Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341
United States Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Joint United States-United Kingdom Study Group1
[Extract]
JSG MC–4
[Participants:]
- UK
- Sir Robert H. Scott
- Mr. Dennis Holland, Legal Advisor, British Embassy
- Maj. Gen. C. R. Price, C/S of British Joint Staff Mission
- Lt. Col. R. G. V. FitzGeorge Balfour
- Mr. M. G. L. Joy
- Mr. F. R. MacGinnis
- US
- The Under Secretary
- Admiral Davis
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. C.C. Stelle
- Mr. W. J. Galloway
- Mr. L. C Meeker
- Mr. W. R. Tyler
- Mr. E. A. Gullion
- Mr. P. J. Sturm
- Mr. C. Van Hollen
Sir Robert Scott opened the meeting with reference to the draft treaty saying that since the Working Group cannot agree on a final text it might be advisable to put up a paper on the agreed purposes of the several articles of the treaty.
[Page 617]The Under Secretary replied that that might be a helpful procedure but inquired why we should not push ahead with a draft of the treaty.
Sir Robert Scott replied that to complete a treaty would require a long time.
The Under Secretary asked whether the U.S. draft2 was causing the British some trouble.
Sir Robert Scott replied that in a few points it is in fact giving the British trouble. In this connection the third paragraph of the preamble as drafted may raise in British minds the question of whether immediate independence for Malaya is intended. With regard to paragraph four, Sir Robert suggested that the wording was unfortunate and should be revised (the Under Secretary agreed with this comment). Sir Robert submitted an alternate version of paragraph five as follows: “Desiring to promote stability and well-being in the area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, to strengthen the fabric of peace and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”
Sir Robert suggested that the words “and Communist subversion and infiltration” be deleted from Article II. He stated that the purpose of this suggestion was to render the treaty more attractive to the Colombo Powers.
The Under Secretary objected that the whole purpose of this effort is to define the dangers of Communist subversion and infiltration and to erect defenses against them.
Sir Robert suggested that it might be possible to find a euphemism for “Communist subversion and infiltration” such as “subversive activities directed from without.”
The Under Secretary said that he liked the insertion proposed by the UK representative but asked why we should be coy about Communism. Nehru is rough on Communists in his own country and the President and Prime Minister in their recent public declarations did not shy from the word.
Mr. Stelle interjected that we would have very grave difficulty here with a revision along the lines suggested by the British.
The Under Secretary said he must refuse to delete the word “Communist.” The purpose of the Study Group is to discover whether the words used by the respective principals mean the same thing. He added that he preferred to retain the present wording of article II.
Sir Robert Scott inquired whether we wish in fact to use the word “Communism” in the text of a treaty.
[Page 618]Sir Robert Scott continued by saying that in Article III he wished to propose the deletion of the words “on any of the Parties, or on any states or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement so designate.” He commented in this connection that he had in mind areas such as Burma which might not wish to be included under a protective umbrella and also the fact that the wording could permit the parties to designate an area in any part of the world.
The Under Secretary replied that the purpose of this wording was of course to provide protection to Laos and Cambodia and retained Vietnam without naming them. He suggested that after the words “or any states or territory” there be added the phrase “in that area.”
Sir Robert Scott said that we could not contemplate action to protect a country without first having consulted with it. Perhaps Laos, Cambodia and retained Vietnam could be somehow covered by article V.
The Under Secretary suggested that a small joint drafting group get together to work over the text. He said that he was less worried than the UK appears to be by the prospect of other nations benefiting by any protective arrangements worked out.
Mr. Joy suggested that Article VIII of the NATO Treaty be worked into the text of the present treaty.
Sir Robert Scott said that the question of the duration of this treaty gave him some concern, but he added that we should not spend too much time on trying to perfect a draft at this stage since any documents submitted to the respective governments would be labeled “a preliminary draft.”
The Under Secretary said that in his view it was best to have the treaty of indefinite duration with the right of denunciation. He added that Sir Robert Scott’s submission which incorporates a statement on the purposes of the treaty might be incorporated in the U.S. draft of the Study Group’s report [to] the respective governments. With reference to the draft U.S. declaration on Indochina, the Under Secretary said that he preferred to leave the text as it stands for the moment owing to the Secretary’s absence in Paris and the fact that our thinking at the moment is not final. With reference to a “Declaration of Intent”3 to conclude a defensive pact in Southeast Asia, Sir Robert Scott inquired whether the declaration should be made in any case or only if there were no Geneva settlement or else a very bad Geneva settlement. His own [Page 619] thought was that there would be no immediate need for military action if a settlement had been made at Geneva.
The Under Secretary replied that Western prestige in the area would be at a low ebb regardless of what comes out of Geneva and that a declaration of this sort might go a long way toward overcoming the handicaps we will inevitably face in the area. Even if there is no military crisis there is bound to be a political crisis of sorts among those whom we would hope to enlist in a defensive arrangement. Moreover, the negotiation of a treaty may require a very long time especially if India and others of the Colombo Powers are to be associated with it. If there is no really acceptable Geneva settlement a Declaration of Intent becomes imperative. New Zealand has suggested that we issue such a declaration even before the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. We would favor such a move but probably the UK would not.
Sir Robert Scott suggested that the draft declaration might be issued without Article II if there is a respectable Geneva settlement. He added that London may not want any declaration at all if there is a settlement.
The Under Secretary said that this would be acceptable if the British were prepared to press for the conclusion of a defence treaty.
Sir Robert Scott replied that the British attitude will depend upon the situation as it actually is at the time.
The Under Secretary said that if the UK is determined to win over India to this concept the whole proceedings may occupy many months.
Sir Robert Scott said that they certainly would make an effort to win over India but would not hold up for that purpose.
The Under Secretary said that Australia and New Zealand will be anxious to press on as are we and our friends in Southeast Asia. He added that whatever the Geneva settlement may be it will be more acceptable to the UK than to the US, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand or the Philippines. He added that the Working Group report to the Governments could note disagreement on specific points.
Sir Robert Scott made it clear that the British would not want the scope of the treaty extended except as new members might be admitted to the organization. He said that as far as possible he wished definitions to be positive rather than negative. He did not exclude the possibility of the pact’s growing, developing and embracing other areas.
With reference to Item 3B of the terms of reference Sir Robert said that we had not yet considered what we should do about Laos, Cambodia and retained Vietnam in the event that there is no [Page 620] agreement on Indochina. He had therefore and was submitting a draft (which appears as a separate document in this series).4
The Under Secretary said that our view in the contingency mentioned is that we should press ahead as fast as possible. It is still conceivable, he remarked, that a French government might fulfill the conditions stipulated by this government and request US military intervention. He added that the British themselves might be willing to participate in a rescue operation in Indochina.
Sir Robert Scott indicated that British troops would not be used in Indochina for any other purpose than a rescue operation.
A small drafting group will meet July 14 at 10 a.m.5 The next full session is scheduled for July 15 at 11 a.m.6
Drafted by Sturm, and attached to a covering note of July 16 by Walter Trulock of the Reports and Operations Staff. Both documents are at tab 31 of the “Documentary History”.
Previously unidentified U.S. participant L.C. Meeker was Assistant Legal Adviser for UN Affairs.
↩- Dated July 9. See the comparative texts in SEAP D–2, Aug. 2, p. 686.↩
- A U.S. draft “Declaration on Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific”, tabled at this meeting, is identical to that printed as Annex C to the Joint Study Group’s Final Report dated July 17, p. 641.↩
- The “UK Informal Draft Reports on Items II and III (b) of Terms of Reference”. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341, “Documentary History”, tab 30)↩
- Minutes of this meeting have not been found in Department of State files.↩
- In circular telegram 35, July 13, 7:17 p.m., sent to Bangkok, Canberra, Geneva, London, Manila, Paris, and Saigon, the Department summarized this meeting and commented: “Attitudes ‘Colombo powers’ obviously giving UK serious preoccupation. Believe UK may attempt bring Colombo powers along with collective security arrangement whatever form it takes and may be tempted ‘water down’ its provisions to secure acquiescence Colombo powers.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341)↩