790.5/5–2054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

top secret

Subject:

  • Southeast Asia Defense

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • Foreign Minister Webb, New Zealand
  • Ambassador Munro, New Zealand
  • Minister Laking, New Zealand
  • Mr. MacArthur, C

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he assumed Mr. Webb would like to be brought up-to-date on the proposed five-power military talks in Washington. The Secretary said the British had come up with a proposal two weeks ago suggesting that the talks start in Washington with the possibility of moving to Singapore or some other place later if this seemed desirable. The British proposal also had a paragraph which dealt with proposed terms of reference for the group. He said the US believed the talks should be in Washington and should only be transferred to some other place if there was full agreement by each of the five participating powers. The Secretary then read the terms of reference set forth in Eden’s memo of May 18 (paragraph 2 of Dulte 84).1 He then read the US counterproposal suggested by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff which he said had been sent to Mr. Eden this morning (paragraph lb of Tedul 93).2

The Secretary said he was not certain there was any great difference of substance in the two texts but that the US military had a strong preference for their text. Mr. Webb expressed the view that when the military representatives of the five powers actually got together and met, the precise wording of their terms of reference would probably not seriously affect their discussions.

Mr. Webb then said he would be interested in knowing the level at which the US envisaged these talks being held. The Secretary said he did not know what individual the Department of Defense had in mind but that he understood it would be a general officer of possibly a three- or two-star rank. Mr. Webb said the New Zealand Government took these talks very seriously and hoped the level of representation would be on the high side rather than on the low [Page 501] side. He thought this was important not only substantively but also to give the impression to the world that the five powers were taking the discussions seriously and were represented at a high military level. (Subsequently, Mr. Laking told Mr. MacArthur that New Zealand was contemplating designating General Gentry, who would proceed to Washington to head up the New Zealand representation.)

[Here follows a summary of a general review by the Secretary of United States policy in Indochina and Southeast Asia since the beginning of April 1954.]

  1. Dated May 18, p. 488.
  2. Dated May 20, p. 493.