Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/8–1854

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] August 18, 1954.

Subject:

• Southeast Asia Pact

Our discussions with other prospective members of the SEA Pact have uncovered several points on which we have not expressed clear U.S. views. In order to advance the preliminary work on the Pact, it would be desirable if, during the course of the present week, we could make known the U.S. attitude on the points listed below:

1. Name of Organization

In accordance with your suggestion some weeks ago, we have attempted to get away from the designation “SEATO” so as to avoid fostering the idea that an organization is envisaged for SEA and the Pacific similar to NATO, with all its connotations of elaborate military machinery and large standing forces in the area equipped and maintained principally by U.S. military aid. In spite of our efforts, the designation “SEATO” has stuck, mainly because the press has been using it for many months. Furthermore, the other prospective members of the Pact seem to prefer “SEATO” to any other name we have suggested.

I suggest that we accept that “SEATO” is here to stay and that we continue to make clear in our substantive discussions that so far as the U.S. is concerned, the SEA Pact is not conceived as a parallel to NATO.

2. Treatment of Economic Aspects

Certain of the other prospective members are placing considerable emphasis on economic activities in connection with the SEA Pact. Some of them, like the Filipinos and Pakistanis, obviously see it as a means for obtaining additional American economic assistance and incidentally fostering economic cooperation in the area. Others, particularly the Australians, contend that emphasis on economic aspects is the only basis for securing wide-spread support in Asia for the Pact.

A group is now working under Mr. Baldwin in FE on a possible plan for economic cooperation among free Asian nations, to which the U.S. would devote substantial resources. While it has made progress, this group has not yet made any definite recommendations. Apart from the further work required within the Executive Branch, it seems probable that necessary Congressional consultation on such a plan could not be completed before the end of the year.

You will recall that in preliminary discussions with you on the question of economic development in Asia, it was generally agreed, for a variety of reasons, that the proposed SEA Pact should not be the principal vehicle for U.S. cooperation with countries in the area. This being the case, we need to be as forthcoming as possible during the negotiations on the SEA Pact. Unless we can make our views on the means of economic cooperation fairly clear, the other members of the SEA Pact are likely to believe that the Pact itself offers the only means available.

The present draft economic article is a somewhat loosely worded permissive clause. The main objection voiced to it is that it lacks specification as to the definite forms of economic cooperation which might be undertaken.

It is recommended

a. That we extend the present economic article to specify cooperation in technical and cultural fields, or

b. That we inform the other prospective members why we do not regard the SEA Pact as the appropriate framework for assisting economic development and fostering economic cooperation in Asia and the Pacific; and that we hope soon to suggest the means or vehicle by which we believe that economic development and cooperation among free Asian nations can best be assisted.

3. Definition of the Treaty Area

We have from the outset recognized the need for specifying some limits to the area covered by the Treaty, particularly the principal operative clause thereof.

We would like to discuss with you the possibility of language along the following lines to be inserted as a separate article at an appropriate place:

“As used in this Treaty” the general area of Southeast Asia and of the Southwest Pacific “shall not include the Pacific area north of 20 degrees north latitude”.

or

“As used in this Treaty” the general area of Southeast Asia and of the Southwest Pacific “shall be deemed to include the area south of the southern borders of China and East of the Indian Ocean.”

4. Protection of Vietnam

We and the British agree that the SEA Pact should extend protection against armed attack to Laos, Cambodia, and free Vietnam. Australia and New Zealand agree that Laos and Cambodia should be protected but have drawn attention to the problem presented by Vietnam. We have no clear views as yet of the other prospective members concerning protection to be afforded the Associated States.

If Vietnam is not specifically protected while Laos and Cambodia are, it would be, in effect, an open invitation to the Communists to take over the entire country. On the other hand, if Vietnam is specifically included in the area of protection, we may find that within a period of a few months, we would be committed to protecting a Communist State from armed attack.

So far as armed attack is concerned, the problem is really one of phraseology in the Treaty, depending upon whether all of Vietnam or just the southern half would be protected. The question probably is academic in that it seems unlikely that armed attack is the real danger to Vietnam. The more likely course of events—subversion and infiltration leading to a Communist take-over in southern Vietnam—would be covered by the consultative clause of the Treaty.

It is suggested that we propose the following revision of Article IV, paragraph 1, to cover the Associated States:

“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the general area of Southeast Asia and of the Southwest Pacific on any of the Parties or on Cambodia, Laos, or the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese Government, or on any states or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

5. Interim Machinery

a. Site

The location of interim machinery need not necessarily be the same as for permanent machinery. If, however, agreement can be reached reasonably soon on the site for permanent machinery, the interim machinery could be established at the same place, thereby facilitating the orderly development of the permanent machinery. In general, the U.S. might adopt the position that we would prefer to see the interim machinery located in the area; however, we would be open to other suggestions.

b. Form of Representation

There should be organized an Interim Council which should be composed of the Foreign Minister and the diplomatic representatives of the other parties in one of the capitals. This Interim Council could arrange for such ad hoc working groups or committees as might be required to assist it in its function pending the coming into force of the Treaty. It is not foreseen that any formal bodies or committees, other than the Interim Council, would be required in the immediate future.

c. Military Representation

A Military Advisory Committee to the Interim Council should be provided. These military advisors should assist the Interim Council in making recommendations as to the scope of military work to be undertaken within the framework of the Pact. Following agreement on the scope of the work to be undertaken, recommendations can be made as to further military machinery required.

d. Secretariat

Until there is general agreement on the scope of operations to be undertaken, any international secretariat should be confined to those individuals required for the purely administrative work of the Interim Council and the Military Advisory Committee. In the interim stages, it might be desirable that such secretariat should be provided by the host government rather than by contributed individuals from all of the member nations.

6. Permanent Machinery

a. Site

Both Australia and New Zealand argue strongly against having the permanent machinery situated either in Thailand or the Philippines. By the process of elimination, Ambassador Spender comes up with Canberra as the best location.

We are not impressed with most of the arguments the Australians and New Zealanders have put forward against Thailand and the Philippines, and we believe it would be a great mistake to have the permanent machinery situated in other than an Asian country.

The choice to us seems to be between Thailand and the Philippines.

b. Development of Permanent Machinery

The Interim Council should be given the task of making recommendations for the establishment of permanent machinery. The Foreign Ministers, at the Manila meeting, should attempt to reach agreement in general terms on the scope of activities to be undertaken, as a guide for the Interim Council in drawing up its recommendations on permanent machinery.

1. Attached to a covering note of the same date from Kitchen to the Secretary in which Kitchen wrote that the Secretary was scheduled to meet that afternoon with Merchant, Robertson, Phleger, Jernegan, Bowie, and other officials in order to discuss this memorandum and other papers concerning a Southeast Asia defense treaty.

   No other record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.