790B.5/9–1753: Telegram
No. 100
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Aldrich) to the Department of State
1166. Rangoon’s 178, August 27 to Department. In recent conversations at Foreign Office Embassy has, without elaborating on US policy, endeavored probe British thinking on arms procurement for Burma. Foreign Office seems hold to view that Ward has been able revitalize BSM and that it now operating fairly smoothly and effectively, with increasing support of Burmese military. Foreign Office has often mentioned impractical nature some of Burmese requisitions with emphasis on jet aircraft and tanks at expense equipment [Page 142] for highly mobile infantry capable of out-fighting and out-maneuvering rebels in guerrilla warfare. Doubtless there is some resentment over existence of substantial Burmese holdings in foreign exchange due to Burmese refusal to settle financial obligations to British.
UK believes it to our interest as well as theirs to attempt so far as practicable deter Burmese from squandering their exchange on gadgets and concentrate on building up military machine consonant with their needs. Although concerned over failure GUB respond more frankly to British overtures for extension BSM agreement, Foreign Office has received interim reply which “not too discouraging” and which is now being studied. Foreign Office aware Burmese, in avoiding precise stand on renewal BSM agreement, may be exploring other possible sources military training and equipment and attempting play off UK against US and perhaps other nations.
Foreign Office appears to feel that GUB not too firmly in saddle, that control by pro-Western elements is somewhat precarious, and that majority of politicians are “neutralists” and suspicious Western intentions. They question whether it would be helpful supply present administration with expensive equipment which Burmese do not need, which they cannot adequately maintain, and the purchase of which would deplete their foreign exchange which could be put to better use. If present administration overthrown, they fear equipment supplied would not be used in Western interests.
Embassy assumes Department will wish prior intimate discussion this problem with UK before reached decision supply training and equipment to Burma. However tactful US approach, British bound resent US participation and competition in field heretofore largely monopolized by UK. British tend regard Burma as one of few remaining spheres of interest in SEA, and they might feel US attempting ease them out of picture. Perhaps, solution would be for GUB, US, and UK consult jointly with view working out acceptable minor role for US to play—e.g., furnish GUB at cost price and with British acquiescence, limited quantity matériel of which UK in short supply and which three participants agree would be useful and desirable.
This situation raises fundamental question for US policy. British are still willing and even anxious to carry principal responsibility for arming some countries such as Burma and certain Arab States. They feel, however, that US world power and prestige are now too overwhelming that in order for them successfully to carry out this responsibility we must clearly indicate, and support by our actions, that we consider British have primary responsibility and that we are not to be played off against them. Once we start to play active [Page 143] and independent role in giving military assistance to a country, we undermine already sadly depleted British prestige to point that British no longer able to carry effectively significant share of burden. Any such development, in Embassy opinion, would be short-sighted and not in best interests of US. Far better results, with less cost and minimum political responsibility, could be gained through exercise our influence indirectly through or in junior partnership with British in such areas as Burma. This follows not only from possibility obtaining independent contribution British resources in such cases, but also from greater acceptability policies backed by joint US–UK sponsorship and from reassurance against fear of domination, which is inescapable element in relation less developed areas to largest world power center.
We assume this consideration obtaining maximum US policy results with economy in direct commitment US resources especially relevant under current conditions of budgetary pressure and heavy burdens required by present US obligations, creating presumption against additional commitments, and that we would, therefore, welcome opportunity of encouraging British to retain primary responsibility in such countries as Burma. Our policies toward and relations with British regarding these countries must then be very different from those toward Greece and Turkey, for example.
We fully realize that this situation poses unusually difficult problems for US missions who, despite fact that they are representing greatest power center in free world and in face of local desires for more intimate and direct relationship with US, must to some extent play second fiddle to less powerful nations. This means resisting the temptation, for example, to supply unilaterally arms to Iraq as suggested at recent RECNE Cairo meeting (bottom of page 3 and top of page 4, minutes of meeting).1 Despite difficulties this situation, Embassy is convinced we must accept it if we are effectively to take advantage of and not undermine remaining British strength and prestige and to avoid further expansion direct US commitments and responsibilities.
Would appreciate Department’s comments and guidance in light above on line we should take in further discussions with Foreign Office on Burma.
Department repeat as desired.2
- Reference is to the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Cairo, Aug. 28–29; see vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 413–416. The minutes of the meetings are not printed.↩
- Repeated as telegram 209 to Rangoon, Sept. 22, with a request for comments. (790B.5/9–1753)↩