Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret

[Washington,] July 6, 1954—4–5:30 p.m.

State-Defense Discussions Of Forthcoming US-UK Study Group Meetings

Participants:

• State
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur/Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Bonbright
  • Mr. Drumright
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Stelle
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Sturm
  • Mr. Gullion
  • Mr. Draper
• Defense
  • Admiral Davis
  • Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting.

Mr. MacArthur reviewed the recent history leading up to the US–UK Joint Study Group meetings. The first meeting will be held July 7 at 4:00. The British will be represented by Sir Robert Scott, Michael Joy and others, and we will have General Smith as our chief representative.

Admiral Davis said that he and Mr. Sullivan would be the Defense representatives. The Admiral said that Defense hopes these talks will be of a generalized nature and not get to specific military topics for the time being.

Mr. MacArthur plans to recommend that General Smith take the position regarding publicity for these talks that no communiqués or background statements will be issued, that they are exploratory and technical. We will keep our public relations people advised, but not of the substance.

Mr. MacArthur said that the Secretary wished to emphasize item two (… terms of a collective security pact …)² and leave to the British any proposals they may wish to forward on the other three items.³ The Secretary had directed Mr. Phleger to prepare two papers: 1) a draft treaty, which will not be tabled with the UK; and 2) a working paper incorporating what we believe should be included in a possible draft treaty, this paper to be tabled with the UK as representing the unofficial ideas of the US half of the Study Group.

Mr. MacArthur said that the Secretary wants the British to take the initiative on item 1. At an appropriate time, our position should be that we would be prepared to respect an agreement on the seven points communicated to the French. If there were such an agreement, we might sign with other countries a declaration that the countries involved would individually respect the agreement and would not use force to upset it. The Secretary does not want to push the British on item 3 at this time. Item 4, he thinks, will not come up in the first few meetings but at an appropriate time we would urge that the ANZUS Pact countries, Thailand, the Philippines, and probably France be invited to the talks.

Mr. Phleger outlined his rough draft treaty,⁴ showing how it uses the pertinent language from the Rio Pact, the ANZUS Pact and the NATO Treaty. This will mean that the possible signatories to the treaty, with the exception of Thailand, will have signed similar language before, and that this would merely mean an extension of commitments they have already undertaken in other areas of the world.

There are, he said, a number of questions:

Area: He was thinking of Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific. Should it be larger, and perhaps designed to include Pakistan at some time? (The draft treaty is open-ended.)

Parties: Who would participate besides the US, UK, France, New Zealand and Australia? The Secretary thinks it might be best not to name anyone as perhaps we can get in the Associated States and others.

Operative Provisions: He explained how and where the language was lifted, i.e., from ANZUS “… act to meet the common danger under respective constitutional processes”, the idea of a Council from the Rio Pact. He explained that the treaty would be broad since councils of consultation could be called to discuss action taking place outside the immediate area which could nevertheless be a threat.

Duration: The Secretary was thinking of five years with a one year notice of withdrawal.

Mr. Phleger explained in some detail the subsidiary bodies which might be formed under the treaty. Admiral Davis suggested calling the “Defense Committee” the “Military Committee” and cited some of the experiences of the Working Group negotiating the NATO Treaty.⁵ Mr. MacArthur pointed out that some of the difficulties encountered in preparing the NATO Treaty could be avoided this time.

General Smith entered at this point and the discussion was reviewed. He asked Mr. MacArthur to prepare a talking paper for the meeting the next day with the British, suggesting that he would like to table “a bit of paper” on perhaps what precisely we meant in the seven point reply to the French.^* He agreed that Mr. Phleger’s draft treaty was very good but wondered whether the negotiation for a multilateral treaty would consume months and whether we should therefore try for a declaration similar to the “Declaration of Common Intent”⁶ handed to the British in April.

Mr. Phleger pointed out that a treaty was necessary to get some solid commitments and that a declaration was too easy to sign. The pattern of the treaty has precedent. General Smith thought it would be good to keep the Declaration idea in reserve in case things got bogged down.

In discussing the area the treaty would cover, Admiral Davis said the JCS would prefer that the whole problem in the Pacific be handled as one grand exercise and that India be kept out of everything.

The meeting closed with a discussion of the possibility of our return to Geneva when the Ministerial discussions resume. General Smith hopes to lay down the problem to the Congress and get bi-partisan support for whatever we may be forced to do in the way of associating ourselves with the Indochina settlement.

1. This document is at Tab 6 of a group of papers entitled “Documentary History of US–UK Joint Study Group”.

   Department of State participants not previously identified include Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser; Charles C. Stelle, a member of the Policy Planning Staff; William R. Tyler, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs; and Edmund A. Gullion, also of the Policy Planning Staff; Morris Draper, an Administrative Assistant in the Executive Secretariat.

   From the Department of Defense, Charles A. Sullivan was Deputy for American, South Asian, and Far Eastern Affairs in the Office of Foreign Military Affairs.

2. Ellipses in the source text.
3. Reference is to the numbered paragraphs of the Agreed Minute of June 27, p. 580.
4. Text of a draft of this date or earlier has not been found in Department of State files.
5. For documentation on negotiation of this treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff., and ibid., 1949, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.
6. (Mr. MacArthur explained that Mr. Phleger’s “working paper” would serve this purpose.) [Footnote in the source text. The reference is perhaps to a draft of Phleger’s working paper of July 7, p. 609.]
6. Printed in vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1314.