790.5/9–252
The British Embassy to the Department of State1
secret and personal
Text of a Message From Mr. Eden to Mr. Acheson
I am grateful for the full information about the proceedings of the ANZUS Council meeting which the United States Government have supplied.
- 2.
- I note that the question of United Kingdom association with the Council and the Military Committee was fully discussed and that it was considered that the difficulties involved would outweigh the advantages. This decision was apparently based on the argument that if the United Kingdom were admitted to a special form of association with the Council or the Military Committee other Governments particularly France, would claim, and have to be granted, a special status; and that the association of the United Kingdom alone would cause dissatisfaction to other Governments in the area.
- 3.
- I fear that I cannot accept the validity of these arguments which betray a misunderstanding of the grounds for the United Kingdom’s claim to be represented on the Organisation.
- 4.
- I admit that if the United Kingdom claim were merely based on the strength of British interests in Malaya and South East Asia generally, the French and the Dutch might put forward similar claims for consideration. I am also well aware of the special relationships between the United States on the one hand and the Philippines and Japan on the other.
- 5.
- I must, however, repeat with emphasis that the United Kingdom relationship with Australia and New Zealand is in a quite different category. In particular on the military side the strategic thinking and planning of the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries is based on the closest liaison with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. Australia and New Zealand are both immediately concerned in the defense of the Middle East and of Singapore and Malaya, which remain nevertheless primarily United Kingdom responsibilities. The defense in war of the ANZAM region—which includes Malaya and the South Pacific up to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and Fiji—is the responsibility of the Australian Chiefs of Staff [Page 214] acting jointly with the United Kingdom and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. Above all, if either Australia or New Zealand is attacked, the United Kingdom will at once and without question be at war with the aggressor; this is not the case as regards France, Holland, the Philippines or any other country. This last consideration outweighs all the others and is, in my view, quite conclusive.
- 6.
- It will, I am afraid, be extremely difficult for me to explain in Parliament the exclusion of the United Kingdom from both the ANZUS Council and the Military Committee. I understand that the Council agreed to keep the question of United Kingdom representation under review. I do not suggest that a further meeting of the Council should be called in the near future specifically to reconsider this question; I should hope instead that in the light of the above considerations you would find it possible to review the matter in consultation with Mr. Casey and Mr. Webb, to whom I am sending copies of this message, and that it could be arranged for a United Kingdom representative to attend the forthcoming meeting of the ANZUS Military Committee.2
Washington, 2nd September
1952.
- Note handed the Secretary of State by Sir Oliver Franks the evening of Sept. 2.↩
- In a memorandum of Sept. 3 Kitchen wrote: “the Secretary told me this morning that in handing the message to the Secretary Sir Oliver remarked that Mr. Eden felt very strongly in this matter and that Sir Oliver had nothing to add himself. The Secretary explained the various reasons why all three of the ANZUS countries had reached the decision not to invite the U.K. to participate in ANZUS and pointed out that in practice the British would be very well informed from the standpoint of military planning because of: (1) the forthcoming joint talks regarding the defense of Southeast Asia, and (2) U.K. participation in the Defense Council at Melbourne.” (790.5/9–352)↩