Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 358

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] August 28, 1954.

Acting on instructions from their Governments, the Embassies of the U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines have now all informed us that they were firmly opposed to the inclusion of the word “Communist” in the SEA Treaty. Furthermore, the Pakistanis have informed the U.K. that they would in no circumstances agree to a reference to communism in the Treaty. We have not yet received word from the Government of Thailand, but as things now stand, the score is a solid six to one against the inclusion of the word “communist”.

I attach a copy of an interesting telegram which the British Embassy here has just received from Mr. Eden.¹ It seems to me that if the Manila Conference is to result in the signature or initialing of a Treaty, we are going to have to agree to eliminate the word “communist”; otherwise, it seems quite clear that the Conference will end in dead-lock and we will accomplish nothing. Such a setback would, I fear, have a serious impact both on International and U.S. opinion.

If we are going to have to give on the use of this word in the Treaty, it seems to me that it would be much better to do it in the working group stage of the negotiations than in the meeting of the Ministers. My reason for this is that a considerable amount of confusion would be avoided if we could present the Ministers with an agreed Text of Article IV. And, more important, I believe that if the word “communist” is left in for the Ministers to argue about, the Filipinos and others will leak to the press during the working group meetings that we are dead-locked on this issue. It will be built up in the press and then if we give it will look like a substantial U.S. defeat in the Conference.

I recognize that no decision in this respect can be taken until after the Secretary’s return Monday.² However, if it could be given consideration then, and telegraphic instructions could be sent to Manila, for Mr. Phleger and myself,³ I believe we could succeed in the working group in going very far toward getting an acceptable Treaty, except for the inclusion of the word “communism”, pretty much in hand for the Foreign Ministers to consider. This would mean that we could probably wind up the Conference in about three days.

As the situation now stands, the U.S. working group has virtually no flexibility or give in its position; and, in essence, we will be in the position in the working group at Manila of standing firm on all of the important points of our own U.S. text with no give on any important point at any place. This, in my judgment, risks having other people gang up strongly on certain provisions we do not like (such as the NATO formula) and freezing their position where it may carry over in rigid form into the Ministers Meeting. If we are going to have to give on the word “communist”, and avoid a situation where others may form a solid front against us during the working group on other important points which will be translated into the Ministers Meeting, I believe it is for very serious consideration whether the type of flexibility indicated above would not be desirable.

If such flexibility were given tactically, we could open with a strong defense of the communist formula, listen to the others, and agree to recommend it back if we got satisfaction on the other points.⁴

D MacA

1. The copy attached to this memorandum is undated. In this telegram Eden stated that he objected to specific reference to “communism” in the treaty because the word had no precise or legal meaning and could prove embarrassing, was needlessly provocative, and made it much more difficult for governments such as those of India or Burma (which were publicly committed to noninvolvement in the anti-Communist struggle) to accede. After reviewing the differences between the United Kingdom and the United States on this point, Eden stated that he could accept the American text of the article if the word “communist” was removed. Eden also wanted to know if the United States thought that the wording of paragraph 2 of the article covered Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam and any states that might subsequently be designated. He thought it did not, and wished the words “or any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 above from time to time apply” to be inserted.
2. Aug. 30.
3. Both men were planning to attend the sessions of the working group in Manila, the first of which was Sept. 1 (Manila time). They left Washington the evening of Aug. 28.

4. In telegram Tosec 2 to Manila, Aug. 30, drafted and approved for transmission (but not initialed) by Dulles and marked “From Secretary for MacArthur”, the Secretary stated:

   • “1. In view fact ‘Communist’ included in US proposed text furnished Senators Smith and Mansfield and in view inability confer with them before Manila am not prepared authorize you agree to elimination.
   • “2. Suggest you prepare alternate texts.
   • “3. Please privately consider possible reservation to Treaty by US at time signature to effect that the ‘attack’ to which US prepared to respond as per treaty would be ‘Communist’ inspired attack.” (396.1 MA/8–3054)