Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/9–554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

secret

Manila, September 5, 1954—4 p.m.

Subject:

• Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Australian Foreign Minister Casey
• Senator Smith
• Senator Mansfield
• Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Casey opened the conversation by saying there was a problem to which the Australian Government attached great importance about which he wished to speak to the Secretary. He said that recently there had been a very important change in Australia’s foreign policy and that Prime Minister Menzies had informed the country that Australia for the first time would commit Australian forces in advance of hostilities, under the SEATO concept. In other words, the Australian Government would undertake in advance to maintain and earmark forces for the defense of the Southeast Asia area. The Australian Government was also prepared and desirous of substantially increasing its defense budget. What the Australian Government wished, as a result of the SEATO Treaty, was to be able to say that under this Treaty its military obligations were X number of land forces, Y number of air forces, and Z number of naval forces. In other words, it will immeasurably help Australia in obtaining parliamentary authorization for additional defense forces if they can say that these additional forces are required to meet Australia’s contribution under SEATO.

Furthermore, the Australian Government wanted to know how the US envisaged military planning to be undertaken under SEATO. There had been military planning under ANZUS which to some extent had been overtaken by the planning engaged in by the Five-Power Military Staff Agency which was now in abeyance. There was of course the question of security, particularly with reference to some of our Asian partners. But, if the ANZUS powers and the UK proceeded with secret military planning without informing the other SEATO powers, it might become known, and would raise an important political and psychological problem of a white inner-circle with an Asian outer-circle.

Mr. Casey said there were several possibilities which he had tentatively been turning over in his mind, but which he had not discussed with his Government. The serious military planning might be conducted by ANZUS plus the UK, and this in turn raised in his mind the “revolutionary” question of whether the time might not have come to invite the UK to join ANZUS, to have a cover for four-power military planning which could be applied to SEATO. Another possibility was to have the US alone be responsible for the planning, with the US bringing in the other SEATO powers as appropriate in the development of SEATO plans. This would in effect mean that the US would constitute a one-man Standing Group, although there could be on the side discrete planning with Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. He had no definite convictions on all these matters, but was simply letting the Secretary know the kind of possibilities which had been passing through his mind.

With respect to machinery for SEATO, Mr. Casey said Australia had no desire whatsoever to build up any elaborate machinery. Again, he had had some thoughts which he had jotted down at lunch-time, and which he would have typed up and sent to the Secretary. These consisted of the formation of a SEATO Military Representatives Committee on the Chief of Staff or theater command level, to be served by a small liaison group, which would arrange ad hoc meetings of planners. The planners could consider forces that might be earmarked for SEATO, logistical planning, security measures, etc.

The Secretary replied that he was not familiar with the details of the planning that had been undertaken by the Five-Power Military Staff Agency. He explained in detail why we did not wish to establish permanent machinery, but said this in no sense implied that we thought planning should not be undertaken. He mentioned that there was important planning to be done in the SEATO area, some of which would obviously have to be confined to the countries whose security was adequate. This, in effect, was the three ANZUS powers and the UK. There might be other matters on which the ANZUS powers alone would wish to make planning contingencies, such as the situation which would arise if Indonesia fell into Communist hands.

Mr. Casey then made reference to the Australian amendment to Article V, saying he understood that the US military found it generally acceptable subject to minor language modifications. The Secretary replied that the US did not like the Australian language because it implied that permanent machinery would be set up. They particularly did not like the use of the word “machinery.” He said we had given thought to this matter and believed we could meet the Australian desires for Treaty language by substituting the following: “The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military planning as required by the situation in the area.”

The Secretary also commented that he did not like the Pakistan suggestion of eliminating the term “military,” since that would imply there would be economic planning and the establishment of an economic organization under the Treaty, whereas the present US thinking was that the economic problems might best be dealt with through the Colombo plan, if Japan were also included since it was indispensable, as was Indonesia.

Mr. Casey looked at the new US language and said it seemed to meet their problem in terms of the Treaty draft, and he believed it would be quite acceptable. He said that while this meets his problems in terms of the Treaty, he still was not sure how he could say to the Australian people that under SEATO Australia’s military contribution would be so many land forces, so many air forces, and so many naval forces, which was important to enable Australia to work up its defenses appreciably.

The Secretary said the problems of the US and Australia were somewhat different. The US had no intention of earmarking specific forces for SEATO. It believed in mobile reserve striking power. Furthermore, it had no territory in the Treaty area to defend. If the US started earmarking forces for here, there, and everywhere, it would run out of forces very rapidly since its commitments were global. The Secretary again emphasized that the US policy was based on strong mobile striking power and said that obviously it would continue to have substantial mobile air and sea forces in this general area and also some reserve land forces in Okinawa and Hawaii. In the event of aggression, such forces would be used and deployed where they could best serve the war effort. Mr. Casey nodded his assent.

The subject then turned to the question of the use of the word “Communist” in Article IV of the draft Treaty. Mr. Casey said he had received today a British suggestion which he knew had been communicated to the US. This involved eliminating the word “Communist”; defining more clearly the Treaty area; and having the Treaty apply to an attack from outside the Treaty area.

The Secretary said the British definition of the Treaty area raised lots of complications. Would the southern part of China be interpreted as being within the Treaty area? There were other questions also, and furthermore, the British formula was so complicated that he believed it would be most difficult to get Congressional understanding. Senator Smith said the Secretary was entirely right about this. The Secretary then said he had been thinking of accepting the elimination of the word “Communist” and attaching to the Treaty a reservation or statement of a US understanding that insofar as the US was concerned it applied only to a Communist attack. Mr. Casey said that insofar as he was concerned this would be entirely acceptable, and indeed might be the best way to meet this difficult problem.

In a discussion of Article IV, the Secretary said he had been giving thought to the question of whether Laos, Cambodia, and free Vietnam should be specifically included in the text of the Treaty or whether it might be preferable to have them covered in a Protocol which would indicate that their territory had been unanimously designated by the Parties as being covered by the Treaty against armed attack. Mr. Casey indicated that it was a point worth considering.

The Secretary concluded by saying that if the Conference were to accomplish its work in three days it would have to be a working conference and not a gathering to make political speeches for the record. Mr. Casey heartily endorsed this and said he would do his best to chip in, if there was a tendency to get into long-winded speeches, to remind the Members that they had a lot of work to do.

The Secretary also mentioned that he thought the best way to attack the problem of going over the Treaty was to examine it Article-by-Article and then at the end take up the Preamble, which raised many questions in connection with the specific Articles. Mr. Casey said he thought this might be a good way to handle it.