Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/5–1754: Telegram

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Geneva, May 17, 1954—4 p.m.

Dulte 77. Reference: Tedul 67.² In reply to question whether subject Southeast Asia collective security measures should continue to be dealt with here between Eden and General Smith or in future be handled between Washington and London, Caccia³ said that from British point of view as long as Eden was here it would be better to carry on business in Geneva. Other questions apart, Caccia felt that only outstanding problem regarding proposed military staff talks was development of terms of reference. He felt that Eden was now prepared to go along with Washington as site.

However with respect to subject in general, a new obstacle has been created by published reports of US–French talks on US participation in Indochina war. Before this report was published on Saturday Eden had been ready to agree to going ahead immediately with military staff talks but now felt he had to await outcome of US–French talks. Problem for him was that if French were to ask for US intervention on terms proposed it would not be possible for him to pretend that five-power military staff talks were “without commitment”, for the US and France would in fact be planning on basis of very specific commitments.⁴ Caccia said that as far as British were concerned it remained essential that proposed five-power military talks be without commitment and that Eden be able so to report to Parliament.

When it was pointed out to him that some time might elapse before French Government reached decision whether to request US intervention, Caccia seemed to reflect that this aspect had not been considered by Eden and he said that the latter would no doubt wish to give further thought to this aspect.

Caccia said Eden was disturbed by press reports indicating Department had put specific question re adherence to Southeast Asia pact to certain Colombo states including India and Burma and had got flat turndown. Eden was also concerned whether this reflected decision on our part not to follow agreed division of labor whereby British would deal with Colombo states and US with Thailand, Philippines, etc., on this subject. We are assuring British that there is no such intention on our part and that talks between Murphy and Ambassadors of Colombo states were of much more general character than that attributed to them by press.⁵

Smith

1. Repeated for information to Paris, marked “Eyes only Ambassador”.
2. Dated May 14, p. 484.
3. Sir Harold Caccia, Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.
4. For documentation on the French request of May 9 for U.S. consideration of military intervention in Indochina, see vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 1522 ff.
5. In telegram Dulte 79 from Geneva, sent later on May 17, Smith in part reported: “Caccia has just informed us that Eden has gotten off telegram to London recommending approval of immediate start of five-power military staff talks. He has asked for reply by tomorrow and believes it will be favorable.” (790.5/5–1754)