Note: Military Attaché here who is familiar with territory reports it is approximately 800 miles by foot through rugged country from guerrillas stronghold in north at Myitkyina to Chiengmai but points out there are good airfields at both Bhamo and Myitkyina. Foreign Minister has requested Ministry of National Defense to explore possibility of evacuation by air.)

Total target number of evacuees in new phase not yet possible to ascertain but General Pao Li of Ministry of National Defense who was present at conference with Foreign Minister informed Jones MND estimated 3 to 4 thousand men.

In this connection General Pao requested that Burmese cease-fire be extended to all points and not limited to specified corridors to permit travel of evacuees from all directions. He said if Burmese would refrain from military action for three months he believed most of remaining foreign forces could be brought out.

In explaining sudden change by jungle generals Foreign Minister said this resulted from two developments (a) personal appeal by Generalissimo, (b) generals in favor of evacuation now for first time have upper hand.

Jones repeated points made in reference telegram and stressed necessity for more immediate evidence of good faith. He raised question as to whether there were not still troops in vicinity of Monghsat who could be evacuated this month. Foreign Minister and General Pao agreed that effort in this direction could be made but emphasized necessity of continuing basic headquarters organization as reception center for new arrivals.

Two points remain to be settled before plans can be finalized. (1) Assurance that funds will be made available to meet obligations incurred by foreign forces in Burma as outlined reference telegram³ and (2) question of arms. Each soldier regards his rifle as his own personal property and wants assurance he can bring it to Formosa with him, General Pao said. Jones pointed out difficulties involved in this and said it was a matter to be determined by the joint committee in Bangkok.

Foreign Minister was more optimistic than ever as to possibility for obtaining genuine settlement problem foreign forces in Burma but emphasized repeatedly importance of cooperation and patience on part of Burmese Government. We have strong assurance that no delaying tactics involved, that genuine cooperation appeared to be forthcoming from Monghsat headquarters.

Rankin

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Rangoon.
2. Telegram 344, Dec. 15, reported that Yeh told Jones that the generals in Burma and the Defense Ministry were working on a plan to evacuate 150 men daily to a total of 2,000 a month but that the difficulties involved might prevent the schedule from taking effect until January. Jones cautioned against delay, stressing the importance of prompt action to demonstrate Chinese good faith. (690B.9321/12–1553)
3. Reference is presumably to telegram 343 from Taipei, Dec. 14, which reported Yeh’s request that the United States consider providing a minimum of $200,000 to the Joint Military Committee to assist in meeting the obligations of the evacuees. Yeh considered this plan preferable to the small bonus payments previously contemplated and thought it would greatly enhance the evacuation, since the troops owed debts to the local tribesmen who would be aroused if the men were to leave without paying them. (690B.9321/12–1453)