790.5/7–2754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Metcalf)
Subject:
- The Ambassador’s Observations on SEATO
Participants:
- Mr. S. Amjad Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
- NEA—Mr. Jernegan
- SOA—Mr. Metcalf
In conversation yesterday the Ambassador on his initiative offered some observations on the character of a South East Asia defense arrangement. He said that on the assumption that the forthcoming meeting of Asian and other powers would address itself to the actual organization of such an arrangement, it seemed very important to him that the allocation and provision of troops should be an integral part of the plan. He said that this point would have a great psychological effect on the small, weak nations of South East Asia. The Ambassador could see two contingencies in that area: either outright invasion of some nation by Red China (which he said would probably mean general war), or a Viet Minh-type of operation (which he said would be the more likely prospect). Without the allocation of troops for ready use in the area, the Ambassador was not sure that small nations would be willing to provoke the Chinese by adhering to a collective security arrangement. The Ambassador cited Burma as an example of such a nation.
Mr. Jernegan1 wondered whether Burma had to worry about a Viet Minh-type development within its borders. The Ambassador replied that according to his information from Karachi, there were communist “cells” in northern Burma which could become active and which were of some concern to Pakistan, which shared a frontier [Page 677] with Burma. Also the Pakistanis understand that Chou En-lai told the Prime Minister of Burma2 during their recent meeting in Rangoon that they should meet again for further talks.
Mr. Jernegan observed that our thinking on SEATO was in the formative stage, but that it was his understanding that eventual troop provision was not necessarily to be excluded from the organization. He pointed out that NATO itself did not have any troops when it was first created. He added that if the Asian participants in the forthcoming conference should give emphasis to this point, he was sure it would become a matter for consideration.
The Ambassador said that on his own initiative he was pressing his Government to give serious thought to participation in SEATO. He believed he had won Foreign Minister Zafrulla over to his line of thinking. He could go no further, however, until he had a better idea of what the U.S. attitude would be toward Pakistan’s relation to SEATO. (He added that the Australian Ambassador, Sir Percy Spender, would like to see Pakistan join up at the beginning.) The Ambassador said that Pakistan had the “bodies”; the requirement now was equipment.
Mr. Jernegan remarked that there were various aspects to be considered, including the possible need of Pakistan to build up its economy before trying to support larger forces. He wondered whether this could be accomplished very soon. He went on to ask whether the Ambassador really thought it would be desirable for Pakistan to join SEATO if all the other Colombo powers stood aloof. Might it not be better, in the long run, for Pakistan to remain outside and exert its influence on the others to modify their policies in the direction of eventual participation? The Ambassador did not directly answer this last question but said that if Pakistan made up its mind to join SEATO it would probably make a determined effort to get Ceylon to do likewise. If both Ceylon and Pakistan joined, he thought this would have real advantages.
The implication was left that he was not sure it would be advantageous for Pakistan alone to participate.