Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/10–854

United States Position Paper Prepared for the ANZUS Council Meeting¹

secret

Washington, October 8, 1954.

Military Machinery Under the Manila Pact

probable australian/new zealand position

1. Both countries will probably say they do not believe a NATO–type military structure is desirable.

2. Both will probably favor a small permanent secretariat which could form the nucleus of military planning activities.

3. Australia will probably refer to the recent change in its foreign policy which permits a commitment of forces in advance of hostilities, and stress the desirability, for parliamentary purposes, of being able to specify what forces it is obligated to furnish under the Treaty.

4. Both countries will probably favor the formulation of combined military plans and the earmarking of forces.

us position

1. The US opposes establishment of a formalized body of advisers under the Manila Pact. Such a body would almost certainly lead to the development of combined regional military plans along the NATO pattern with the following disadvantages: it could provide a means by which pressure could be exerted to commit the US to a military effort disproportionate to its over-all responsibilities and commitment; it could tend to reduce, without compensating military advantage, US military freedom of action; and it could give other countries of the Treaty power of veto over the type and scope of plans evolved.

2. The US considers that military machinery necessary to make the Treaty effective should be similar to the ANZUS arrangement. Military representatives should be appointed by the individual nations signatory to the Treaty. These representatives should not be considered as a formally constituted group, but should be accredited as individuals to the Council. They should constitute a consultative arrangement looking toward improvement of the defense of the Treaty area.

3. The US envisages such a consultative arrangement as leading to the development of national military plans so coordinated as to increase the mutual effectiveness of the defensive effort of the countries concerned.

4. The military consultative arrangement could have the following general organization and functions:

a. The Military Advisers: appointed at the level of chief of staff or theater commander. The Military Advisers would:

i. meet periodically as required after consultations among the signatory Parties;

ii. formulate their own rules of procedure;

iii. advise the Council on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of the Treaty;

iv. consider and make recommendations to their respective military superiors;

v. furnish the Council those recommendations which have received approval of their respective military superiors;

vi. designate, as necessary, planning assistants to meet as required to work on agreed projects.

b. Possible Planning Tasks (same as under ANZUS): as a matter of principle the military advisers themselves at their first meeting should determine the planning tasks to be undertaken. Without prejudice to the position to be taken at such time by the US Military Adviser, the following planning tasks would appear to be appropriate:

i. review of the military situation in the area (essentially an intelligence estimate to be used in planning procedures);

ii. development of a strategic estimate on Southeast Asia;

iii. determination of possible courses of action to meet the current Communist threat in Southeast Asia and in the event of further Communist aggression in the area short of a general emergency.

c. Possible Additional Activities:

i. exchange of planning information;

ii. exploration of ways and means of increasing the mutual effectiveness of the defensive effort of the signatory Parties in the Treaty area;

iii. designation by such countries as wish to do so of military resources for specific defensive tasks, it being understood that the US, having worldwide obligations, must necessarily refrain from commitments of specific military resources to a particular area;

iv. consideration of measures to be taken in each country to increase the security of classified information with a view to augmenting the effectiveness of an exchange of intelligence data.

1. Attached to a briefing memorandum dated Oct. 8 from MacArthur to the Secretary, not printed. In the memorandum MacArthur refers to this position paper as incorporating the “thinking of the Defense Department”. Its format, however, indicates that it was probably drafted in the Department of State.