Eisenhower library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 201st Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Wednesday, June 9, 19541
[Extracts]
There were present at the 201st Meeting of the Council the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Tuttle for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 2, 3, 6 and 7); the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 2 and 3); Assistant Attorney General Barnes (for Item 1); the Secretary of the Army; Under Secretary of Commerce Murray (for Item 1); Assistant Secretary of the Interior [Page 551] Wormser (for Item 1); the Under Secretary of the Navy; Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
7. Southeast Asia (NSC 5405; NSC Actions Nos. 1086–b and -c, 1104–b, 1110,2 1112, 1147–b,3 and 1148–b4)
Secretary Wilson indicated the various countries which he had visited in the course of his journey to the Far East. In Japan, he said, Ambassador Allison had arranged for Secretary Wilson to have an interview with the Emperor. Secretary Wilson then read from a memorandum of conversation which Ambassador Allison had prepared after the interview.5
Secretary Wilson said that he had had “quite a visit” with Prime Minister Yoshida, who had tried to interest him in a great road-building scheme in Japan. While Yoshida seemed very anxious to proceed with the Japanese rearmament program, Secretary Wilson said he expected a lot of economic assistance from the United States in this process.
Secretary Wilson said that when he reached Korea he found President Rhee both courteous and friendly, but there had been no “business” talked between them. Subsequently, however, at a review of South Korean troops, President Rhee had made a speech which dealt with various policy matters. Secretary Wilson read to the Council excerpts from Rhee’s speech, which heaped praise on General Van Fleet for his part in building up the ROK Army. The speech also contained a plea for continued U.S. build-up of South Korean armed forces.
In Formosa, said Secretary Wilson, the Generalissimo had tried to sell him a number of things in the course of three interviews. Secretary Wilson had taken the position that he was merely an observer. Chiang had taken the position that the United States was [Page 552] wasting its time and money in Indochina. American aid had better be channelled elsewhere, since the great issues in Asia would not be settled in Indochina. Chiang had also pointed out that while the United States has treaty arrangements with the Philippines, the ROK, and Japan, there was no formal agreement between the United States and Nationalist China. Secretary Wilson had replied by pointing out the difficulties of working out an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek unless such an agreement were restricted to areas which the Generalissimo actually controlled. Secretary Wilson expressed the opinion that Chiang was very over-optimistic on what he thought he could accomplish in an invasion of the mainland, which the Generalissimo said could be successfully carried out without the need for any American ground forces.
With regard to the Philippines, Secretary Wilson said he had had “quite a talk with the folks down there”. He had been advised in advance not to discuss with Magsaysay our base agreements.6 He had, however, been told to indicate to Magsaysay the view of the United States that the time had come to implement the treaty with the Philippines.7 Secretary Wilson also discussed with Magsaysay the economic situation and the need for educational development in the Philippines.
As a general result of visiting around in the various Far Eastern countries, Secretary Wilson said he clearly sensed the necessity of getting some kind of real internal stability in these countries. He wondered, however, if the United States was not trying to achieve economic improvement in many of these countries at too rapid a pace. Secretary Wilson therefore suggested that now was the time to take a “real new look” as to how best to accomplish our objectives in the Far East with far fewer U.S. personnel.
At the conclusion of Secretary Wilson’s report, Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Dulles if he had any comments to make on developments in Southeast Asia since his last report to the Council.
Secretary Dulles replied that there were very few changes to report. As we had anticipated, the pre-conditions we had set for armed intervention in Southeast Asia had been “toyed with” by the French, but that the French had reached no firm conclusion with respect to internationalizing the Indochina conflict. In effect, they are using these pre-conditions and the prospect of our intervention at Geneva, but they seem to have no intention of actually taking up the option. Beyond this, an acceptable formula had been [Page 553] found for the independence of the Associated States if the time ever comes to invoke the formula.
The Thai appeal for UN observers, said Secretary Dulles, had made some progress, despite the obstacles placed in its way by the British and French, to whom it had been necessary to present a virtual ultimatum. At least a beginning had been made of getting the UN involved in Southeast Asia.
If a breakdown occurred at Geneva, Secretary Dulles predicted that the British would move for some kind of regional organization to protect what was left of Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia. Secretary Dulles expressed himself as still opposed to United States intervention with armed force in Indochina unless our preconditions for such intervention had been met and unless we have other nations as associates in the enterprise.
Secretary Dulles then commented briefly on the U.S. course of action in the event of overt unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression, which the Council had discussed at its previous meeting. He said that he had had a number of talks with the representatives of the nations concerned, but no definite reactions had yet occurred. The Australians, he said, were obviously concerting their response with the British. However, Secretary Dulles had himself informed the British of the proposals he would discuss with the Pacific Dominions. The British remained heavily influenced by the point of view of India and by their fear of a desire on the part of the United States to provoke general war with Communist China.
Secretary Dulles concluded by offering the guess that Australia and New Zealand would ultimately agree to stand beside us in the face of overt Chinese Communist aggression. However, what their precise posture would be, Secretary Dulles said he could not predict.
The President said that he had one bit of information to add to the discussion. Pleven had called in General Gruenther8 and pointed out what terrific repercussions would arise in France if the Tonkin Delta were lost. There would be harsh feelings against all of France’s allies, and especially against Great Britain. The United States, however, would not avoid criticism. The President said that he had written back to General Gruenther9 suggesting that he tell Pleven that if the Tonkin Delta fell, there would be very strong anti-French reactions in the United States in view of all that we had done to provide against its loss.
Secretary Dulles commented that if Indochina were lost, everyone would be on the lookout for a scapegoat.
[Page 554]The National Security Council:10
Noted oral reports by the Secretary of Defense on his recent Asian trip and by the Secretary of State on developments in the current negotiations with respect to Southeast Asia.
- Drafted by Gleason on June 10.↩
- Dated May 8, 1954, and printed with an extract from the memorandum of the 196th NSC meeting held the same day, in vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1505.↩
- Dated June 3, 1954, and printed with an extract from the memorandum of the 200th NSC meeting held that same day, ibid., p. 1660.↩
- See footnote 6, p. 537.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The original military base agreement between the United States and the Philippines (already much amended by 1954), had been signed at Manila on Mar. 14, 1947. For text, see TIAS 1775.↩
- Reference is to the Mutual Defense Treaty.↩
- Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.↩
- Letter not found in Department of State files.↩
- The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1155. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)↩