Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State¹

[Washington,] August 30, 1954—7:46 p.m.

Telephone Call to Mr. Merchant

The Sec. said he just saw the message from Eden which he got last week and feels he should have seen it sooner.² He said he has serious question whether he should go or not. M. said he has the same doubt, but it seems this project is so intimately associated with the Sec. personally that if he doesn’t show up, it would cast a pall over the participants. The Sec. said he is not happy at the way things are going. The idea they are signing the Treaty to please him does not please him at all. He has great reservations about the Treaty—whether it will be useful in the mood of the participants–whether we are not better off by ourselves. This running away from the word Communist—the unwillingness to allow unofficial observers to come from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and the objection to our having any military mission to Cambodia are examples. They seem to have no desire or intention to hold the balance of Indochina. By going into a treaty of this sort, we limit our own freedom of action. Once we sign, then we have to consult re any action. They are more concerned with trying not to annoy the Communists rather than stopping them. M. does not take as gloomy a view, but there are problems. It provides a basis for action and the probability of some allies—and so M. does not see the advantage of having complete freedom of action. Apart from the word Communist, M. doesn’t see any real major difficulties there. The Sec. said he has a feeling these things will come up and someone from the UK will say he has to consult with London and then Eden will run with the ball on EDC. It raises the question of which place to be. M. said it is against his interest, but he thinks the Sec. should be there for 3–4 days. The effect on the Thais and the Cambodians if he does not attend will be fatal. The Sec. said we can’t help the Cambodians and if we sign, we are less able to help. He suspects there are side deals from Geneva that are undermining the Treaty. M. thinks the British are prepared to lay it on the line for Laos, Cambodia and So. Vietnam. The Sec. said they won’t let them send an observer to Manila. The French and British are blocking everything we want to do. Once the Sec. goes out, he said, he is hooked on it—he can’t come back without a treaty. M. said he may be ascribing to the British too much good faith, but he thinks they are anxious to avoid anything that can be publicly exploited as contrary to the Geneva Agreement. The Sec. said this may well be as contrary to secret agreements. The point is to build up and they are trying to pull down. The Sec. said he was always willing to have Cambodia as part of the Treaty. M. thinks they are determined to hold the area. They are more concerned over the form than the substance. The Sec. said forms are important. Who will be at the Conference—Wan, Casey, Garcia, Webb, Khan. The Sec. said we don’t know if they will let Khan be part of the Treaty. The Sec. said he doesn’t think so. M. said it will protect him. The Sec. said we are making a treaty with Pakistan against India—M. said that was the purpose of putting in Communist. The Sec. agreed and asked what is the answer.

The Sec. said he is disturbed. It will be a mess out there. He will be there, the Pres. is in Denver, Smith is retiring and his successor is not here. It leaves us in a weak position. M. said he is not as disturbed over the SEATO business. The Sec. has to be there. The inference in that part of the world would be disastrous. M. said we can’t afford to hand the other side the complete victory in both quarters on a silver platter. The Sec. said he is willing to fight it out, but is it good to tie oneself up with people who are not willing to fight. They agreed we have to accept the French. They have the only military force there for the next 12 months.

1. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau, secretary to Dulles.
2. In a note dated Aug. 25, Eden had informed the Secretary that developments regarding the European Defense Community might prevent him from attending the Manila Conference. (Attachment to covering note from Sir Robert Scott to the Secretary, Aug. 25; 396.1 MA/8–2554) For documentation concerning EDC, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.