State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Here follows a list of persons present (28). All of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended. General Ridgway had become Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Department of State group was led by Murphy and MacArthur. Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, attended for the CIA.]
1. Southeast Asia Defense Pact
Mr. Murphy stated we would like to bring the Joint Chiefs up to date with respect to our current thinking on the creation of a Southeast Asian defense alliance and asked Mr. MacArthur to outline our views.
Mr. MacArthur dwelt at some length on the developments over the past few months with respect to this subject and the attitude of countries in Southeast Asia. Thailand and the Philippines, as well as Australia and New Zealand, favor a pact. Indonesia has informed us its attitude would be one of “active neutrality”.2 We do [Page 654] not know what the position of Burma and India will be although the Burmese may be benevolent although non-participants whereas the Indians will probably be negative. We hope that a working group of the countries willing to participate may meet around the first of September and it has been agreed with the British that invitations for this meeting should be issued early in August. The working group will need to reach conclusions about (a) the text of a treaty, (b) the permanent organization to implement the treaty and (c) interim organization. With respect to the permanent organizational structure, there are three possibilities: (a) an elaborate structure comparable to NATO’s; (b) a simple standing council with a civilian representative and military advisers and no other committees; and (c) a council which would meet when called together or periodically. We tend to favor the second type of machinery. With respect to interim machinery, we favor the establishment of an interim council at a suitable location in the Far East. The Ambassadors of the participating countries at this post might serve as the foreign ministers’ deputies and they might have attached to them a small civilian and military staff.
At the conclusion of Mr. MacArthur’s briefing, Admiral Davis said he had understood the study group talks with the British involved no commitments on either side and that the U.S. was not committed to anything with respect to a Southeast Asia defense alliance. He stated he thought the Chiefs might question participation by the Colombo powers and might also have questions to raise about the area to be covered by the defense pact. He said he had discussed this subject with Secretary Wilson and thought this might be a suitable occasion to give Secretary Wilson’s initial thinking.
Admiral Radford interrupted at this point to say that he thought it would be desirable to present the Joint Chiefs’ views. He made it clear that the Chiefs had reached no formal decision about a Southeast Asia defense alliance but thought he could speak for them on this occasion. He invited any of the Chiefs to speak up if they had views contrary to those he would express.
Last April, said Admiral Radford, the Joint Chiefs had recommended that a regional pact be formed in Southeast Asia. This recommendation, however, was made before the Geneva Conference and when it was assumed that the military power of France and Vietnam would be included in the pact. The Chiefs had believed that French and Vietnamese power would form the nucleus of the [Page 655] strength needed in a defense alliance in this area. The situation has fundamentally changed since that time as we are now talking about an area where there are no developed military forces. The Burmese and the Thais have only forces sufficient for the maintenance of internal security. Indigenous military power in the Far East is found in Korea and Formosa and some is developing in Japan. Military power can be built in Southeast Asia only at considerable cost. Admiral Radford feels we should take a good look at the idea of a defense alliance for this area to be sure we are not making a mistake. The idea of countering aggression should it occur in Southeast Asia is one thing, but that is different from meeting the aggression in the locale where it occurs. Admiral Radford implied we would not wish to resist aggression there but would wish to strike at China. Furthermore, if we attempt to build forces in Southeast Asia we will have to reduce expenditures elsewhere.
Mr. MacArthur stated the reasons why we regarded the creation of a defense alliance as a first priority project and emphasized we believed its initial purpose would be mainly one of assisting the countries there to devise means to resist internal subversion. The cost of a program for this purpose could be kept within reasonable limits.
Admiral Radford disagreed, noting that the Thais had requested $400 million in aid and that even this amount would only result in the creation of a force of 180,000 men. If we had agreed to this request, we would not have gotten any real defense for this expenditure. In addition, if we conclude a defense alliance, the South Asians [sic] will be led to believe that they will be protected. This will not be the case because if there is further military aggression by China it will not be countered locally in Southeast Asia but we will hit directly at China itself. Hence, the whole project can have the most adverse effects.
General Ridgway stated he fully agreed with Admiral Radford. For security reasons we would not be able to tell the countries of the area that we were not going to protect them if they were invaded. To attempt to protect them would be an unjustified diversion of our military resources.
Mr. MacArthur said we were not disagreeing with the Chiefs’ strategic concept and that he personally assumed that we would strike at China itself. However, the defense alliance would serve notice on the Chinese that if they cross the line we would retaliate.
Mr. Murphy repeated the theme that we felt the greatest danger at the moment was not from overt aggression but rather from internal subversion.
[Page 656]Mr. MacArthur also pointed out that a defense pact would give the countries confidence that there is a deterrent and this would perhaps decisively affect their willingness to deal with the internal problem. He again stressed the view that the aid required for this purpose would not be substantial.
Admiral Radford again cited the Thais as an illustration that the demands on us would not be modest. Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Secretary was anxious to obtain the $800 million we had requested for fiscal 1955 for aid to Southeast Asia and inquired whether the Chiefs had not been in accord with this position. Admiral Radford replied that the $800 million would not be enough to put real teeth in a defense pact and in any case it had already been cut to $712 million and from what Congressman Taber had said to him he expected there would be further cuts.
Admiral Radford stated that from a military point of view a Southeast Asia defense pact seemed undesirable and unwise. It will lead the countries of this area to believe they will be protected. This will not be so. All the Chiefs agreed with this position. They were extremely concerned about our joining such an alliance under present circumstances. All the military strength in the Far East is in the north but neither Korea nor Formosa are even being invited to participate. Will this not complicate our problems with them? Furthermore, Admiral Radford said, he felt the entire world wide military aid program was getting out of hand. We make additional commitments to various countries (recently, for example, to the Turks and the Thais) and these complicate the problem. In addition, Congress is going to pull in its belt and reduce the size of the program. And now, under the terms of the Geneva agreements, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, he assumed, would not even be able to participate in a defense pact.
Mr. MacArthur, referring to the last point made by Admiral Radford, said our analysis of the Geneva agreement was incomplete and that we were not yet clear on the extent to which they might be able to participate in such a pact. However, an alliance would serve notice on the Chinese that we would go after them if they renewed their aggression. We did not want to lose the area by default. Admiral Radford reiterated the view that we should not take the risk of allowing the Formosans, Koreans and Japanese to feel they had been left out. Mr. Murphy then inquired if the Chiefs assumed we lost Southeast Asia, what difference it would make to their strategic plans. Admiral Radford, without answering this question, said he thought the main problem was internal subversion. In Burma, so far as he knew, there was no military mission. Mr. Murphy said we do not expect the Burmese to participate in an alliance. General Ridgway then said that Admiral Radford and [Page 657] the rest of the Chiefs really felt we should take a very hard look at the idea of a defense pact to make sure we are not making a mistake. General Ridgway expressed his very deep concern over our dollar commitments for military aid and referred to the very substantial costs of our undertakings in Korea where aid next year will have to be of the magnitude of $700 million to a billion.
Admiral Radford expressed like sentiments and again stated his fear that the U.S. would suffer a severe loss of prestige if we agree to a defense pact. Mr. MacArthur repeated his view that large expenditures would not be required providing we kept the emphasis of the program on measures to improve internal security.
Admiral Radford felt this would not be possible and that the nations of the area would not be modest in their demands. We have a position of strength in the north which has cost us a lot. Very little can be done regardless of expenditures to generate military strength in the south. Why should we not divide up the area? The U.S. could assume responsibility for the Western Pacific and ask the British to assume responsibility for the security of the south.
General Twining expressed his agreement with Admiral Radford and his feeling that we should not use American forces in Southeast Asia to stop aggression. Mr. Murphy said he felt it essential that Admiral Radford discuss his views with the Secretary as soon as possible and the latter indicated that he would do so at a meeting already arranged in the Secretary’s office at 11:30 tomorrow.
Admiral Davis said he assumed that the agreement the President reached with Churchill did not commit us to proceed on a Southeast Asia defense alliance. Mr. MacArthur pointed out this was not the case since the agreement was in terms of either a success or failure at Geneva.
[Here follows discussion of other topics.]
- A note on the title page reads: “State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.”↩
At a conversation held July 21 with MacArthur and other officials, Sir Robert Scott had shown the group a telegram from the British Ambassador in Indonesia, Oscar Charles Morland, which described the latter’s conversation with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. In his memorandum of the conversation in Washington, Jernegan paraphrased part of the telegram as follows:
“The Prime Minister went on to say that whether or not agreement was reached at Geneva on Indochina, the Indonesian government would not participate in the establishment of collective defense for Southeast Asia, as suggested by Mr. Eden, since this would be contrary to the policy of ‘active neutrality’ of the Indonesian government.” (790.5/7–2154)
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