Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Sunday, September 12, 19541
[Extract]
Present at this meeting, held at Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado, were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; and the Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
1. Report by the Secretary of State (NSC 5429/1 [2?])
At the suggestion of General Cutler, Secretary Dulles began the report of his recent Far East trip by discussing the Southeast Asia Treaty which was signed at Manila to protect the Southeast Asia area of the signatory nations. By separate protocol, Cambodia, Laos, and the free areas of Vietnam were also included in the treaty area.
As desired by the United States, the treaty utilized what Secretary Dulles termed the Monroe Doctrine formula previously used in the ANZUS and Philippine treaties. The other countries made an effort to utilize the NATO formula, but in view of the Senate debate on this subject and the previous use of the “Monroe Doctrine” formula in other treaties, the U.S. view had prevailed. Secretary Dulles believed that the other countries wished the NATO formula because it would provide for building up an elaborate military organization. Most countries wished the treaty to have a permanent organization, but this did not fit U.S. policy, so we had avoided a commitment in the treaty to a permanent organization. The treaty only provides that the nations will consult from time to time. In fact, there is no agreement yet as to where the treaty [Page 904] powers will meet, and this might be in different locations at different times.
Under the treaty, if there is aggression the U.S. response would probably be with our mobile forces, as desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was a good deal of discussion of economic matters, and some suggestions of a Marshall Plan for the area. Secretary Dulles indicated that the U.S. was prepared to consider economic problems, but could not make any commitments or agree to an economic organization. Secretary Dulles had pointed out that the participation of other countries in the Far East would be required for the solution of the economic problems of the area. Pakistan had wanted an indication that the treaty gave the signatories preference for economic aid. Secretary Dulles agreed that non-member countries would not be entitled to ask for such aid, but that the treaty powers might, in their own interests, want to give other nations aid.
As to indirect aggression, the treaty provides that the nations will consult together, but there is no commitment as to action. Secretary Dulles said he did not feel he could press this further than that.
The greatest controversy had been over the U.S. proposal that the treaty should be against Communist aggression. In the beginning no other country was willing to single out Communist aggression, but wished the treaty to cover any aggression. Secretary Dulles had tried to break the deadlock by saying that the other countries could undertake the commitment against any aggression if they wished. However, the U.S. could not say that any aggression in the area endangered U.S. security, such as a border incident. Specifically, Secretary Dulles said he was thinking of the India-Pakistan dispute. He made it clear that the U.S. understood its commitment under the treaty to apply only to Communist aggression.
Secretary Dulles described the difficulties which were encountered toward the end of the negotiations when both the Philippines and Australia decided they were against the general formula and wished to have the treaty apply only to Communist aggression. It had then been necessary for Secretary Dulles to persuade them to sign the treaty with the general formula.
Secretary Dulles felt the most significant aspect of the meeting was the confrontation of the colonial and Asiatic powers trying to work out common problems. Magsaysay was the one who wanted a Pacific charter, and one was drawn up along the lines of the “Potomac Charter” by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill. This proposal caused an altercation which required Secretary Dulles to persuade the colonial powers that they should [Page 905] agree to encouraging the aspirations of colonial people. The charter was finally worked out pretty much along the lines of the Potomac Charter. Secretary Dulles said that he believed the Asian members thought real progress had been made, and that the treaty would provide a better basis for fellowship between the East and the West.
In answer to General Cutler, Secretary Dulles said that U.S. ratification would probably take about six months, and that it would be six to ten months before the treaty went into effect. He believed, however, that there was sufficient agreement to provide a basis for planning action and, if need be in an emergency, to take action. The most doubtful nation to ratify will be Pakistan.
The President asked why Australia and New Zealand had fought on the side of the colonial powers. Secretary Dulles said that it was because of the dependent areas which they had around them. In general they were worried about too much independence for the island peoples adjacent to them, and particularly about the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea. Also, they had a general disposition to show a common front with Britain. The British representatives, incidentally, were on the defensive because Foreign Secretary Eden had not attended.
Secretary Dulles then described his talks of about five hours with Chiang Kai-shek.2 The burden of the talks was a great plea by Chiang for a mutual security treaty with the United States. Chiang said that this was the basic reason why they felt isolated, since the U.S. had treaties with all of the other free nations in the area. Chiang realized that the reason the U.S. was concerned about a treaty was the possibility that the Chinese Nationalists would bring the U.S. into an effort to reconquer the mainland. Chiang said that they wished to do that themselves, with only U.S. logistic support, since the fact U.S. participation would be a liability from the Asiatic viewpoint. Chiang felt that the Chinese Nationalists had shown their willingness to cooperate with the U.S., particularly by obtaining U.S. approval for everything they did regarding the Chinese Communists. In fact, Chiang said that they had waited four days, before retaliating for the artillery shelling of Quemoy, in order to get U.S. approval. Admiral Radford said he doubted this was an accurate statement.
Secretary Dulles told Chiang that it was funny that when he was in the Philippines they had been upset because they weren’t covered by the Seventh Fleet orders to protect Formosa. It seemed that everybody thought the other fellow was better off. Secretary [Page 906] Dulles suggested that Chiang think twice before changing the present situation under which U.S. operations regarding Formosa were covered by clear Executive order. If there were a security treaty he was not sure that the President would feel as free to take action. Secretary Dulles expressed to Chiang the belief that the Chinese Nationalists were better off for the time being the way they are. Secretary Dulles said he could not say that he had persuaded Chiang, but he thought he had aroused new considerations in his mind.
Secretary Dulles said that Chiang made no special plea for help regarding the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles knew that Chiang would like to have it, but thought he might have been afraid of being turned down, so he never asked.
Secretary Dulles had a feeling that Chiang was beginning to get tired and had aged considerably. He wondered whether Chiang still believes that he can reconquer the mainland. Chiang says so, but without the previous conviction. The President observed that Chiang’s only hope was in a general uprising in China, for which Chiang would be called back, like Napoleon from Elba. Secretary Dulles commented there was no evidence that such an uprising would occur. He said that Chiang had applauded the Manila pact as a great achievement. Chiang thought the U.S. was doing better in Asia than in Europe. The President observed that Chiang had pointed out long ago that our future lay in the East, and was probably trying to prove it. Secretary Dulles said he had also explained to Chiang the principle underlying our redeployment in the Far East, and Chiang had made no criticism.
Secretary Dulles said that in Japan3 he had had lengthy meetings with Premier Yoshida and Foreign Minister Okasaki, and a separate talk with Ikeda.4 Secretary Dulles had explained U.S. redeployment policy and, as far as he could judge, Yoshida seemed to understand it and accept it.
Secretary Dulles said that the talks had indicated that economic matters were of considerable concern to the Japanese. The Japanese economic situation actually is improved, because of their austerity program and their good crop this year. They have almost enough rice for domestic consumption. In fact, the Chinese Nationalists were complaining that the Japanese were not buying Formosan rice. The Japanese trade deficit last year was about $1.1 billion. It is expected to be considerably less this year, and may be manageable if Japan can find some export markets in Southeast [Page 907] Asia. Secretary Dulles told Yoshida frankly that Japan should not expect to find a big U.S. market because the Japanese don’t make the things we want. Japan must find markets elsewhere for the goods they export.
Secretary Dulles said the big problem economically for Japan at present is the question of reparations, particularly with the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma. He had told Yoshida that this presented a real dilemma, since the Japanese economy can’t stand sizeable reparations but can’t be built up without a reparations settlement. He suggested that Yoshida try to accept a reasonable settlement such as the recent Burmese offer, which appeared to be a reasonable proposal. Yoshida assured Secretary Dulles in the most emphatic terms that the outward evidence of anti-Americanism was not truly the feeling of the Japanese people. Secretary Dulles said that he feels no doubt that the Communists are making progress on that campaign, however.
Secretary Dulles expressed the belief that we may have to lower our sights on Japanese rearmament. We must measure the value of military forces in being against the political support as to how and when they may be used. He feels that General Hull5 and Ambassador Allison agree. General Hull recently made a trip to Hokaido, where he observed the air facilities being built on a series of islands in the Kuriles. There were 50 MIG’s on the nearest island, and if the build-up continues at its present rate the Russians will have more air power there than our entire Far East Air Force. The President commented that while we had spent many months arguing about the responsibility for losing China, we had just given away the Kuriles. He said he had never understood why in the name of God we did it, and that he thought it constituted the “damnedest stupidity”.
In answer to the Attorney General’s question whether Japan would need rice from Indochina, Mr. Stassen said that he did not believe so, although Japan was buying a little rice from Pakistan and Thailand. In answer to the President’s question, Mr. Stassen said some progress was being made in persuading the Japanese to eat wheat. In answer to the Vice President’s question regarding the impression Magsaysay made on the other people at the Manila meeting, Secretary Dulles said that he saw more of Magsaysay than the others, who did not get a chance to have an adequate impression. Secretary Dulles said that Magsaysay had told him how [Page 908] he, Magsaysay, had dealt with the Communists, and that it would make your hair stand on end.
The National Security Council:
Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State regarding the signing of the Southeast Asia Treaty and his visits to Formosa and Japan.
- Drafted by Lay on Sept. 13.↩
- After the Manila Conference, Dulles proceeded to Taiwan, where he conferred with President Chiang on Sept. 9. For documentation on this visit, see volume xiv.↩
- The Secretary had flown to Japan from Taiwan, and had then started back to the United States on Sept. 10. For documentation on the visit, see volume xiv.↩
- Hiyato Ikeda, former Minister of Finance, was Secretary General of the Liberal Party.↩
- Since 1953 Gen. John E. Hull had been Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East Command; Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East; and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.↩