Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341

United States Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Joint United States-United Kingdom Study Group1

[Extract]

2
secret
JSG MC–2
[Washington,] July 8, 1954—4–5:30 p.m.

[Participants:]

  • UK
    • Sir Robert H. Scott
    • Mr. M.G.L. Joy
    • Mr. F.R. MacGinnis
    • Lt. Col. R.G.V. FitzGeorge Balfour
  • US
    • The Under Secretary
    • Mr. Herman Phleger
    • Admiral Davis
    • Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
    • Mr. C. C. Stelle
    • Mr. E.A. Gullion
    • Mr. P.J. Sturm
    • Mr. W.R. Tyler

General Smith then discussed the UK draft on a collective security arrangement. He said it was a very good paper and that it covered the essential problems under consideration. With regard to membership, General Smith said that it would create a very serious problem for the US if the British have in mind issuing formal invitations to the Colombo powers and excluding Japan, Nationalist China and Korea. However, provided there is no formal invitation to India or the other Colombo powers, unless they indicate a desire to adhere, and provided that the terms of membership would not be exclusive with regard either to the Colombo powers of Nationalist China, Japan and ROK, there would be no great problem. We presume that while the Netherlands and Portugal would not be included initially but that the terms of the treaty would leave the door open for later entry if this seemed desirable [sic].

With respect to the possible association of certain colonial territories to that arrangement, there might be difficulties, e.g.: the provision for protecting Hong Kong in a treaty from which Nationalist China is excluded would raise a problem for us. Initially at least it would be better not to include colonial possessions in such a treaty.

The discussion then turned to the question of the structure of the organization. General Smith said that we hadn’t really gone into this. We feel the thing is to get the permanent treaty set up and that the structure should be considered by a temporary committee or council which would act as a kind of staff group both for the political and the military aspects of the structure.

Turning to the question of consultation with key potential members, General Smith said that the US would want to call a “Deputies ANZUS meeting”. Sir Robert Scott said that London would not be happy about this and would greatly prefer that the US should just inform the Australians and New Zealanders. General Smith said that we have [a] little problem here that these two countries were very anxious that ANZUS should not be submerged in the collective security arrangement. Sir Robert Scott said he was afraid that if a hard-core ANZUS inner group were maintained within the collective security arrangement, this would not be well received in London. General Smith said that we would handle the matter in [Page 612] such a way as to keep Australia and New Zealand happy as members of ANZUS without overstressing this aspect.3

Sir Robert Scott felt that France should be informed very soon in order that Mendes-France’s position should be given as much support as possible. He suggested that the French Government might be informed by our Ambassadors in Paris. The question of informing France and where, was left open until the next meeting. It was agreed that Canada should be informed with the hope that she might adhere to the collective security arrangement.

There will be no meeting on Friday, July 9. The next meeting will be on Saturday, July 10, at 10:30 A.M.

  1. Drafted by Tyler. This document, which is at tab 14 of the “Documentary History”, is attached to a covering note dated July 9 by Draper, not printed.

    British participants previously unidentified include: M. G. L. Joy, First Secretary at the British Embassy, and F. R. MacGinnis, Second Secretary at the British Embassy.

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  2. The omitted section of these minutes includes discussion of an Indochina settlement.↩

  3. The Under Secretary briefed Munro and Spender, and other officials of the two countries, at a meeting held July 9. A section of Tyler’s memorandum of this conversation follows:

    “The Australian Ambassador asked if, in our talks with the UK, we had sensed a difference in the UK attitude toward timing with regard to setting up a collective security organization if there were an acceptable settlement. The Under Secretary said that it did seem that the UK feels that there is less urgency than we do. Our position is that no effort must be spared to set up a collective security arrangement now. He referred to the possibility of a declaration of common intent to be used in the event of emergency. The Under Secretary said that Sir Robert Scott seemed to be in agreement with us on the question of timing, but it is not so sure whether London would be.

    “At this point both the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors said that the whole matter was one of the greatest urgency. They said they were uneasy with regard to the British position so far as timing is concerned. They asked when we would be ready with the actual draft of a treaty and expressed their fear that the UK would delay matters in negotiation. The Australian Ambassador said he thought a declaration of common intent should be ready by the 20th, and feared the UK would hold things up by insisting on consulting with India. Neither he nor the New Zealand Ambassador thought that either India or Burma would be brought any nearer to joining a collective security organization by the issuance of a declaration on the Indochina settlement, if there were one.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341, “Documentary History”, tab 20)

    Also on July 9, Ambassador Spender gave the Under Secretary a memorandum representing the views of the Australian Government on an Indochina agreement and on SEATO (JSG Memo 6) and a draft (of a Southeast Asia defense treaty) which he represented as containing his personal views (JSG Memo 7) (ibid., tabs 18 and 19, respectively).

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