Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 358

United States Minutes of a Meeting of the ANZUS Council Deputies

secret

Participants:

  • United States
    • Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR, Acting for the Under Secretary
    • Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
    • Mr. Phleger, Legal Adviser
    • Mr. William J. Galloway, C
    • Mr. John P. Furman, L/E
    • Mr. Outerbridge Horsey, BNA
  • Australia
    • Ambassador Spender
    • Mr. Allen, First Secretary
  • New Zealand
    • Ambassador Munro
    • Minister Laking
  • United Kingdom (informal observers)
    • Sir Robert Scott, Minister
    • Mr. M.G.L. Joy, First Secretary

The meeting began at 3:00 p.m. and adjourned at 4:50 p.m. The proceedings were informal and no “agreed record” was kept. The meeting was for the purpose of discussing further the content of a South East Asia treaty. A proposed U.S. redraft of the preamble, Articles II, III, IV, VII and VIII was circulated1 and likewise a memorandum of U.K. views on Article III, on the form of designation of Vietnam and on Article IV(1).2

Mr. Merchant noted that we still lacked comments on our second draft of a South East Asia treaty from the French, the Pakistani and the Philippinos. We were pressing for such comments and would appreciate any such assistance which other governments could give us along the same line. Mr. Merchant said it was important that we should be in substantial agreement at the time the Foreign Ministers meet. Sir Robert Scott said that the British views were those of officials and were subject to review by Eden when he returns to London at the end of August. All present recognized the advantage of narrowing the area of discussion for Manila, [Page 764] but Ambassador Spender also said that his principals would doubtless wish to be free to make substantial suggestions at Manila.

Organization. Mr. Merchant emphasized that from the outset we had felt it was not desirable or necessary to model the new enterprise on NATO, with its elaborate permanent machinery and large standing forces. In the last day or two we had come to feel more strongly that we should simply have an article creating a Council unembellished by organizational trappings, i.e., a Council of Foreign Ministers which would meet at times and sites of its own choosing, leaving the question of standing machinery to develop from subsequent experience. Ambassador Spender asked if this meant that we wished to postpone consideration of the question or that we would simply leave it out of the treaty but have an understanding at the time of signature as to whether forces were to be committed to the area and whether there should be command and staff organization under the treaty. Ambassador Spender referred a number of times to his Government’s desire to know in specific terms the extent of their commitments and he said that the Prime Minister had said publicly that the treaty would spell out Australian commitments in detail. After later discussion on this point, it seemed the general feeling that these problems would develop best in the interests of all concerned if it were not attempted to settle them definitively at too early a stage.

Scope of Treaty. Mr. Merchant outlined the thinking behind our redraft of Article IV (which carried with it a change of language in the preamble) intended to particularize the threat against which the parties were banding together, without leaving the treaty open to application in circumstances not intended by the parties, as, for example, to conflicts between non-communist states within the treaty area. This had led to use [of] the word “Communist aggression” as the best means of achieving this end. There was considerable discussion of Article IV and of the type of situation which would lead to action by the parties under each of the two paragraphs. The advantages of the new language were recognized, but the other representatives indicated that they would need to refer the new draft to their respective capitals.

Sir Robert Scott mentioned the provision for reporting to the Security Council measures taken under Article IV which had been in an earlier draft and there was general agreement that this should be re-instated at the end of paragraph IV (1).

Sir Robert Scott asked whether the words “maintain and develop” in the new Article II implied any financial or economic commitment and there was agreement that they did not.

There appeared to be general agreement, at least on a personal basis, that our redraft of Articles II and III represented an improvement. [Page 765] Sir Robert Scott noted that the new language of Article III covered the points he had been instructed to raise and he reserved his language until he had comments from London on our draft.

Vietnam. The manner of designation was discussed and the advantages of describing it as “the territory under the jurisdiction of the Free Vietnamese Government” were recognized.

Ambassador Spender said he was under instructions to suggest the advantage of having language in the treaty which would overcome Asian misgivings and make clear that the treaty would not be used to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. He did not wish to discuss specific language in detail but noted that his Minister would want to take care of this issue. It was suggested that, if suitable language could not be found, the subject could be covered in speeches by the Ministers at the Conference, or in the final communiqué. Sir Robert Scott suggested that it was already covered by the provision of Article VI reserving the rights and obligations of the parties under the UN Charter taken in conjunction with Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

Sir Robert Scott said that he had been instructed to say that it was important, from the point of view of Asian comment, that the treaty recognize the need for parallel economic measures. The British have an open mind as to whether the treaty should contain merely a statement of principle, as at present, or more detailed specifications. They do not wish to disturb present bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the area. They thought there should be a two-tier structure in terms of economic organization, leaving existing arrangements undisturbed and creating new machinery to give effect to new defense support measures. Even if provisions to this effect are not incorporated in the treaty, the British thought that the Foreign Ministers should be in position to make some statement of their economic aims before the end of the meeting.

Mr. Merchant noted that we thought it best not to use the Council as a vehicle for economic measures. Ambassador Munro agreed. Ambassador Spender concurred with the British statement as to making clear the economic aims during the conference.

Reverting to organization, Sir Robert Scott said he had received tentative comments from the Chief of Staff, but he emphasized that they did not yet have governmental approval.

On the military side, Scott said that the Chiefs of Staff thought there should be a Military Council at the Chief of Staff level, meeting from time to time, and a Military Executive Committee. In addition, there should be a small permanent secretariat for intelligence and other purposes.

[Page 766]

On forces, the ideal would be a strategic mobile reserve concentrated in the area but it was doubted that this could be managed and probably we would have to do the best we could with some forces in the area, others earmarked for the treaty area, to be reinforced after the outbreak of hostilities.

On the site of the Secretariat, Scott said that if there were any permanent organization, the British wished to make a strong plea for Singapore since it met the tests as to location, security, accessibility and communications. The British thought its colonial status irrelevant.

It was agreed to circulate to all the conference parties the new U.S. draft, with the changes proposed at this meeting.

On arrangements for the conference, it was agreed that the Working Party would assemble on September 1 at Manila and there was discussion of other arrangements.

Next Meeting. Mr. Merchant thought that there should be at least one more meeting next week, after we had the comments of those from whom we had not yet heard, or when any of the other parties present wished to have one called. He said it would be useful at that time to consider any comments from their own respective capitals on the new draft which was now being circulated.

  1. Apparent reference to SEAP D–2/5 dated Aug. 19, not printed. The Preamble and Articles II, III, and VIII in SEAP D–2/5 are identical to the equivalent parts of the U.S. working draft printed under date of Aug. 24, p. 784.

    Article IV in SEAP D–2/5 reads as follows:

    • “1. Each Party recognizes that Communist aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against Cambodia, Laos, or the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese Government, or against any States or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
    • “2. If, in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area is threatened by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any other fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security in the area.
    • “3. Measures taken under this Article in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 348)

  2. Supra.