Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341

Working Paper Prepared for the United States-United Kingdom Joint Study Group by the Minister at the British Embassy (Scott)¹

secret
JSG Memo 1

[Washington, July 7, 1954.]

Collective Security Arrangement In South East Asia

1. The following are among the main topics for consideration:

A. Operative Clauses

B. Membership

C. Structure

D. Relation to an Indo China Settlement

E. Relation to other Defense Treaties affecting the Area

F. Negotiation and Timing

G. Concurrent Action

a. operative clauses

2. These might be considered under three headings:

(a) contingency to be guarded against;

(b) the area to which the commitment applies;

(c) the nature of the commitment.

3. In regard to 2(a) the danger is of overt military aggression by China or the Vietminh; but there is also ( )² the danger of internal subversion. It may be desirable to split the operative clause into two parts to cover these different risks.

4. In regard to 2(b) the commitment should cover such territories of the signatories as lie within the area of the Treaty. In addition it may be desirable to cover territories of states in Indo China which are not parties to the treaty, since the terms of a settlement in Indo China may preclude some or all of the Associated States from themselves joining the treaty.

5. Finally, the desirability or otherwise of covering other countries in the area (e.g. Burma) should be considered.

6. In regard to 2(c) the nature of the commitment in the event of armed aggression could take one of several forms, from the principle that “an attack on one is an attack on all” to a promise “to concert action to meet the common danger”. The terms of reference of the Study Group³ provide an indication of what is required.

7. In regard to 2(c), the nature of the commitment in the event of Communist infiltration and subversion, short of open aggression, the commitment should be so drafted as to avoid charges of interference in the internal affairs of a signatory state and equally to avoid committing the signatories to action in the event of a non-Communist coup. Most of the new Asian states will hesitate to join an organization which appears to them to have supranational attributes.

b. membership

8. In addition to the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, the following countries would be appropriate as members: France, Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Burma.

9. The following countries would not be appropriate members of a collective security arrangement for South and South East Asia: Japan, Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea.

10. Possible membership by Laos, Cambodia and free Vietnam is also for consideration.

11. Possible membership by certain other countries is for discussion. Examples are the Netherlands and Portugal.

12. The possible association of certain territories with the collective security arrangement is for discussion. Examples are Hong Kong, Macao, Portuguese Timor, Netherlands New Guinea, United States Dependent Territories in the South Pacific.

c. structure

13. It is for consideration whether there should be standing machinery set up under the Treaty, and if so whether this should take the form of a permanent Committee of political or military representatives of signatories, or both. The composition of the permanent staff to be employed for these purposes is also for discussion.

14. Much will depend on the degree of urgency of the military situation in Indo China. If there is an agreed settlement there, with declarations from many countries that they will respect it, and if the Allies are confident that there is no immediate risk of a resumption of fighting in Indo China, there will be less need for the formulation of immediate plans to meet aggression and there will be more time to achieve the important aim of associating the Colombo powers with the defence of South East Asia. These countries may be more willing to participate in an arrangement for collective defence if participation does not commit them to accept a ready-made structure of political and military planning.

15. If on the other hand the military situation in Indo China continues to deteriorate despite or in the absence of a settlement, and if there is a prospect of sweeping Communist military gains and of a French military disaster, urgent consultation on military plans between the Allies will be required. There are several possibilities. We might press forward with the permanent arrangement for collective defence in South East Asia, so that action, if it has to be taken, could be taken under its auspices. If this is done it may be necessary to aim at a two-tiered structure, allowing countries other than founder members either to adhere or to associate themselves later with the Collective Security Arrangement, without necessarily accepting all the commitments accepted by its founders. Another possibility is a special ad hoc arrangement to meet the immediate threat, proceeding independently with plans for a permanent arrangement comprising as many as possible of the countries listed in paragraph 8 above.

16. In any case it is probable that some form of military planning board will be needed. In this connection it will be necessary to keep security considerations in mind, and the difficulty of coordinating intelligence and of military planning in a forum in which all signatories are represented.

17. The Treaty will presumably be a Regional Arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. The structure of the organisation should be designed to meet the requirements of Chapter VIII.

18. The terms of reference of the Study Group also refer to machinery “for assisting the lawful governments to resist Communist infiltration and subversion”. It is for consideration whether this will entail standing machinery for the provision of economic and other forms of aid to these Governments.

d. relation to a settlement in indo china

19. Laos, Cambodia, and free Vietnam may not (under the terms of an Indo China settlement) be free to join the proposed collective defence arrangement. The Treaty could however still give them protection against external Communist aggression, and assistance against Communist infiltration and subversion. The wording of references in the Collective Defence Treaty to these three countries will have to be considered very carefully, not only so that the extent of commitments is known, but because of the bearing of those references on the Indo China settlement and on the readiness of other countries to sign a Declaration of Association with the terms of an Indo China settlement.

e. relation with other defence treaties

20. The relation between the commitments in the proposed collective security arrangement and those in existing defence treaties is for examination, and similarly the relation between machinery set up under them for consultative and planning purposes.

f. negotiation and timing

21. The Study Group should consider and agree upon extent and timing of consultation with other countries, apart from Australia and New Zealand who, it is assumed, will be kept fully informed.

22. The progress of the French negotiations on Indo China, and developments there, will closely affect the negotiation and timing of a Collective Security arrangement for South East Asia among the noncommunist powers.

g. concurrent action

23. While the treaty is under negotiation it may be desirable to negotiate concurrently on other matters affecting the security of South East Asia, such as the provision of military training facilities and material, or the provision of bases in the area.

1. This paper, which is at tab 10 of the “Documentary History of US–UK Joint Study Group”, was put forward by Scott at the first meeting of the Joint Study Group on July 7. It is attachment 3 to a covering note in which Draper wrote Scott had indicated that it was an informal working paper and “did not represent an official UK position.”

   The US–UK Joint Study Group on Southeast Asia was established after Churchill’s and Eden’s visit to Washington June 25–29.

   The first meeting of the Joint Study Group was largely devoted to questions of procedure and to discussion of the Geneva Conference negotiations. An excerpt from the minutes concerning this paper, and that infra, follows:

   “Sir Robert at this point produced another document (JSG Memo 1) regarding the points to be covered in a collective security arrangement (organization) for Southeast Asia. In discussing this document Sir Robert mentioned that the Netherlands and Portugal presented a difficult problem since other prospective members in the area would be reluctant to see them admitted.

   “The Under Secretary remarked that Australia would be desirous of having the Dutch admitted.

   “Sir Robert said that in the end the existence of the Netherlands Union might provide the Dutch with a card of entry.

   “After this UK document had been gone through the Under Secretary said that we have been thinking along the same lines but have not gone into as much detail. He followed up with remarks based on a second talking paper (see JSG Memo 2).

   “Sir Robert remarked that the duration of a security arrangement offered a difficult point in that it might appear to freeze the status quo and to perpetuate colonialism.

   “The Under Secretary said that the basic points of a security arrangement (organization) were covered in both papers. The UK and the US see the problem alike. Our job now is one of coordinated drafting. (The Under Secretary gave a copy of his talking paper on a collective security pact to Sir Robert.) He asked for an opportunity to study the UK documents.” (Minutes of meeting by Sturm; Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341, “Documentary History”, tab 14, JSG MC–1)

   The date given in the heading is that of the covering note; the paper was drafted on July 5.

2. Blank space with parentheses in the source text.
3. That is, the Agreed Minute of June 27, p. 580.