The Planning Board prepared the enclosed statement of policy in the light of
the outcome of the Geneva Conference and on basis of a review of (1) the
current policies with respect to Japan, Formosa, Communist China, Korea,
Southeast Asia, the Philippines, South Asia and Hong Kong contained in
references A–C and (2) the current NSC
projects relating to the Far East listed above as references D–I.
Paragraph 10 of the enclosure is intended as a response to the recommendation
of the Operations Coordinating Board with respect to Thailand contained in
paragraph 8 of the memorandum from the Executive Officer, OCB, transmitted by reference H. Paragraph 11
of the enclosure proposes a revision of paragraphs 19 and 21 of NSC 171/1 in response to the recommendation of
the OCB contained in the first paragraph on
page 3 of the reference progress report (reference F).
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of
policy after resolution of the divergent proposals contained therein, it be
submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it,
direct its use as a general guide in the implementation of policies toward
the Far East by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the
U.S. Government, and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the
coordinating
[Page 698]
agency. Based upon
Council action on the enclosure the Planning Board will review the current
NSC policies for the Far East contained
in references A–C and will recommend to the Council any necessary revisions
therein.
[Here follows a table of contents.]
[Enclosure]
Draft
Statement of Policy Proposed by the
National Security Council on Review of U.S. Policy in the Far
East
preface
Consequences of the Geneva
Conference
Communist successes in Indochina, culminating in the agreement reached at
the Geneva Conference, have produced the following significant
consequences which jeopardize the security interests of the U.S. in the
Far East and increase Communist strength there:
- a.
- Regardless of the fate of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,
the Communists have secured possession of an advance salient in
Vietnam from which military and non-military pressures can be
mounted against adjacent and more remote non-Communist
areas.
- b.
- The loss of prestige in Asia suffered by the U.S. as a backer
of the French and the Bao Dai Government will raise further
doubts in Asia concerning U.S. leadership and the ability of the
U.S. to check the further expansion of Communism in Asia.
Furthermore, U.S. prestige will inescapably be associated with
subsequent developments in Southeast Asia.
- c.
- By adopting an appearance of moderation at Geneva and taking
credit for the cessation of hostilities in Indochina, the
Communists will be in a better position to exploit their
political strategy of imputing to the United States motives of
extremism, belligerency, and opposition to co-existence seeking
thereby to alienate the U.S. from its allies. The Communists
thus have a basis for sharply accentuating their “peace
propaganda” and “peace program” in Asia in an attempt to allay
fears of Communist expansionist policy and to establish closer
relations with the nations of free Asia.
- d.
- The Communists have increased their military and political
prestige in Asia and their capacity for expanding Communist
influence by exploiting political and economic weakness and
instability in the countries of free Asia without resort to
armed attack.
- e.
- The loss of Southeast Asia would imperil retention of Japan as
a key element in the off-shore island chain.
[Page 699]
courses of action
[I. Communist China]*
I. The Off-Shore Island Chain
1. The United States must maintain the security and increase the strength
of the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa,
Philippines, Australia and New Zealand) as an element essential to U.S.
security. To this end:
- a.
- Increase the military strength of Japan and the Philippines,
improve the effectiveness of existing military strength of the
Republic of Korea and of Formosa, and continue participation in
ANZUS.
- b.
- Provide related economic assistance to the local governments
in those cases where the agreed level of indigenous military
strength is beyond the capacity of the local economy to
support.
- c.
- Encourage [the conditions which will make possible]16 the formation of, and be prepared to
participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense
arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of
China, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the
Southeast Asia security structure and ANZUS.
- d.
- Initiate and support appropriate measures which will
contribute to strengthening the economy of Japan, its internal
political stability and its ties with the free world.
- e.
- Intensify covert and psychological actions to strengthen the
orientation of these countries toward the free world.
II. General Political and Economic
Measures in the Far East†
2. Encourage the prompt organization of an economic grouping by the
maximum number of free Asian states, including Japan and as many of the
Colombo Powers as possible, based on self-help and mutual aid, and the
participation and support (including substantial financial assistance)
of the U.S. and other appropriate Western countries through which, by
united action, these free Asian states will be enabled more effectively
to achieve the economic and social strength needed to maintain their
independence.
3. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of free Asian
countries for trade with each other and with other free world
countries.
[Page 700]
4. Provide technical assistance to help develop political stability and
economic health.
5. [Increase and] strengthen “exchange of persons” programs with the
countries concerned.
III. Southeast Asia
6. General The U.S. must protect its position and
restore its prestige in the Far East by a new initiative in Southeast
Asia, where the situation must be stabilized as soon as possible to
prevent further losses to Communism through (1) creeping expansion and
subversion, or (2) overt aggression.
7. Security Treaty. Negotiate a Southeast Asia
security treaty with the UK, Australia,
New Zealand, France, the Philippines, Thailand and, as appropriate,
other free South and Southeast Asian countries willing to participate,
which would:
| Alternative A |
Alternative B |
| a. Involve the agreement of the participants that there
should be immediate retaliation against Communist China if
Communist China, directly or indirectly (such as through the
Viet Minh) commits armed aggression against any free nation
of Southeast Asia, including Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam. |
a. Commit each member to treat an armed attack on the
agreed area as dangerous to its own peace and safety and to
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its own
constitutional processes. |
- b.
- Provide so far as possible a legal basis to the President,
without need for further Congressional action, to attack
Communist China in the event it commits such armed
aggression.
- c.
- Ensure that, in such event, other nations would be obligated
to support such U.S. action.
- d.
- Not limit U.S. freedom to use nuclear weapons, or involve a
U.S. commitment for local defense or for stationing U.S. forces
in Southeast Asia.
The U.S. would continue to provide limited military assistance and
training missions, wherever possible, to the states of Southeast Asia in
order to bolster their will to fight, to stabilize legal governments,
and to assist them in controlling subversion.
8. Action in the Event of Local Subversion
[Page 701]
| Alternative A |
Alternative B |
| Because of the strong possibility that the above-mentioned
economic and military measures may not prove adequate to cope
with the type of creeping expansion and subversion utilized by
the Communists in Indochina, the U.S. should issue at the
earliest practicable moment a declaration to the Chinese
Communists that further Communist expansion on the mainland of
Southeast Asia, determined by the U.S. to be directed and
supported by the Government of Communist China, will not be
tolerated and that its continuance would in all probability lead
to the application of military power not necessarily restricted
to conventional weapons against the source of the aggression
(i.e., Communist China). Efforts should be made to expand the
Security Treaty to include allied support for the above
declaration. Failure to achieve full allied support should not,
however, deter the U.S. from making such a declaration or taking
action. |
In addition to its commitments under par. 7–a, the U.S. should
be prepared, either unilaterally or under the terms of the
South-east Asia Security Treaty, if requested by a legitimate
local government, to assist it by military force, if necessary
and feasible, to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion
which does not constitute external armed attack. |
IV. Communist China
Alternative A
12. In order to foster free world unity and to remove concern that we
will provoke a total war by accident or design, the U.S. should seek, as
rapidly as feasible, to put its relations with Communist China on the
same footing as those with the Soviet Union. To this end, the U.S.
should:
[Page 702]
- a.
- Make clear to Communist China our determination to attack
Communist China only if it commits armed aggression.‡
- b.
- Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and
military strength of non-Communist Asian countries.
- c.
- Cease to encourage or support Chinese Nationalist military
action against Communist China while continuing to support the
right of the Nationalists to retain Formosa.
- d.
- Acquiesce in the entry of Communist China into the U.N. if she adheres to U.N. principles and if Formosa also
remains a member.
- e.
- Consider recognition of Communist China as the government of
mainland China if she qualifies for entry into the U.N. under subparagraph d.
above.
- f.
- Bring trade restrictions into conformity with those applying
to the Soviet Union.
- g.
- Seek to impair Sino-Soviet relations by all feasible overt and
covert means.
Alternative B
13. Seek to reduce, by means short of war, the relative power of
Communist China in Asia:
- a.
-
(1) Make clear to Communist China our determination to
attack Communist China only if it commits armed
aggression.§
(2) Retaliate promptly and appropriately for any Communist
Chinese violation of accepted international behavior, other
than armed aggression, directly affecting U.S. security
interests.
- b.
- Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and
military strength of non-Communist Asian countries.
- c.
- Maintain political and economic pressures against Communist
China, including the existing embargo and support for Chinese
Nationalist harassing actions.
- d.
- Support the Chinese National Government on Formosa as the
Government of China and the representative of China in all
UN agencies.
- e.
- Impair Sino-Soviet relations by all feasible overt and covert
means.
Alternative C
14. Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but
without deliberately provoking, war:
- a.
-
(1) Prevent, by force if necessary, any further expansion
of Communist control in Asia through creeping expansion and
subversion or through armed aggression. Make clear to the
Communists U.S. determination to take action directly
against the source of any such expansion.
[Page 703]
(2) React with immediate positive, armed force against any
belligerent Communist Chinese move.
- b, c, d, e.
- Same as 13–b, c, d, e.
Alternative D
15. Reverse the present trend toward greater Communist Chinese power in
Asia by initiating an increasingly positive policy toward Communist
China designed to confront the regime with a clear likelihood of U.S.
military action against China proper unless Communist China takes public
action to change its belligerent support of Communist expansion. To this
end:
- a.
- Take such actions as to present Communist China with an
obvious casus belli in the face of which
the U.S., with such allied support as may exist, can by its
preparatory acts and through direct secret warnings threaten
military action against China and thus require China to test
Soviet willingness to support China in the specific
circumstances even though this involves general war.
- b.
- Be prepared and determined to carry out the threat of military
action unless China backs down on the issue involved.
- c.
- Exploit by all means such a backing-down by Communist China to
make it lose face in the Orient.
- d.
- Prevent, by force if necessary, any further expansion of
Communist control in Asia through creeping expansion and
subversion or through armed aggression. Make clear to the
Communists U.S. determination to take action directly against
the source of any such expansion.
- e.
- Maintain all practicable pressures on China, including covert
actions, to create internal division in the regime and to
intensify conflicts in Sino-Soviet relations.
- f.
- Maintain political and economic pressures against Communist
China, including the existing embargo, covert actions and
support for Chinese Nationalist harassing actions.
- g.
- Support the Chinese National Government on Formosa as the
Government of China and the representative of China in all
UN agencies.
- h.
- Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and
military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including
development of Japan as a major power to counter-balance
Communist China.
