Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141

United States Minutes of the First Plenary Session of the United States-French Political Talks¹

[Extract]

²

secret
FPT MIN-2

Washington, March 26, 1953—3:30 p.m.

Coordination of Action in Southeast Asia [FPT Agenda 1, item B]³—Turning to the second item on the agenda for the meeting, Mr. Mayer posed the following two questions: (1) What course of action would the U.S. follow should the Chinese Communists begin aggressive action in Tonkin? (2) What would happen in Indochina if it appeared that an armistice were reached in Korea? He asked Mr. Letourneau to amplify both questions.

With respect to the first question, Mr. Letourneau said that several military conferences had been held on this subject in Singapore and Washington but certain questions still remained unanswered. For example, what could be expected in the way of aid in case of Chinese aggression if it became necessary to save the maximum number of troops? This was particularly important since the best French troops were in the Tonkin area and therefore outside help would be necessary to evacuate them, either by sea or air. Mr. Letourneau said that he still had no idea what could be expected from the U.S. should such an aggression take place. Another point which was still unanswered was what would be done if it were considered possible to defend the Tonkin area. Elaborating on the second question, Mr. Letourneau asked what would happen if the U.N. reached an agreement with the Chinese and North Koreans which, by releasing troops from Korea, increased the risk in Indochina.

Secretary Dulles replied that he would attempt to answer Mr. Mayer’s second question and would ask Mr. Nash to handle the first question. Referring to his earlier statement that a Chinese Communist attack in Indochina seemed unlikely, Secretary Dulles explained that he believed that such an aggression would not take place since the Communists recognized that such an action would induce much more serious consequences than any gain which they might obtain in Indochina. He pointed out that the action of President Eisenhower in ending the mandate over the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on the Chinese mainland opened large vistas of trouble—by sea and air operations—against the Mainland. Furthermore, the tenor of the President’s State of the Union Address⁴ and the general attitude of the present Administration made it unlikely that the Chinese Communists would undertake any foolhardy action which entailed such tremendous military risks.

Answering the first question posed by Mr. Mayer, Mr. Nash said that there had been several military discussions—the first in February 1952—but that full agreement had not yet been reached on precise courses of action. However, considerable progress was being made on courses of action, and at the recent five-power meeting between the U.S.-U.K.–France-New Zealand-Australia, it was agreed that further talks should take place on the subject of implementation. As a result of this decision, Admiral Radford had issued an invitation to the other powers to meet for a conference at Pearl Harbor on April 6th to discuss intelligence matters, communications, and national plans, as far as practicable. Invitations had been accepted by all the powers except France who, it was understood, felt that it would be more desirable to hold the conference in Saigon. The U.S. position had been that if Saigon were selected, considerable pressure would be exerted by nearby countries to join the conference.

As to the question of evacuation in case the Chinese Communists should invade the Tonkin area, Mr. Nash recalled that the one point upon which agreement had been reached in the February 1952 talks was on the question of improving the port at Haiphong in order to insure prompt evacuation of French troops if that were necessary. More recently, the port, improvements had been going forward for a more dynamic purpose—to provide a more expeditious method of unloading the end-item equipment in Indochina to aid General Trapnell⁵ in his MAAG functions.

Mr. Letourneau replied that he quite agreed with Mr. Nash that it was preferable to hold the next military meeting in Pearl Harbor rather than Saigon. The earlier point at issue was not the French insistence upon Saigon as a conference site but rather the uncertainty that the Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, General Salan, would be able to leave Indochina to attend the meeting. Recently it had been learned from Admiral Radford that another representative might attend the meeting in General Salan’s place and, therefore, Mr. Letourneau was able to state that France had agreed to the April 6th meeting.

Secretary Dulles, referring back to the question of the effect on Indochina of an armistice agreement in Korea, stated that such an agreement did not appear likely. He said that if an armistice in Korea did occur, and if such an armistice were used as an excuse by the Chinese Communists to transport troops from Korea into Indochina, the U.S., as a member of the U.N., would consider that such action made peace impossible and that such an armistice would automatically have failed. Mr. Mayer replied that he was happy to receive this assurance. Secretary Dulles concluded the discussion of Southeast Asia by recalling that President Eisenhower, in his State of the Union Address, had coupled the war in Korea with that in Indochina and Malaya—as part of the same struggle.

1. A French delegation, headed by Prime Minister Rene Mayer, whose cabinet had succeeded Pinay’s in December 1952, was in Washington, Mar. 25–28, for conversations with U.S. Government officials. For additional documentation on these talks, see volume vi, and vol. xiii, Part 1, pp. 423 ff.
2. A list of 68 persons present is part of the omitted material. Besides Mayer, leaders of the French delegation included Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of Finance; and Letourneau. American participants included Dulles; George Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; Stassen; and Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Ambassador Tran Van Kha of the State of Vietnam and Ambassador Nong Kimny of Cambodia also attended.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. For pertinent excerpts from Eisenhower’s message to the Congress of Feb. 2, 1953, see Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. I, p. 61.
5. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Chief of MAAG in Saigon from August 1952.