396.1 MA/9–254: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of State1
Secto 3. Second session working group, September 2 morning.2
[Page 829]Shanahan (New Zealand) in general statement had gravest doubts on wisdom of limitation of treaty to “Communist” aggression both on practical grounds and since it would do enormous damage in other countries of Asia which it was hoped to associate with any organization established.
Watt (Australia) analyzed operative clauses of NAT and ANZUS–type language used in SEA Pact draft to show that difference not so great as press discussion suggested. Article 5 of NAT not “automatic” since each party agrees to take action “it deems necessary.” Noted that Article II of NAT referred to respective constitutional processes which public discussion of SEA Pact draft associated only with ANZUS. In any case, resulting action is more important than fine distinction of wording. Final language should be effective and provide for some degree of consultation, especially in case of doubt as to gravity of particular incidents.
Phleger traced origin of language in NAT and ANZUS–type commitments. Referred to Senate debates on NAT ratification new clear understanding that respective constitutional powers of President and Congress unchanged by NAT. Specifically powers of President as Commander-in-Chief are identical under both arrangements. Said considered view of Secretary was that language of ANZUS, Philippine, Korean Treaties3 was most appropriate for new treaty.
Since (Philippines) agreed both types of commitment served same purpose from US point of view, but preferred NAT language as conveying greater sense of immediate response to emergency which important factor in Philippines against background of experience in last war.
Each delegation except US then indicated which articles of third draft were acceptable and kind of changes to be proposed on each of others, as preliminary to examination of specific language of third draft.
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The content of this telegram indicates that it was prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the Manila Conference.
Telegram repeated for information to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, Bangkok, New Delhi, Karachi, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, London, and Paris, and by pouch to Colombo, Djakarta, and Rangoon. Telegram repeated for information to CINCPAC via military channels; the Department was requested to pass it to the Department of Defense.
↩ - A summary of the first session held the afternoon of Sept. 1, at which the U.S. draft of Aug. 24 (p. 784) was accepted as the basis for detailed discussion, is in telegram Secto 1 from Manila, Sept. 1, not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, ‘F 353)↩
- For text of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington on Oct. 1, 1953, see 5 UST (pt. 3) 2368.↩