Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.00/5–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

secret

Taipei, May 24, 1954—11 p.m.

640. Department pass CINCPAC. In rather lengthy conferences with Secretary Wilson² and General Van Fleet³ separately, President Chiang outlined his views in extenso with particular emphasis on following numbered points:

1. Useless to hope for solution of Indochina problems in Associated States themselves whether or not SEATO can be established with UK in addition to French participation. US inevitably would find itself enmeshed in British and French colonial problems and made to appear to Asians as another champion of colonialism. Nothing short of large scale use of American ground forces in Indo-china could check Communists under these conditions. Further expansion of military aid to France is simply waste of money as far as saving SEA is concerned. (Taipei’s 578 and 629)⁴

2. Only practicable military means of relieving pressure in Indochina is by threatening coastal flank of Communist China, which is prime move in Red machinery for aggression in Asia.

3. Anti-Communist countries of East Asia (Korea, Japan, Free China, Philippines) from which Red flank could be threatened are in area where US has comparatively free hand and need not concern itself with British and French colonial problems. Moreover these four countries have important actual and potential military power.

4. Above four countries should be linked by security pacts with each other and with US. Due present difficulties between Japan and Korea, as well as between Japan and Philippines, Chiang suggested series of trilateral pacts such as US–Japan-China, US–Philippines-China, US–Korea-China. He pointed out that in common with US, Free China enjoys good relations with all, and that above approach would give promise of eventually making Korea and Philippines allies of Japan against common enemy—Communism. (Taipei’s 610)⁵

5. Foregoing proposal, if sponsored by US would prove to all concerned existence of firm, long-term, anti-Communist US policy in Far East. Such demonstration essential to combat neutralist tendencies in Japan which Chiang believes are being encouraged by what he considers present US indecisiveness.

6. Essential link remaining to be forged before above proposals can be implemented is conclusion of bilateral security pact between US and Free China.

Long telegram from Ambassador Koo re his May 19 conversation with Secretary Dulles (Department’s 889)⁶ was summarized by Foreign Minister for President Chiang before latter’s final talk with Wilson May 21. Chiang made no reference to this telegram in talking with Wilson or Van Fleet but Foreign Minister told me privately both he and President were very disappointed US unwillingness negotiate bilateral pact with Free China as already done with ex-enemy Japan and with Korea, occupying similar position to that of Free China. Foreign Minister expects give me detailed memo on this subject shortly. Meanwhile he could see no valid objection on part of US to pact carefully drawn on purely defensive basis and practical value of which would be almost entirely psychological but no less important on that account. Chiang’s remarks to Wilson doubtless were influenced by Koo’s telegram. He observed inter alia that continued refusal by US to conclude security pact with Free China would be interpreted as indicating US intention recognize Red China in due course.

Rankin

1. Repeated for information to Geneva, Hong Kong, Manila, Saigon, Seoul, and Tokyo.
2. Defense Secretary Wilson was on a tour of East Asia which had begun with his arrival in Tokyo on May 13. Besides Japan, his itinerary included South Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines. He had arrived in Taipei on May 19 and had conferred with President Chiang Kai-shek that same day. He arrived back in the United States on June 2.
3. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, U.S. Army, ret., was (at the request of the President) at the head of a mission which was surveying military forces and U.S. Military Assistance Programs in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. The mission was in East Asia May 5–July 8.
4. Neither printed.
5. Dated May 10, p. 477.
6. For a memorandum of this conversation, see volume XIV.