Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 339

Position Paper Prepared for the Churchill-Eden Visit, by William D. Fisher of the Office of Western European Affairs¹

top secret
CEV D–4/3b

[Washington,] June 24, 1954.

Possibilities of United Action (Some em; scope, nature, procedure, and UN aspects)

U.S. Position (to be raised by US)

1. Now that the probable results of the Geneva Conference are known, the US and UK, in the first instance, must make immediate decisions as to the action to be taken to prevent further Communist infiltration or expansion in Southeast Asia.

2. We believe it is agreed by UK that a defensive alliance should be created and that it should embrace the territories of Thailand, Philippines and probably Burma and should have the full support of Australia and New Zealand as well as the UK. Whether or not it embraces any of the territory of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is the question that we should attempt to resolve.

3. We believe we should include Laos and Cambodia plus all of Vietnam that can be salvaged. US–UK decisions now on this point might prevent French agreement to Communist terms which would have the effect of giving these areas to the Communists.

4. US would be prepared to sign a Geneva settlement, assuming obligations as guarantor, only if (1) that settlement met US minimum requirements for a workable armistice and if it did not provide Communists with means for take-over of all Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, and (2) US–UK agreement had been reached on action to be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in the area. US considers Locarno type pact a dangerous illusion—US cannot have hands tied in event Communists start trouble in Korea, or attempt expand further in Southeast Asia.

5. In the first instance, we should proceed as rapidly as possible with the Thai appeal to UN (independently from Geneva) and with the appeal from Cambodia and Laos if these states are disposed to move in this direction. Initially, this should be limited to POC but if US and UK can agree on paragraph 3 above, their appeals should be broadened to a request for assistance.

6. Time does not allow the formal negotiation of a NATO type treaty for Southeast Asia. We should have a conference of governments concerned to issue communiqué on a line, the crossing of which by Communist forces, would bring about retaliation from the Southeast Asia alliance.

7. How far is UK prepared to go? Locarno pact would mean limiting SEATO to line Communists would approve.

Probable UK Position

1. UK concurs with 1 and 2 above.

2. However, SEATO should be accompanied by Locarno type pact. Also, UK disagrees with 3 above on basis military situation renders such action too risky and Commonwealth would not acquiesce.

3. No conference on SEATO, no UN action and no final commitments on other points until Geneva Conference over to avoid complicating achievement best obtainable settlement by French and Viet Minh.

1. A covering note by Robbins P. Gilman of the Reports and Operations Staff indicates that Fisher was assisted by Samuel De Palma of the Bureau of UN Affairs and by Paul Sturm of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, and that the paper had been cleared by the Bureau of European Affairs.