790.5/6–454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Asssistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1
Subject:
- ANZUS Meeting
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Sir Roger Makins, British
- Ambassador Mr. Merchant—EUR
The British Ambassador called on the Secretary late in the afternoon at the Secretary’s request.
The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he desired to inform the British Ambassador of the meeting he had had earlier in the afternoon with the Ambassadors from Australia and New Zealand. After briefly summarizing the talking paper2 which he had used for the ANZUS meeting, the Secretary handed the British Ambassador a copy which he said the Ambassador could keep.
Sir Roger Makins read the paper twice, slowly and carefully. He then asked if he understood correctly that it was our opinion that overt aggression by the Chinese Communists (which the Secretary had emphasized he regarded as highly unlikely) would bring the ANZUS Treaty into play. The Secretary replied that reaction by the United States against overt Chinese Communist aggression as intimated in the President’s declaration might be expected to bring the Treaty into play. The British Ambassador asked if such reaction contemplated the possible use of the forces on Formosa, to which the Secretary replied affirmatively. The British Ambassador then asked if the use of Chinese air power in Indochina or the employment of bases in Communist China by aircraft which entered the fight in Indochina would be construed as overt aggression. The Secretary replied in the affirmative though he stated that use of air bases in Communist China by aircraft which might be marked as Vietminh and manned by Vietminh pilots would be an instance where the facts of the aggression might be a little difficult to establish. The Secretary went on to say that in establishing our intentions under the hypothetical situation, the United States would be acting in direct defense of what it regarded as its own national security interests. Its motivation would not be helping the French and its reaction would not necessarily be in the immediate area of the aggression. In consequence the Secretary said that this position of the United States was neither at the request of the French nor [Page 547] in the form of contemplated commitment to the French nor a source of bargaining with the French. We would be acting directly in defense of the United States’ own interests.
The British Ambassador inquired if we contemplated making public any joint declaration along these lines. The Secretary replied not necessarily but this was a matter which could be decided later. He went on to say that he had a feeling the Communists’ intelligence in the free world was sufficiently good to make it reasonably certain that they would sense or detect an agreement of this sort and the firmness of purpose underlying it.
The Secretary then noted that he was going to talk to the Philippines along similar lines. In reply to the Ambassador’s question the Secretary confirmed that there was no present intention to tell the French at this moment of these actions.
The British Ambassador thanked the Secretary for the information which he said would be helpful to the British Cabinet at its meeting the next morning. From his manner and his questions it was clear that he considered the entire matter one of very real seriousness.