Editorial Note
On June 23 Eden made a statement on the Geneva Conference and the situation in Southeast Asia before the British House of Commons. In the course of remarks on a regional defense arrangement he said:
“I hope that we shall be able to agree to an international guarantee of any settlement that may emerge at Geneva. I also hope that it will be possible to agree on some system of South-East Asian defence to guard against aggression. In other words, we could have a reciprocal arrangement in which both sides take part, such as Locarno. We could also have a defencive alliance such as N.A.T.O. is in Europe, and, let me add, such as the existing Chinese-Soviet Treaty provides for the Far East so far as the Communist Powers are concerned.
“That is the kind of plan that should develop. These two systems, I admit, are quite different, but they need be in no way inconsistent. My belief is that by refraining from any precipitate move towards the formation of a N.A.T.O. system in South-East Asia, we have helped to create the necessary conditions in which both systems can possibly be brought into being.” (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, volume 529, column 433)
Mention of this statement occurs twice in the records of talks held on June 25 between British and United States leaders. First, in the unsigned memorandum of a luncheon meeting at the White House, at which the President, the Prime Minister, Dulles, Eden, Merchant, and Sir Harold Caccia were present:
“Toward the end of the conversation in the course of the discussion of the American reaction to Mr. Eden’s speech yesterday in the House, the President described the letter which he had received signed by a majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee stating in effect that unless our position in connection with Mr. Eden’s stated views was made unmistakably clear at this conference, the entire matter of the Mutual Security Program would have to be re-examined.
“The Secretary pointed out that the problem of Indochina and Southeast Asia was probably the most difficult facing the conference. Mr. Eden, who had previously explained that his purpose in resurrecting Locarno was to emphasize the unwillingness of the UK to enter any guarantee of a Geneva settlement which required unanimous action by the guarantors, stated that he would only require about twenty minutes to lay the ground work for the discussion of Southeast Asia and that he was most anxious that the Prime Minister be present at the time. It was accordingly agreed that the group would adjourn to the solarium for a continuation of the discussion.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 336, CEV MC-2)
The letter mentioned by the President is described and partially quoted in the New York Times, June 28, page 3. Another reference to Congressional concern with the concept of an “Asian Locarno” is in Nolting’s memorandum to the Secretary dated July 12; see volume I, Part 1, page 737.
Ambassador Aldrich and Sir Roger Makins joined the group during the continuation of the discussion, which is summarized in a separate unsigned memorandum of conversation. The section on Southeast Asia follows:
“From this point the discussion swung into Southeast Asia, with the Prime Minister’s statement that he was anxious to take some of the weight off the United States in its presentation of an anti-Communist front. He said, however, that England would never accept going to war in Indochina. He doubted that the United States would either. He felt, however, that the British could take the major responsibility for the Kra Peninsula line which could be held by sea and air with some ground forces. All of these plans, he said, Lord Alexander would go into with our military people when he came over next month. He went on to say that in building the front against Chinese aggression he hoped that the Colombo powers would find it possible to join in SEATO as well as the Philippines. He said there was no basic conflict between such a treaty and Eden’s idea of a Locarno guarantee of a Geneva settlement.
“At this point Mr. Eden said that he was bewildered by the press reaction to his reference to Locarno. He said what he endeavored [Page 572] to do was to point out the unacceptability of a guarantee of a Geneva settlement which involved the retention of a veto on the part of any single guarantor. ‘Change the name Locarno,’ Mr. Eden said, ‘if it stinks in the United States.’” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 336, CEV MC-3)
Both memoranda of these conversations held on June 25 were drafted on June 27. For complete texts, see volume VI.