Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/12–354

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] December 3, 1954.

I attach a draft paper prepared by a State-Defense-CIA working group on activities that could be undertaken by the Manila Pact powers to combat Communist subversion. This paper would be tabled in the Manila Pact working group which will begin operations here in Washington on December 6. Before we actually table the paper in our working group, we will discuss it with the British here in compliance with the request which Ambassador Makins made to you last week.

We are anxious to talk to the British about this as soon as possible but before doing so, I wanted you to glance over the paper and see if there were any points which you wished to make before we go ahead and show it to the British.¹

Douglas MacArthur II²

[Attachment]

Activities That Could Be Undertaken Under the Manila Pact To Combat Communist Subversion³

1. The Nature of the Problem: It is generally agreed that at this time the major communist threat in Southeast Asia is more one of internal subversion than of overt military invasion. Whereas the latter threat can be met by the firm resolve of the signatory powers to carry out their obligations under the Manila Pact, subversive activities are less readily identifiable as such and can be countered effectively only by measures far subtler than military action. Communist subversive attacks upon the governments of free nations are usually either cloaked under the guise of legitimate political activities (including agitations by communist-led labor organizations and other communist fronts) or, if they take the form of guerrilla warfare, are represented to the world at large as expressions of valid nationalist or indigenous revolutionary forces. The provision of certain kinds of external aid to a government to assist it in resisting internal subversion may therefore not only be denounced by the communists as interference in the affairs of the country but may have this appearance in the eyes of neutral nations or even of some of the people of the country concerned. Accordingly, the first principle to be recognized in devising measures to cope with this threat is that resistance to subversion is, and must of necessity always be, primarily the responsibility of each national government.

2. General Approach to the Problem of Mutual Assistance: Much of the assistance that may be provided by the governments of the treaty members to meet communist subversion will have to be planned and carried out by the governments directly concerned rather than on a broad multilateral basis. As an example, certain types of help that one country might request from another in the political and psychological fields might best be worked out privately between the two governments directly concerned. There is the further consideration that there are areas of activity in which the need for and the possibilities of mutual assistance vary so greatly as between countries that a series of differing arrangements might be appropriate. In some cases, therefore, it might be unwise to attempt an all-inclusive program involving all the members. Moreover, many of the details of counter-subversive activity require a special technical knowledge and competence. Much of the detailed planning and implementation in this field should therefore be delegated to the appropriate officials in the countries concerned. Requests for assistance in this technical area should be strongly encouraged, but since each government must retain clear responsibility for combatting subversion in its own territory, the initiative must be left to each to seek the kinds of help it wishes through whatever arrangement it cares to work out from those members to whom it chooses to turn.

It is clear, however, that discussion among the members of the full range of problems involved in countering communist subversion will contribute importantly to the ability of all the members to meet this threat. Such discussion will lead to discovery of useful activities which can be undertaken either by all the members of the Pact or by the member countries individually.

3. Forms of Mutual Assistance: Types of assistance that the members might render to one another, and which might usefully be discussed include the following:

a. The exchange of information on communist personalities and communist subversive activities and propaganda within or against the states of the treaty area;

b. Mutual assistance in control of movement of communist agents and personalities, or of communist propaganda materials;

c. Exchange of information on the kinds of measures that have proved effective against communist subversion;

d. Assistance in the development and strengthening of local security forces (as distinguished from purely military forces) including on occasion (1) help in the training and indoctrination of such forces, (2) the supply of equipment for them, and (3) the exchange of views and experience as to how they may be used in combatting communism;

e. Assistance in the development of effective propaganda and information activities including advice on organization, the exchange of views on appropriate propaganda themes and, where appropriate, assistance in the supply of equipment and the training of technicians;

f. Cooperation in the development and maintenance of non-communist labor organizations and useful civic organizations, (such as those in the Community Center Movement in the Philippines), including arrangements for exchange of persons in the cultural and educational fields;

g. Exploration of the possibility of joint political action, supported by official statements, propaganda, and other activities, to counter subversive political movements against one or more of the signatory powers, especially movements that are based outside of the territory of the nation at which it is directed. (An example might be the Pan-Thai movement that is being nurtured by the Chinese communists);

h. Possible formulation at an appropriate time of a formal declaration setting forth in general terms the seriousness of the threat of communist subversion, asserting the determination of each member government to combat subversion within its own territory, and further strengthening the determination of the members to give mutual assistance to each other as may be useful and appropriate.

1. This memorandum bears several handwritten marginal notes, including the following: “OK JFD” and “Sec approved R [oderic] O’C [onnor]”. Another note indicates that MacArthur was informed of the Secretary’s action by phone on Dec. 3.
2. A note in MacArthur’s handwriting underneath his signature reads: “P.S. CIA will have some minor modifications simply for clarification. We now plan to talk to British on next Tuesday, Dec. 7.”
3. Paper typed on Dec. 2; drafting officer(s) not named.