790.5/7–2854: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State1
118. Department’s 102, July 24 (sent Karachi 92)2 and Karachi’s 9, July 26 (sent Department 88).3 This Embassy concurs that participation in SEATO by Pakistan would increase Indian hostility against collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia. However, [Page 679] it seems clear that India will oppose such arrangement anyway, particularly in view of Indian chairmanship of Indochina Cease-fire Commission.
There are pros and cons to Pakistan participation as viewed from New Delhi. Arguments against Pakistan participation include fact that United States military aid to Pakistan is already important reason for India’s increasing relations with Red China. Further Indian concern regarding Pakistan at this moment might change GOI attitude on Indochina Commission. Moreover, in view of Pakistan’s economic conditions, it might not be desirable to encourage Pakistan to increase its commitments or to lean too heavily on US for additional support. While there is little likelihood that Pakistan’s abstention would soften Indian attitude substantially, less polemics in press and public statements against SEATO would be made if Pakistan is not member.
On other hand, Pakistan’s participation might have favorable effect on Burma and Ceylon. While Burmese would probably not say so publicly, they would in fact feel more assured of prompt support in case of Chinese attack, just as Afghans now feel help could come to them through West Pakistan if USSR attacks. Closeness of East Pakistan to vulnerable areas of South Asia would serve as justification for Pakistan participation. If Pakistan collective security connections remain solely with Turkey and Middle East, we may find it difficult to justify introduction of US military equipment into East Pakistan, whereas Pakistan’s membership in South Asian arrangement would make American equipment and some personnel in Dacca understandable. Moreover, it may be difficult to find adequate basis for refusing Pakistan participation if GOP shows strong desire to join either initially or later. I am inclined to think views of GOP should be chief determinant. Impact on India would be lessened if one other Colombo power could be induced to join. Ceylon seems most likely candidate, and Pakistan may wish to sound out Ceylon. If, in addition, some indication of benevolent attitude by Burma could be obtained, Nehru could hardly lash out against all his immediate neighbors.