Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111
United States Summary Minutes of Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting With France and the United Kingdom1
[Extract]
MTL TRI–2
Present:
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
- Sir William Strang
- Sir Pierson Dixon
- Lord Reading
- Mr. Frank Roberts
- Mr. Scott
- Mr. Denis Allen
- Lord Hood
- France
- M. Schuman
- Ambassador Massigli
- M. de Latournelle
- M. Seydoux
- M. Offroy
- M. Laley
- M. Roux
- M. Lebelle
- M. Mattei
- M. Letourneau
- United States
- Secretary Acheson
- Ambassador Gifford
- Ambassador Dunn
- Ambassador Jessup
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Hacker
- Mr. Sprouse
- Mr. Ringwalt
- Mr. Nash
- Mr. Battle
- Miss Kirkpatrick
Schuman: Military questions regarding Indochina and Southeast Asia have previously been discussed, as was done at Paris, and I should like to speak especially regarding political matters. At Washington a communiqué2 was issued at the end of Mr. Letourneau’s talks in which it was said that the French effort in Indochina was an integral part of the free world’s struggle against Communist aggression. I hope that the UK will agree to this principle and that we could confirm it here in the communiqué at the end of our meetings as a sign of Western solidarity. This is the first point, which I wish to make to Mr. Eden.
The second question was dealt with at Paris, that is, the Ad Hoc Committee conclusions. These conclusions, assuming a large scale attack from Communist China, refer to air and sea support by our Allies for definite limited tasks. There is reference to the question of evacuation from Tonkin. These were the unanimous proposals of the military experts. Could they be approved diplomatically? I hope that we can have political approval of the studies of the Ad Hoc Committee in Washington in February.
The third point is the establishment of some sort of permanent military organization to concern itself with the whole of Southeast [Page 139] Asia, to study the military situation and to suggest measures to be taken. This organization would not be just for Indochina.
There are also other political questions. The question of a statement which would indicate Western solidarity, for which two formulae are possible: (1) A direct warning to the Chinese Communists against aggression. We have certain doubts about a direct warning of this kind. Its drawbacks are as considerable as its advantages. (2) A statement by 2, 3 or more countries—I have Australia in mind—saying that none of the countries joining in the statement would admit or tolerate aggression against the countries concerned. This would show Western solidarity and would run less risk of provocation of the Chinese Communists.
Eden: You will recall that I made a statement at Columbia University on the subject of Chinese aggression. I must examine the question of the principle contained in the Washington communiqué and am not now prepared to include it in the communiqué at the end of the meetings. It is important that we draw up political assumptions for the military talks to be held.
The Secretary: Mr. Schuman has made three suggestions. He wishes to put into the communiqué at the end of our meetings the principle contained in the Washington communiqué. We are willing to say again what we said in that communiqué. With reference to political support for some of the Ad Hoc Committee conclusions, I said at Paris that we would be glad to have the military people deal with the matter. We would, however, rather look at the whole thing rather than in part at this time. With reference to a permanent military organization, we would rather have such an organization grow out of the military talks in preference to setting it up before agreement on military policy.
With reference to the last suggestion of Mr. Schuman regarding formulae for a possible statement, this should grow out of the political guidance principles. A public warning may not be wise and a private warning might be wise. A public statement by 2, 3 or 4 nations might carry far reaching implications. This question should be worked out between us.
Schuman: We must avoid being caught in a vicious circle. The military say that they must have political instructions and we say that the military must finish their work. We have reached the stage where we must give political instructions. Mr. Eden said that he was not able to join in inserting the principle of the Washington communiqué into the communiqué to be issued at the end of our meetings. He asks whether it should include Malaya. I would answer “yes”. A warning in moderate language would produce an impression on the Chinese Communists and others. A direct warning [Page 140] might result in adverse reactions. This question should be examined again or events may outstrip us.
The Secretary: There seems to be some misunderstanding. Neither Mr. Eden nor I said that the military should not have political guidance before they continue their work. We are both ready to go to work at once to provide political guidance.
Mr. Letourneau: Some parts of the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee were agreed upon by all the representatives on the Committee. We should make possible the issuance of political directives which are wanted for those points on which no Ad Hoc Committee agreement was reached. The US military experts said they could go so far and no farther. All the points discussed are in the Ad Hoc Committee report. We find points agreed upon and those not agreed upon. Mr. Schuman mentioned some of those points; for example, the warning to the Chinese Communists and the permanent military organization. These are discussed in the Committee report. The Committee must continue its work and it needs political advice and directives. The Ad Hoc Committee report also states that, while the Committee began with Indochina, it has also examined all Southeast Asian territories and discussed possible Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
Mr. Eden: We are all agreed that we must formulate political guidance. We should have certain assumptions: (1) Chinese Communist aggression; (2) we are prepared to take action in that event; (3) we must tell the Chinese we will take action in that event; and (4) the action must not be such as to risk Soviet involvement.
The Secretary: We must sit down and draw up a paper as political guidance and the Ad Hoc Committee will then tell us what it is feasible to do within the confines of this guidance. With reference to Mr. Eden’s statement regarding avoiding action which would result in Soviet involvement, all action involves some kind of risk of this nature.
Mr. Eden: I agree but feel that we should reduce the risk to the minimum. With respect to the assumptions for political guidance, I suggest that we submit our assumptions to each other.
The Secretary: We might produce a written paper first and then discuss it or we might discuss the question first and then produce a written draft. Messrs. Nash and Nitze are here and would be glad to meet with British and French representatives in London or in Paris.
Mr. Eden: Either here or in Paris.
Mr. Letourneau: I would like to know if the UK and the US could approve those Ad Hoc Committee conclusions unanimously agreed upon. Mr. Eden said at Paris that they had not yet been considered by the UK but the French Government has agreed [Page 141] unanimously on the conclusions. Next, I would like to bring up the question of the date of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee after political guidance has been formulated. Whether the political guidance should be put into directives by the government or in draft form is a question for decision. But the Committee meeting must be soon. In Washington the Ad Hoc Committee members spoke of the second half of July.
Mr. Eden: The UK JCS did not think that the conclusions represented agreements. I see no reason why the Committee shouldn’t meet in mid-July.
Mr. Letourneau: I would like to ask whether the UK accepts a meeting of the experts here or in Paris to draft political directives for the Ad Hoc Committee.
Mr. Eden: They can start tomorrow morning.
The Secretary: The paper on political guidance would have to be looked at by the governments. Messrs. Nash and Nitze are here and can start tomorrow morning.
(In general discussion it was decided that the US-UK-French representatives would meet at the Foreign Office the following morning at 11 o’clock.)3
All British participants not previously identified were from the Foreign Office: The Marquess of Reading, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State; presumably William Denis Allen, Head of the German Political Department; Lord Hood, a Counselor. French participants not previously identified are: Guy le Roy de la Tournelle, Director General of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry; Roger Seydoux, Minister at Washington; Raymond Offroy, Diplomatic Counselor with the High Commissioner in Indochina; Jacques Roux, in charge of Asia-Oceania in the Foreign Ministry.
Of the American participants Philip D. Sprouse was First Secretary at Paris.
↩- Released June 18; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.↩
Telegram Secto 42 from London, June 28, is a report on a conversation between Acheson and Schuman on that date. The portion on Southeast Asia reads:
“The Secretary then referred to the exchange of views yesterday at the tripartite meeting on the question of the defense of Southeast Asia. He told Mr. Schuman that he thought it wld be a mistake to even consider the setting up of any special organ to deal with the defense of Southeast Asia, that it was important for the govts concerned with that area to come to definite conclusions as to what each one wld do with regard to the defense there and that he felt that this cld best be done by having conversations and exchanges of views from time to time on the subject and to maintain service of liaison between the govts, perhaps in Wash. He said that Mr. Nash and Mr. Nitze, working with Mr. Dunn, had already started discussions this morning with the French and the British with respect to the Indochinese sitn and that these conversations wld be continued in Paris next week. He said that when this group had arrived at the point of putting something on paper they cld be submitted to the three govts for their consideration. Mr. Schuman expressed himself as appreciative of the steps thus taken and in entire accord with the Secy’s views on the defense of this area.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111)
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