790B.5/9–2853: Telegram
No. 105
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State1
287. Deptel 209.2 Study of London’s 11663 emphasizes fundamental difference between present British approach and that which appears from this vantage point demanded by both American and British policy objectives in this formerly colonial area. Entire concept of spheres influence reminiscent of gunboat diplomacy and implies tutelary paternalism of colonial power. Resentment of continued British attempt wield such power is at heart of present BSM problem and at same time in direct proportion to our support such British attitude it will undermine US political and strategic interest here.
Essential clarify two apparent misconceptions reference telegram. We believe: (a) Ward has not been able revitalize BSM and BSM is not now operating with increased support; (b) GUB is firmly in the saddle and though majority of political leaders are indeed “neutralists” they are noticeably less suspicious Western objectives than is general rule among Arab-Asian group.
It is, of course, not in our interest to weaken prestige of British in Burma nor replace them in position of proctorship. On contrary, from our point of view, it is most regrettable that British have exhausted their once ample reservoir of prestige in Burma through their propensity to use their preferred position as lever with which to exercise measure of control over these highly nationalistic people. British do not appear realize active resentment caused by this practice nor associate it with Burmese firm intention terminate BSM in present form.
If this resentment were directed solely against British, it would not concern us so much but UK and US are so closely associated in Burma that feelings against British also affect their attitude toward us especially when we appear connive in effort continue British control.
We agree that some Burmese requests are unrealistic and that effort should be made discourage purchase of expensive equipment which they cannot effectively use. We believe, however, that this can be done without compulsion and that final controlling factor [Page 150] should be Burmese shortage of foreign exchange rather than outright refusal to sell.
My service attachés are satisfied that Burmese armed forces could effectively use much more equipment and supplies than British are allowing them have and it is our opinion that strengthening these forces would add to defensive capacity of free world. We believe in capacity present government maintain itself in power and are convinced that recognition of equality implicit in granting to Burma final say as to nature and amounts of equipment to be purchased would increase observable sympathy for West and that added ability liquidate Communist insurgents which increased purchases would presumably entail would enhance security this strategic area.
Question whether arms are supplied by UK or US is not as important as whether they are to be supplied at all. It, therefore, appears that we should first seek convince British of wisdom of substantial increase in supplies. We agree that intimate discussion of this problem with British is essential and that agreement should be reached as to items on pending list to be supplied by respective governments. We do not believe GUB would agree participate in tripartite discussions. Fact that GUB has approached US on this matter under clear provision of American law and that request could be refused only for apparent reason that we supporting British coercive policies should be kept in mind in determining extent our participation.
We should bear in mind that first approach for arms assistance in instant case was not made by US but by Burma. As previously pointed out, basis this action was deep-seated smouldering dissatisfaction by Burma with British procurement policy which was implemented in such manner as to result in interference with internal affairs of Burma. By lending ourselves to continuation this state of affairs, we gratuitously offend Burma’s aspirations for freedom of action, lend credence to charges of American support for colonial practices by metropolitan powers and discard opportunity demonstrate avowed American desire assist free Asian countries maintain their freedom in face Communist pressures.
While we unable comment whether US as leading world power should or should not take on added burdens, we believe Burma, as well as other free nation in face Communist menace, is already inescapably burden of US. It does not appear to us, however, that reimbursable arms procurement in relatively modest proportions requested by Burma adds and/or appreciably changes that burden. On contrary, strengthening of Burmese defense forces by US sale of sorely needed equipment would seem to us be on positive side of ledger.
[Page 151]Notwithstanding doubts expressed by British Foreign Office re Burmese reliability in case of need, we are convinced Burma would fight against any aggressor in endeavor maintain its independence. Further, such doubts if well founded can only be dispelled and Burma’s pro-Western orientation strengthened by sympathetic assistance, understanding and reasonable response to Burma’s problems and needs. It is precisely in matter of arms procurement where US can demonstrate its desire see Burma free strong and sovereign.
Problem, therefore, appears to us to be one of coordinated assistance by UK and US with foregoing considerations as objective. Solution, it seems, is not to be found in one or other of two powers taking sole responsibility even if that were possible or necessary but rather in approaching Burma’s needs from viewpoint of its potential contribution to the cause of free world.
- Repeated to London.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 100.↩
- Document 100.↩