Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Wednesday, October 6, 19541
[Extracts]
Present at the 216th meeting of the Council were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Twining for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
3. Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429/2; NSC Actions Nos. 1148 and 1206;2 Note on Revision of Annex A to NSC 5429/2, dated October 1, 1954)3
Mr. Cutler reminded the Council of the necessity of developing courses of action to carry out paragraph 3 of the review of Far Eastern policy (NSC 5429/2), which called for the formation of an economic grouping of the free Asian nations. Mr. Cutler went on to say that great emphasis had been placed on such an economic grouping, both by the NSC Planning Board and by the Operations Coordinating Board. No time should be lost in getting ahead with this project, and Mr. Cutler said that the arrangements he was about to propose had been worked out with General Bedell Smith. In short, he was suggesting a high-level committee appointed by the Council to prepare and submit courses of action on the subject, to be submitted through the NSC Planning Board to the Council. [Page 928] Once the Council had approved such courses of action, the OCB would be requested to coordinate the implementation of the approved policy in the usual manner.
At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s comments, Governor Stassen pointed out that we were already moving ahead in carrying out courses of action with respect to an Asian economic grouping on the basis of the Colombo plan. In accordance with the wishes and guidance of the Secretary of State, we have already succeeded in getting Japan and Thailand admitted to the Colombo plan, and we are already engaged in the process of getting the Philippines in. Thus, while Mr. Cutler’s suggestion for an ad hoc committee to formulate courses of action was an excellent idea, it would be too bad if progress already made on the basis of the Colombo plan were to be held up pending the development by the ad hoc committee of new courses of action.
Mr. Cutler replied that he saw no reason for such a slowing up. The problem was an enormous one, and what we needed to do was to get clearly in mind and in considerable detail just what we proposed to do. Since the matter was also likely to be controversial, he felt that membership should be at the level of Assistant Secretaries.
Governor Stassen thereupon expressed himself as satisfied, and pointed out that it was an OCB working group which had, in the first instance, reached the conclusion that we should go ahead and build our Asian economic program on the Colombo plan. If the new committee simply contemplates parallel action, that was all to the good.
Secretary Dulles also agreed that progress should not stop while the new committee formulated its recommendations. There would, of course, be a lot of programs to deal with Asian economic problems.
Secretary Humphrey said that where we are going from an economic point of view in Asia was a matter of interest to many departments of the Executive Branch. The new subcommittee ought therefore to study the general situation in order to avoid unnecessary duplication. We need not delay what is already going on, but let us not get ourselves tripped up by taking steps at the outset which we will have to disavow subsequently.
Secretary Wilson commented that there was no hurry, in any case, that he could see.
Mr. Cutler then explained again his feeling of the need for a high-level committee as opposed to a mere OCB working group. The new subcommittee could also see to it that there was no delay in the progress which Governor Stassen was already making.
[Page 929]Governor Stassen expressed agreement that Treasury, Commerce and ODM, who were not members of OCB, should be members of the proposed new subcommittee. Moreover, as long as it is clearly indicated that creation of this new subcommittee will not prevent further progress on what has already been begun, the work of the committee could be very useful.
After certain suggestions with respect to the wording of the Council action, Secretary Wilson said that he was enthusiastic about what the United States was trying to do to assist the economies of the free Asian nations and especially to relate the Japanese economy to that of the Southeast Asian nations without political overtones. There were, however, a number of unresolved military problems in Asia. In addition, there was the question as to whether Korea and Formosa were to be included in such a grouping of Asian nations. We do not want to move too fast with Japan, warned Secretary Wilson. Otherwise Japan may go in the neutralist direction. In short, we don’t wish to make mistakes in this important area, and creation of this new subcommittee seems a good way to avoid such mistakes.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that he could not understand why it was necessary to substitute a new committee to do this kind of work when the OCB had been designed to accomplish it. Do we have to have a new mechanism every time difficult problems such as these arise?
Governor Stassen inquired whether the objective would be met if it were agreed that we should make no financial commitments respecting the Colombo plan base without the approval of the National Security Council. The initiative in this area has got to come from the Asian nations themselves, and if it is forthcoming the United States will agree to help. On the other hand, Governor Stassen reiterated that he had no objection to the formation of the new committee provided it did not hold up progress already being made on the basis of the Colombo plan.
Mr. Cutler explained again that he had been uncertain as to precisely what the OCB had been doing with respect to this plan, and accordingly he had felt the need for a more widely representative group from all the interested departments and agencies. At least, he said, he knew what the Planning Board and the Council had in mind when they had initially formulated and approved the policy for an Asian economic grouping. Unfortunately, the Planning Board itself did not have the necessary expertise to develop courses of action to carry out this policy.
Mr. Allen Dulles, however, again expressed his conviction that as long as we have an OCB, that body ought to be charged with carrying out such policies and making the necessary recommendations.
[Page 930]Secretary Humphrey insisted that the OCB was an “action committee”, whereas the proposed new committee was a “thinking committee”. He again said that he had no desire to stop present progress, but wished to be assured that the progress now being made fitted appropriately into military, financial, and other planning with respect to free Asia.
Mr. Hughes said that there were so many budgetary implications with respect to the proposed courses of action that the Bureau of the Budget should be represented on the new subcommittee.
After the Council had agreed to the creation of the ad hoc committee and had accepted a statement of its terms of reference, Mr. Cutler said that he wished to move on to the larger consideration of United States policy respecting China and United States policy with respect to the offshore islands and to Formosa, which were scheduled subsequently on the agenda.
Mr. Cutler pointed out that the courses of action on page 3 of NSC 5429/2 (Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East) were inconsistent with paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2 (U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government). Moreover, they were not in tune with NSC 166/1 (U.S. Policy Toward China). The courses of action on page 3 of NSC 5429/2 were more belligerent in tone than were the corresponding courses of action in NSC 166/1. After illustrating his contentions by reading the pertinent paragraphs from these policy reports, Mr. Cutler inquired of the Secretary of State whether he was prepared to report to the Council his final decision with respect to U.S. policy toward Communist China called for by NSC Action No. 1206–e.
Secretary Dulles replied that he was not as yet ready to report to the Council the final results of his review of the statement of policy on Communist China contained in NSC 5429/2. He was prepared, however, to make some preliminary comments if the Council thought these would be useful. He added that in so significant a field of policy it was of doubtful value to come to any decision in the absence of the President.
Secretary Dulles then pointed out that paragraph 1–a of the policy on Communist China, set forth on page 3 of NSC 5429/2, read as follows:
“Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking war:
“a. (1) React with force if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.”
Secretary Dulles indicated that he doubted whether paragraph 1–a as read offered a very useful formulation of policy. The word “lawful” should be added alongside of “necessary and advantageous”. It was wrong to decide in advance to take bold actions which the Executive Branch cannot carry out without going to Congress. Furthermore, continued Secretary Dulles, any U.S. action based on Formosa is becoming more and more tenuous as time goes on and the Korean armistice continues more or in effect. The continuation of this armistice plainly curbs the freedom of the United States to use its armed forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores. Also, we should give increasing consideration to the conclusion of a security treaty between the United States and Formosa. A purely defensive treaty would have many advantages. Unfortunately, however, the Chinese Nationalists want to go beyond this to take offensive action against Communist China, and this desire greatly complicates the problem of a security treaty.
In various other areas of the world—Germany, for example—we have tried with some success to impose our view that these nations should not resort to armed force to secure their objectives. We have also been successful so far in the same endeavor in Korea. However, it would be much harder to do this in Formosa, since Secretary Dulles said he doubted if Chiang Kai-shek really wanted a purely defensive treaty covering Formosa.
As to paragraph l-a-(2), which read: “React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China”, Secretary Dulles said he did not know whether this paragraph was supposed to cover the Nationalist-held offshore islands, but in any case he believed that the situation in these islands was not one which called for the use of the armed forces of the United States.
As to paragraph 1–b of NSC 5429/2, which called for the development of political, economic, and military strength of the non-Communist nations, including the military strength of Japan, etc., Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed this matter when he was last in Tokyo. On this occasion he had detected a feeling among the Japanese that we were pressing Japan a bit too hard on her military contribution. We might, accordingly, lose the vital political sympathy of Japan in our effort to get the desired military levels. On balance, this would be a net loss. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles predicted that we might have to lower our sights a bit on the Japanese military contribution. While in Japan the Secretary said he had also noted mounting pressure for wider trade between Japan and Communist China. There was marked resentment over the fact that Japan was singled out for different treatment from the European powers with respect to trade with Communist China. Finally, [Page 932] Said Secretary Dulles, it was becoming harder and harder for the United States to hold to its old position against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. We could probably hold out for a while longer on this position, but certainly not for the indefinite future.
At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles’ preliminary observations, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council defer action on this item and turn its attention to the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, on which the Secretary of State was also to make a report.
The National Security Council:4
- a.
- Agreed to establish an ad hoc committee,
composed of officials at the Assistant Secretary level from the
Departments of State (Chairman), Treasury, Defense, and Commerce,
the Foreign Operations Administration, the Office of Defense
Mobilization, and the Bureau of the Budget, with the Central
Intelligence Agency as intelligence adviser and the Executive
Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, as observer, to prepare and
submit to the Council proposed courses of action to carry out the
broad policy stated in paragraph 3 of NSC 5429/2, with the understanding that:
- (1)
- The work of the committee will not suspend the preliminary actions now underway; but the committee will take into account, and consult with the appropriate departments and agencies regarding, actions being taken prior to its report.
- (2)
- No financial commitments will be made prior to the committee’s report without consideration by the Council.
- b.
- Noted the “Note on Revision of Annex A to NSC 5429/2,” as distributed at the meeting.
- c.
- Noted the interim comments of the Secretary of State on Part I of NSC 5429/2, relating to Communist China, and deferred further consideration until a subsequent meeting.
Note: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the departments and agencies concerned for appropriate implementation.
- Drafted by Gleason on Oct. 7.↩
- For NSC Action No. 1148, see footnote 6, p. 537. For NSC Action No. 1206, see footnote 11, p. 756.↩
- Ante, p. 924.↩
- Lettered paragraphs a-c constitute NSC Action No. 1233. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)↩