Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 115
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Foster) to the Secretary of State
Subject:
- ANZUS Council Meeting: U.K. Observer Problem
Mr. Meloy has informed us that you noted in connection with the background section of the paper (D–3/1) on the U.K. observer problem1 that there has apparently been a change in our position since April 1951 when “the British were told that if as a result of discussions with Australia and New Zealand it seemed desirable for the U.K. to participate in an observer or consultant capacity the U.S. would have no objection”.2
Our position today is certainly a different one, but I believe the explanation lies in the fact that the statement to the British in April 1951 was made in a different context and without regard to considerations which have subsequently become apparent to us.
At the time the original statement was made to the British, we had been discussing with them various alternative arrangements, including a proposed pact which would include the Philippines as well as Australia and New Zealand. The British were opposed to this and it was partly their opposition which decided us to go for the ANZUS Treaty.
Since April 1951 it has become increasingly evident that the participation of the U.K. in the ANZUS Council in an observer or consultant capacity would open us to pressures from other countries of the western Pacific who would claim the same right to participation. As you know, there has been some excitement in Manila over the ANZUS Treaty. Again, on July 24 the Counselor of the Korean Embassy asked Mr. Johnson of FE whether Korea might be permitted to send an observer and whether any governments were sending observers to Honolulu.
Meanwhile the Department of Defense has registered its misgivings about the attendance of a U.K. observer. Whatever the merits of its position, Defense fears that the participation of the U.K. in the ANZUS Council would lead toward the sort of military involvements—Combined Chiefs of Staff and that sort of thing—which the JCS are so strongly opposed to.
[Page 160]It might be possible to persuade the JCS to withdraw their opposition to a U.K. observer but I believe it is generally felt in the Department that the other consideration (pressures from the Filipinos and others) is of itself sufficient to justify us in opposing the attendance of a U.K. observer, at least at this stage.