Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/8–1754

The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, August 17, 1954.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to the Draft Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty,¹ copies of which were made available to the Department of Defense by the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their views² on the draft submitted by the United States member of the Joint US–UK Study Group on Indochina. The comments of the Department of Defense are made in light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in consideration of a revised version of the draft Treaty contained in SEAP D–2/1, dated 5 August 1954.³

The Department of Defense considers that the revised draft Treaty is generally satisfactory subject to the following comments:

a. In order to strengthen provisions of the Treaty which permit protection to be extended to countries of the area not participating in the Treaty, the word “general” before “area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific” should be added in paragraph four of the preamble as well as in paragraph one of Article IV.

b. The Department of Defense believes that in further negotiations both preliminary and at the time of the meeting of the Ministers, it should be made clear that no commitments by the United States to support the raising, equipping, and maintenance of indigenous forces and/or to deploy United States forces in such strengths as to provide for an effective defense of all of the national territory of each signatory is implied or intended. Military aid by the United States to the Southeast Asian countries who are members of the pact would be limited to that necessary to permit the countries concerned to raise, equip, and maintain military forces as necessary to insure internal stability, to provide a reasonably effective opposition to any attempted invasion, and to instill national confidence. This is consistent with the views expressed at our meeting on 24 July 1954,⁴ and in your message No. 589 to London dated 28 July 1954.⁵

c. It should equally be made clear that the Treaty would not commit the United States to a large-scale program of economic aid to the signatory countries in lieu of military aid since, in the final analysis, funds for economic aid must come from the total amount of money available for the national security programs of the United States.

d. It is the view of the Department of Defense that if the Treaty is ultimately to result in the development of effective collective strength to halt further Communist control in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, those nations in the area which are potentially capable of making a substantial military contribution, i.e., Japan, Korea, and possibly Nationalist China, should eventually be permitted to subscribe to the Treaty if they so desire. Accordingly, this point should be made clear to the other signatories in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty.

The Department of Defense considers that it would be premature and undesirable to discuss, either at the meeting of Ministers or before, the formation of an organization associating the military representatives of the participating nations. The Council and the political machinery of the Treaty should be established first. This could be followed by the creation of military machinery necessary to make the Treaty effective. In the view of this Department such military coordination should be similar to the ANZUS arrangements.

It is recognized that it is not feasible to include in the Treaty itself details relating to implementation of the provisions by the Parties. However, the Department of Defense strongly urges that in the formulation of implementing procedures by the Council, the United States take a position in support of permitting concerted action by a lesser number than the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggression in any form. In addition, careful consideration should be given to the practicability and desirability of providing voting machinery in the Council which would preclude the possibility that, at some time in the future when the membership is expanded, a bloc of “neutrals” or a British Commonwealth bloc could exercise a controlling voice.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the opinion, with which I fully concur, that the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina, considered in conjunction with the general retrograde trend within the Western Bloc, serve to increase the urgency of the need for a comprehensive United States policy with respect to the Far East region as a whole. This is necessary in order to give direction, cohesiveness, and greater effectiveness to the political and military actions which must now be taken to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia to Communist control. It is considered that until the United States formulates and adopts such an over-all policy we shall be severely handicapped in any negotiations for the establishment of a collective defense in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. It would appear necessary that certain basic decisions be made with respect to how far the United States is willing to go, in concert with all or certain of the non-Communist nations having interests in the Far East or, if necessary, unilaterally, in opposing further Communist accretions in the area under consideration.⁶

Sincerely yours,

C. E. Wilson

1. Dated July 9, and included in SEAP D–2, dated Aug. 2, p. 686.
2. See the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Aug. 13, printed in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 719–724.
3. Ante, p. 708.
4. For the minutes, see p. 665.
5. Ante, p. 680.

6. In a memorandum for the files dated Aug. 20, Merchant wrote:

   “On August 18 Admiral Davis telephoned me to give me a preview of a letter which Mr. Wilson had just signed to the Secretary generally endorsing the JCS views on our Working Draft 2 of the SEA Treaty text. He ran down the points. I challenged him on the concept that economic aid was undesirable because it allegedly came out of the U.S. defense budget and I also stated that I thought it was an untenable position to attempt to avoid discussion with the other prospective parties of the question of military machinery or organization.

   “The matter was left that we would study the letter on arrival and then get hold of Admiral Davis for discussion of it if such then seemed necessary.” (790.5/8–2054)