Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/8–2654

Memorandum of Conversation, by William J. Galloway, Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State

secret

[Washington,] August 26, 1954.

Subject:

• U.K. Views on the Southeast Asia Pact

Participants:

• Sir Robert Scott, British Minister
• Mr. F. R. MacGinnis, Second Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. MacArthur, Counselor
• Mr. Stelle—S/P.
• Mr. Galloway—C

Sir Robert Scott called on Mr. MacArthur to discuss the Southeast Asia Pact. Sir Robert said he visualized that the Foreign Ministers in their meeting at Manila would have a threefold task: (1) to agree on the provisions of a treaty, (2) to discuss the question of any machinery which might be established, and (3) to discuss any action which might be taken under the treaty.

Regarding the text of the treaty, Sir Robert would discuss later the latest suggestions of the U.K. government.

As for machinery under the treaty, Sir Robert said that the UK chiefs of staff had made some recommendations on military machinery which had not been considered by the government. The UK chiefs suggested that there should be a Military Committee and a Military Executive Committee at a lower level. These two bodies would require a small permanent staff and secretariat. Sir Robert then outlined his understanding of the U.S. position with respect to organization under the treaty, and Mr. MacArthur confirmed that we envisaged the establishment of only a Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers, which would meet from time to time as required, similar to the arrangement under our ANZUS Treaty. There would be no permanent site for meetings and no permanent staff or secretariat in any fixed location. The members of the Council could have military advisers as required.

Sir Robert emphasized that the UK Government had not expressed definite views on organization and, in particular, had not considered the chiefs of staff recommendations on military machinery. Personally, he thought there should not be much difficulty on the question of organization as between the U.S. and U.K. Governments, but he thought that some of the other Governments would strongly desire the establishment of some permanent machinery.

As for action under the treaty, Sir Robert’s third point, the only immediate possibility he envisaged was in the field of economic activity. The U.K. view is that, regardless of how the economic article in the Treaty is drafted, the Ministers should be prepared to discuss the question of future action in the economic field.

Mr. MacArthur said that the U.S. envisaged that there would be discussion by the Ministers on this subject. He referred to the remarks made by Secretary Dulles at his last press conference, when the Secretary had stated his belief that it would be desirable for this general question to be discussed at the Manila meeting. The Secretary had made clear that he was thinking in terms of the general economic problem in free Asia and not just in connection with the Southeast Asia Pact. Mr. MacArthur said, however, that he did not think that this question had yet had sufficient study to allow any very definite decisions or actions to be taken as of the time of the Manila meeting.

Sir Robert then asked how far the U.S. expected the Manila meeting to progress on the Treaty, adding that he had no views from his Government on this point. Mr. MacArthur said that the U.S. hoped the Treaty could be completed and signed at Manila. The U.S. delegates would have plenipotentiary powers to sign a Treaty.

Sir Robert then inquired as to the U.S. views regarding the latest British proposed revisions of Articles IV,¹ II, and III² of the Treaty text.

Mr. MacArthur, noting that the British revision of Article IV omitted the word “Communist”, said that the Secretary attached real importance to the formula we had proposed for describing the nature of the armed attack in Article IV and to stating in the preamble that the purpose of the Treaty is defense against Communist aggression. It is our understanding that there is no disagreement among the prospective members of the Pact that its whole purpose is to defend against Communist aggression in whatever form this aggression might take. Consequently, using the word “Communist” in the Treaty would make clear both to the Communist world and to the free world the fundamental purpose of the member nations. The use of this formula also has the great advantage of excluding for the purposes of the commitment in Article IV any armed attacks which might occur in the area involving non-Communist states. For example, if there should be trouble between India and Pakistan resulting in armed conflict, under the U.S. formula the provisions of the Treaty relating to armed attack would not apply. We certainly would not wish the Treaty to apply in such a situation, and we believe that other prospective members, with the possible exception of Pakistan, would not wish it to apply in case of an armed attack of this character. We have not been able to think of any formula other than the one we have suggested to avoid the problem presented by the possibility of armed attacks in the area other than a Communist attack.

Furthermore, since the language of the Treaty states that an armed attack on any of the parties would endanger the peace and safety of all of the parties, we seriously doubt the truth of such a statement unless it applies only to a Communist armed attack. This is a point which would need to be made perfectly clear by the U.S. Executive to the Congress, and the best means, we believe, is actually to draft the armed attack which would endanger the peace and safety of the parties.

Mr. MacArthur then said he would like to explain why the U.S. preferred not to use the NATO language in Article IV as had been suggested by the U.K. The pattern of U.S. security arrangements in the Pacific, the ANZUS Treaty, Philippine Treaty and others, all have been defined in very similar language to that which we have suggested for Article IV of the present treaty. The precedent is therefore well established with the Congress and also with the countries in the area. If the present Treaty were to utilize the NATO language, the Congress might well raise questions as to the difference between this language and the language used in our other Pacific commitments. While, in fact, there may be little or no material difference in terms of the commitment involved, there might well be a revival of the debate on Constitutional powers of the Executive Branch vis-à-vis the Legislative Branch, and this coming at a time when the controversy over the Bricker Amendment³ is high, could cause us serious difficulties.

For all of these reasons, Mr. MacArthur emphasized our preference for the language in the U.S. draft of Article IV.

As regards paragraph two of Article IV, the consultative provision, it was pointed out that the U.K. draft by omitting certain clauses which appeared in the U.S. draft tended to weaken the provision. The U.S. hoped that this consultative clause could be made as broad and as strong as possible, since in our view, it might well be the principal means for dealing with the real danger in the area—Communist subversion and infiltration.

Sir Robert Scott then summed up the British views on Article IV and read a telegram giving Mr. Eden’s views on this article (a copy of the substance of this telegram is attached).

The discussion then proceeded to the British redrafts of Articles II and III. (A note setting forth the proposed UK revisions and reasons therefor is attached.)⁴

Mr. MacArthur, on a personal basis, commented that the British redraft of Article III seemed to propose that economic cooperation be on a more exclusive basis. The U.S. much preferred the general language of the article in the present U.S. draft so as to allow complete flexibility in dealing with the economic problem on a broader basis. As for the expression “other like-minded nations” to which the British objected, he thought some other expression such as “other free Nations” might be used. Sir Robert expressed the belief that the U.S. and U.K. positions on the economic aspect were actually very close together and that there would not be difficulty in arriving at agreeable language.

[Attachment]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

secret

[Washington,] August 27, 1954.

United Kingdom Comment on Article IV of the Draft Southeast Asia Defence Treaty

Objection persists for the reasons already given to inserting the word “Communist” before “aggression”, and to its inclusion in the third paragraph of the Preamble.

2. The United Kingdom is anxious that Article IV (1) should be as acceptable as possible to Asian opinion and should not be open to objection on the ground that the parties are unilaterally proposing to take action about an armed attack for instance on Burma without consulting in any way the Government concerned.

3. For these reasons it is believed that the best solution would be to adopt as closely as possible the wording of Article V of the NATO Treaty. This wording is not only now well known but we have always maintained that it is entirely defensive in character. Further, the obligation upon the parties is to “assist the party … by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary”. This gives considerable discretion to the parties to decide what if any action at all they are going to take if the armed attack is not one which it is the real purpose of the proposed Treaty to guard against. The United Kingdom redraft follows mutatis mutandis the wording of Articles V and IV respectively of the NATO Treaty.

4. Finally in order to meet the difficulty about Asian opinion referred to in paragraph 2 above the United Kingdom view is that if we are asked which States or territories we propose to designate under Article IV (1), we should say that it is not our present intention to designate any State or territory unless they so request. This would leave it open to us to designate other States or territories later on if the circumstances seem to render this necessary or if as we hope they come and ask for it themselves.

1. See Annex 1 to MacArthur’s memorandum, p. 791.
2. See the memorandum, supra.
3. Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio introduced into the Senate several bills intended to bring about a constitutional modification of the Executive’s treatymaking power. For documentation, see vol. i, Part 2, pp. 1768 ff.
4. Not printed as attached. See the memorandum, supra.