Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 336
United States Memorandum of Bilateral Conversation With the United Kingdom1
CEV MC-4
Participants:
- United States
- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. MacArthur
- Ambassador Aldrich
- Mr. Sturm
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Anthony Eden
- Sir H. Caccia
- Mr. W.D. Allen
- Sir Roger Makins
- Mr. R.H. Scott
- Mr. M.G.L. Joy
Subject:
- Indochina
The Secretary stated he intended to ask Mr. Eden questions about his document entitled “A Southeast Asia settlement”2 and asked Mr. Eden what he thought the settlement was likely to be.
[Here follows discussion of prospects for an Indochina settlement at Geneva.]
The Secretary said that if a de facto settlement divides Vietnam, why should not what remains after this division be guaranteed by a collective defense system?
Sir Harold Caccia replied that there was no profound philosophy back of this but at Geneva it appeared that these areas would be neutralized behind a political line.
[Page 577]The Secretary said that we need to give thought to whether Laos and Cambodia and parts of Vietnam can develop viable non-Communist governments if they are not given substantial help from the outside. In other words, the degree of neutralization or demilitarization, affecting military training missions, equipment and advisors, was very important. If these elements were excluded, it is doubtful that these governments could survive.
Sir Harold Caccia said that Chou recognized the validity of some military elements in Laos and Cambodia, including perhaps a very restricted number of French.
Under Secretary Smith said that while there are very few French cadres in Laos and Cambodia, the Communists have insisted upon the provision of no more arms from outside except for restricted defense. We should take the same line for agreements (1) and (2) of the Eden document, but the line should be political and if it were violated the military would decide where the fighting should take place.
Mr. Eden agreed that the defense line should be the political line, but where should it be drawn? That depends on what comes out of Geneva. He did not exclude from the defense provisions those parts of Indo-China which might be salvaged.
Sir Harold Caccia added the qualifying remark: even though these areas cannot be turned into a defensive position.
Sir Roger Makins inquired about an enclave in the delta.
Under Secretary Smith said that any enclaves which remained would be short-lived and unfortunately would not enter into a permanent political settlement.
Sir Harold Caccia said that if anything was salvaged in South Vietnam, we would have to consider what would bring the secondary pact3 into operation. Would subversion, for example, do this?
The Secretary replied that in his view this line would not cover internal subversion but he would be glad to consider another view of this matter.
Sir Harold Caccia said that it would be extremely difficult to define the terms of a violation of a defensive line: Assume, for example, that the Communists win elections.
Mr. Eden remarked that we would have to work to improve the lot of those persons remaining outside Communist zones and to hope that things would work out. All this depends on what settlement is reached at Geneva.
[Page 578]The Secretary inquired whether, if there were no Indochina settlement at Geneva, the UK would wish to give thought to saving parts of Vietnam.
Mr. Eden replied that he did not believe the people of Vietnam were with us and that consequently a great effort would be required. Laos and Cambodia are different. Moreover, those two countries could be taken to the UN. If Laos and Cambodia, for example, appealed to the UN and the appeal went well that would be a good basis for future action in the area.
Under Secretary Smith said he believed Mendes-France’s immediate goal was to gain acceptance of the Thakhek-Dong Hoi line.
Mr. Eden inquired whether Mendes-France would be willing to abandon part of Laos.
Under Secretary Smith said that he would, partly because of the difficulty of defending the long border and partly because the Communists will hold fast to Northern Laos.
Mr. Eden said that he had been disturbed by the staff paper4 of the five power military talks which had indicated abandonment of so much of Laos.
The Secretary left the room briefly at this time. General conversation in his absence touched upon Communist fear of US bases in Laos and Cambodia, a fact which gives us some bargaining power; French intention not to attempt to hold in the Delta; what we can do to stiffen the French at this time; and French fears that the US and the UK will disassociate themselves from a Geneva settlement.
In reply to a question regarding “C. Proposed Action,” Mr. Eden said that the five power discussions had been all white. If the talks proposed in the paper were not all white, we would be faced with the difficult problem of how many, and which, others.
Under Secretary Smith said that we might be able to continue as at present, adding political advisers, without advertising our talks.
The Secretary re-entered at that point and reported his conversation with Ambassador Bonnet, who had brought him two messages from Mendes-France. One of these messages mentioned regrouping of military forces and said that the French would try to hold an enclave in the North and to neutralize the Catholic province of Bui Chu and Phat Diem.5
Mendes-France would like the communiqué on the Eisenhower-Churchill talks to say that a failure of the Geneva Conference would aggravate the international situation.
[Page 579]Mendes-France indicated also that there would be objections from elements in Vietnam about any settlement reached and repeated his hope that we would help sell this to the Vietnamese.
The Secretary continued by saying that there would be more headaches in attempting to develop the five power talks into a political conference. The Philippines and Thailand were already seriously irritated by the purely military talks. Our troubles would become almost unbearable if the five power talks became political.
Mr. Eden suggested that perhaps the US and the UK could talk among themselves, plus possibly the other members of ANZUS. Mr. Eden said that the details that might be discussed were the terms of a formal engagement and who invites whom.
The Secretary said that he thought it was best to proceed on a bilateral basis. The French are preoccupied with other things but their views can be obtained on an ad hoc basis. We already know the views of Australia and New Zealand.
Mr. Eden said that he would much prefer this, adding that we could tell Casey what is going on.
The Secretary said that these talks did not have to be publicized.
Mr. Eden replied that we should consider whether they should or should not.
The Secretary said that would depend. We might say that matters had been discussed by the heads of governments and as an aftermath the details were to be discussed at a working level with the objective of putting flesh on bare bones.
He added that under C, paragraph 3 should be eliminated, since at some point we must consider Indochina.
Mr. Eden said that both sides should prepare draft terms of reference covering what the study is to do.
Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Eden’s position on the international control commission, in particular whether Mr. Eden still wished the Colombo powers to take on this job.
Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative, adding that one Communist state and “one of ours”; Sweden, Switzerland or Norway, might be added. The Communists for their part might suggest: Poland or Norway plus three of the Colombo powers.
Mr. Robertson inquired why we had to accept a Communist satellite state.
Mr. Eden replied that his position so far was that the Colombo powers should accept supervision.
Mr. Robertson asked why we should dilute this type of control commission. The idea of entrusting supervision to the Colombo powers has great appeal to the Asians.
Mr. Eden replied that the Communists have already rejected the proposal of the Colombo powers plus two others. He said that for [Page 580] himself he was all for fighting the Colombo proposal through since it was much the best solution.
Sir Harold Caccia queried whether we should stick on this issue if there was agreement on everything else.
Mr. Robertson said that the control commission is a very powerful element, particularly since it may be concerned at some time with supervising elections.
Mr. Eden said that recently he had written off the question of a control commission altogether, saying that this was a matter for the French. However, he now agrees that we should stick to the idea of the Colombo powers. He will do everything possible to encourage the French to adhere to this position and if we are unable to make any progress on these lines we shall confer again.
- Drafted June 28. Previously unidentified British participants include: Allen, an Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, and Joy, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington.↩
- Supra.↩
- That is, the collective defense agreement referred to in the British memorandum, supra.↩
- Perhaps a reference to Enclosure D to the Report of the Five-Power Military Conference, dated June 11, and entitled “Military Courses of Action in Indochina”; this enclosure is not among the selections from the report printed on p. 554.↩
- For text of this aide-mémoire, see telegram 4852 to Paris, June 28, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1755.↩