Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 355
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Thacher)1
Subject:
- Pakistan Views on SEAP Treaty
Participants:
- Syed Amjad Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
- EUR—Mr.Merchant
- C—Mr.Galloway
- SOA—Mr.Thacher
In preliminary remarks, Ambassador Ali said he had been informed by his government that Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan would lead the Pakistan delegation to the SEAP conference, arriving in Manila September 3rd. The working party group representing Pakistan will be headed by Mr. Aga Hilaly, Acting Foreign Secretary, who expects to be in the Philippines by August 31.
Ambassador Ali came to the Department to discuss questions raised by his government concerning the preliminary draft of the South East Asia Pact.2 With regard to Article II (Maintenance of capacity to resist armed attack and resist subversion) he sought to know whether it implied commitments on the part of the signatories to some specific amount of assistance, either military or economic, or should it be regarded rather as a general expression of sentiment or perhaps “mere phraseology.”
Mr. Merchant said that Article II was intended as plenary language important to an expression of the general intent of the pact. He said the use of these words does not imply a specific commitment on the part of any of the powers and it does not create an obligation on Pakistan’s part any more than it does on the part of the United States for the transfer of any form of assistance to another nation. The question of “means of self-help and mutual aid” will be subjects for the Council to discuss.
With regard to Article III (free institutions and economic measures) the Ambassador asked how the Pakistanis might visualize the implementation of the language of the article. Is it to be viewed as more than a mere declaration of intent? Apparently it would [Page 759] appear that no specific benefits are intended to accrue to the parties by the language of the article. The Ambassador wondered whether this article implies an organization parallel or supplanting the Colombo Plan.
Mr. Merchant said that the article is intended to reflect the growing community sense of the members without carrying any advance commitment to any specific type of organization or to any program of economic assistance. It should not be considered as an attempt to supplant or compete with programs such as the Colombo Plan. We would not, for example, expect to turn over to a SEAP organization our existing bilateral arrangements with other signatories to the Pact. We would in fact regard these commitments as carrying out the language of Article III. Under the provisions of the article it is conceivable that a useful discussion might be held among the parties relative to trade volume between them, trade barriers, and so on. Meetings among the signatories of the pact might include other countries not at present prospective signers, such as Burma. However, it is true that the United States does not visualize the treaty as a vehicle for economic aid to the members. Implementation would be through discussion by the Council.
The Ambassador wondered whether important fields of economic cooperation of the type indicated by Mr. Merchant were not already taken care of through such organizations as GATT, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, ECAFE and the Colombo Plan. He said he had rather assumed from some recent remarks of the Secretary that the United States was thinking of something more concrete in the economic clauses of the treaty.
Ambassador Ali then raised the question as to what geographic areas would be included within the intent of the pact. It was explained to the Ambassador that a new article was being prepared which would be delivered to him shortly, describing the areas which it was proposed to include within the treaty area. It was proposed to draw a line at 21 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude, just south of Formosa and just north of the northern-most islands of the Philippines, which would be the northern boundary of the treaty area. Thus Cambodia, Laos and the territory of Vietnam under the free Vietnamese Government would be included in the protected territory. By its terms the treaty invites other countries to become members with the unanimous agreement of existing signatories. Under the Geneva agreements Vietnam cannot join such a pact. It is less clear that Laos and Cambodia would be barred, but in any case there is no reason why these three countries may not be brought within the protective intent of the treaty signatories.
The Ambassador asked what types of action were contemplated under Article IV (armed attack or other threat to sovereignty of [Page 760] the parties), and whether each country would remain free to decide whether or not it would take action.
It was explained to Ambassador Ali that although the article was meant to include the possibility of the use of armed force as one means of meeting aggression, yet necessarily the character of that aggression would determine what sort of action would have to be taken to meet it. Certainly each party does retain the right to determine what action it should take.
Mr. Merchant explained that the fundamental purpose of the treaty is for nations which have the necessary conviction to place on record their intention to resist armed aggression by the communists. One of the greatest values of the treaty should be as a public statement of a character calculated to reduce the communist inclination to attempt aggression. No country can be forced into a war by a majority vote of the council. We do not see this as a parallel to the elaborate NATO arrangements for specific build-up of military forces in the North Atlantic area within certain time limits. Rather we are thinking primarily in terms of signatories’ existing forces in being. Through the treaty a deterrent to the communists will be created, based not only on the strength of the countries in the area but on that of the United States and the United Kingdom also. However, it is not contemplated that SEAP would be activated by aggression in the NATO area.
Mr. Merchant wondered whether we might expect further comments from Karachi on the text of the treaty before the beginning of the conference. We had hoped that perhaps Pakistan might have some qualitative reaction if not actual suggestions for drafting changes. We feel that the activation of such an agreement is long overdue. But we would try to know in advance that we are going to have a successful convention.
The Ambassador stated that in his personal view there were no important differences between Pakistan’s desires as to what principles should be included and those of the United States. He remarked that Philippine representatives in Washington had expressed to him their desire for a NATO–type organization but that he had pointed out a number of differences between the situation in the Atlantic community and that in Southeast Asia, principally in that almost all of the European nations concerned had joined NATO arrangements. This would not be the case in Southeast Asia. Further, in Europe there had been a much more immediate threat of aggression from the Russians than existed, in the Ambassador’s opinion, from the Chinese Communists. The organization contemplated by SEAP would be too small to deal with direct aggression which would have many world-wide repercussions. Thus SEAP should perhaps be principally concerned with internal subversion. [Page 761] He declared that to Pakistan the possible adherence of Burma was of more importance than that of India in view of Burma’s position as a logical priority target for Chinese aggression. Such aggression would bring communist expansionism very close to East Pakistan. He said he believed that Pakistan would desire more than just a declaration of intent, such as the treaty contained, but that this was up to the more powerful countries to decide. Possibly anything more specific would go beyond U.S. capacity and willingness.
Mr. Merchant stressed that we were anxious to strengthen and contribute to the defense of those countries which wish to be counted as willing to join in collective efforts to oppose communist aggression. On the other hand we would not wish by our support for this organization to arouse excessive expectations of American military aid on the part of any country.
The Ambassador stated that if the treaty emerged as simply nothing more than a declaration of intent, then the other Colombo powers, whom Pakistan has decided to buck in attending the SEAP conference, might well take the position that Pakistan had differed from the general sentiment of its close neighbors for very little purpose.
It was stressed to the Ambassador that the force of the treaty was much more than a mere declaration of intent, and that in creation of a deterrent to communist aggression, a step was taken of substantial value to Pakistan’s national security.
The Ambassador said that he understood this, and that in fact it was for this reason that Pakistan was going to be at the conference in Manila.3
(Latest redrafts of the treaty were delivered to the Ambassador August 20.)4
- Drafted on Aug. 23.↩
- Apparently the draft dated Aug. 5, p. 708.↩
- In telegram 230 from Karachi, Aug. 24, Ambassador Hildreth reported: “Foreign Office apparently concerned over attitude GOP should take toward SEATO. Hilaly expresses fears GOP by joining might be isolated from other south Asian countries thus unable exert influence.” (396.1 MA/8–2454)↩
- Perhaps a reference to SEAP D–2/5a of that date, “Revised Preamble and Articles II, III, IV, VII and New Article VIII’, not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 348) All the revisions in SEAP D–2/5a of the draft dated Aug. 5 are included in the working draft printed under date of Aug. 24, p. 784.↩