790.5/9–452
The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of
State
top secret
Washington, September 4, 1952.
Dear Mr. Secretary: There is inclosed a draft
message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCPAC which is, in effect, a directive concerning the
forthcoming initial meeting of the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council, tentatively scheduled to be
held 22 September 1952.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing information received from CINCPAC (msg
DTG 090332Z, Aug 52, attached as Appendix
“B”)1 with respect to his understanding of the
responsibilities of the Military Representatives accredited to the ANZUS Council, believe that Admiral Radford
interprets the agreed terms of reference of the Military Representatives and
the understandings reached at the initial meeting of the ANZUS Council as committing the United States
to an arrangement under which the Military Representatives would engage in
the joint development of military plans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider
that such a view exceeds the intent and purpose of the machinery for
military consultation in support of the ANZUS Council, as expressed in the approved State-Defense
negotiating paper on this subject. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have prepared a proposed message for dispatch to CINCPAC amplifying the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(Attached Appendix “A”)
[Page 217]
Your concurrence or comments with reference to possible political
connotations concerning the subject draft message to CINCPAC would be appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Appendix “A”
top secret
Washington, September 4, 1952.
Draft Message From the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Commander in Chief Pacific (Radford)
- 1.
- There is no change in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
reflected in the State-Defense negotiating paper which was accepted
by Australia and New Zealand during the ANZUS Council Meetings. As indicated in their
memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated 30 July 19522 (copy of which was
furnished you by Chief of Naval Operations), the Military
Representatives should not be regarded as constituting an
organization for the development of combined regional military
plans. No action should be taken which might lead to even a limited
Combined Chiefs of Staff organization for the Southwest Pacific. The
organization developed should not serve as a basis by which pressure
could be exerted to commit the United States to a military effort
which is disproportionate to its over-all responsibilities and
commitments. There should be no tendency to reduce without
compensating military advantage, United States military freedom of
action or to give Australia and New Zealand the power of veto over
the type and scope of plans evolved. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff prefer that the Military Representatives function in a
consultative arrangement which will assist them to consider and make
recommendations to their respective Chiefs of Staff on the measures
which might be taken to increase mutual assistance and self-help
looking to the improvement of the defense of Australia and New
Zealand and their territories as related to the over-all strategic
defense of the Pacific.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in the event of general war
the primary strategic responsibility for the Pacific—other than
defense in a local sense of the territories and waters of certain
nations—inevitably must rest with the United States, as was the case
during World War II. In view of the foregoing considerations, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree that the Military
Representatives
[Page 218]
should
enter into any arrangement under which Australia and New Zealand
might expect to have an equal voice with the United States in the
preparation of a combined plan. Neither should there be established
an organization or organizations subsidiary to or supporting the
Military Representatives and charged with the preparation of such a
plan.
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with your understanding that
planning information will be exchanged. This information must be on
a broad basis and confined to that which is necessary to insure that
individual national plans developed in connection with the defense
of Southeast Asia provide for an appropriate degree of coordination,
and to insure the exploration of ways and means of increasing the
mutual effectiveness of the defensive effort of these countries in
the Southwest Pacific. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that
the Military Representatives, after consultation among themselves,
will submit to their respective Chiefs of Staff recommendations on
possible courses of action in the event of further Communist
aggression in Southeast Asia short of general emergency. The
consultative relationship of the Military Representatives should
lead only to the development of national plans which are so
coordinated that they serve to increase the mutual assistance and
self-help of the nations signatory to the ANZUS Treaty. Although planning information may be
exchanged by the Military Representatives the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have established a general policy that United States plans shall not
be given to any foreigner nor should any foreigner participate
directly in development of United States plans. This policy would
also apply to the Military Representatives of Australia and New
Zealand.
