Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/7–2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State¹

secret

Djakarta, July 23, 1954—5 p.m.

156. Depcirtel 39.² Indonesia highly unlikely near future to join collective security pact for Southeast Asia. In my opinion, however, Indonesian attitude should not deter us in implementing mutual defense arrangement with those SEA countries now willing.

Now that cease-fire has been arranged in Indochina, Indonesians will be more inclined to continue policy of “wait and see”. This fits their natural bent to inaction when facing weighty complex problems, and cessation of shooting in SEA will now, in their view, give further license to this attitude.

Indonesian motives range over all-too-familiar spectrum neutralist arguments. Many responsible Indonesians, in and out of government, gravely concerned over growing strength Red China, but most appear inclined to allow matter develop in its own way and hope for best. Indonesia is not prepared, because of its whole “neutralist independent” approach to foreign affairs, action which would be equivalent of saying “we regard China as threat to peace of SEA” and would much prefer to avoid making any far-reaching decisions. In addition, in Indonesia writing and discussion of problem, the thought crops up that in last analysis Britain and US would never let Indonesia fall to Chinese, and that their island position plus allied air and sea power makes it possible for them to enjoy a free ride and postpone taking decision on China problem. Future attitude of Indonesians will largely depend on “new signs” of Communist aggression. If this threat develops from without they are not likely to warm to idea of mutual security unless the threat seems to be immediately directed at Indonesia. Indonesia also is not oblivious to possible danger of “liberation” from within. Even non-Communist leaders in present government entertain misgivings re Indonesian Communist intentions and most opposition leaders are even more sensitive to Communist threat, both internal and external.

I agree fully with Department’s views that we should press forward as rapidly as possible with Southeast Asia defense pact. To wait until what would doubtlessly be futile effort to secure participation of “neutral” countries such as Indonesia would only make us the more vulnerable to charges of provocation, should we approach problem after relaxation has set in following Indochina cease-fire. As we progress we should take some pains to keep Indonesia informed to greatest degree possible in keeping with security considerations on formation of such pact. In addition to reducing Indonesian feeling that US in “high-handed manner” and without consulting Indonesia taking action which may vitally affect Indonesian interests, it would especially favorably impress those in sympathy with any action which would provide protection against Chinese Communist threat.

Cumming

1. Repeated to London for information; pouched to Bangkok, Canberra, Karachi, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Rangoon, Saigon, and Wellington.
2. Dated July 16, sent to Colombo, Djakarta, Karachi, New Delhi, and Rangoon. In this telegram, the Department had requested each Embassy to estimate whether the government to which it was accredited might join a Southeast Asia security pact. “US view is that while we would not wish exclude these nations from membership collective security pact we not prepared accept delay conclusion security pact in order have any or all these nations come in as initial members. We continue feel strongly we should press forward as rapidly as possible create collective SEA defense with those nations now ready to proceed.” (790.5/7–1654)