790.5/5–1054: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in New Zealand1
155. Limit distribution. Following is summary, not yet cleared with Secretary, of his talk with New Zealand Ambassador on May 8. (Memo follows.)2
On U.S. plans to deal with situation Southeast Asia, Secretary said his May 7 speech3 which had approval of President probably gave clearest picture our present thinking.
U.S. feeling, contrary to that of British, was that action limited to military discussion within framework Five Power Staff Agency would be too Western in flavor. Exclusion of Asians would have bad repercussions. Vietnamese would consider themselves abandoned. U.S. has no objections to Five Power discussions if desired by others and would prefer Washington as meeting place, but in addition Secretary believed we should continue to plan for and exchange views on broader political association. U.S. does not share U.K. views that talks with Associated States would have undesirable implications.4 In short Secretary thought Five Power talks o.k. but this should not stop exploratory talks with Thailand, Philippines, Associated States. Burma inclusion desirable; Indonesians should be kept informed. Secretary said U.S. continues work closely with British but reserves right talk with Associated States for foregoing reasons.
Secretary said we do not exclude possible participation in the Indochina war if proper conditions existed, if French and people of Associated States wanted us, and his speech had advanced this suggestion by analogy with Korean situation. If Communist conditions at Geneva are as humiliating as expected Secretary said French may reconsider their position on internationalization of the conflict. Secretary said he wanted French to know that there were conditions under which we would be prepared consider participation.
Replying to Ambassador on areas to be held if Indochina situation deteriorates rapidly, Secretary said he thought Thailand of [Page 477] greatest importance and that Thais should be brought in on all plans. With our help Secretary thought Thais not so vulnerable to subversion.
Secretary said we would not support any proposal tantamount turning over Indochina to Communists, would maintain full liberty of action and would encourage and assist such indigenous forces as might remain.
Secretary felt military talks with Thais and Filipinos would be useful. Talks with Associated States would be for purpose of maintaining contact and morale, rather than for military purposes. Secretary asked Ambassador to invite Webb to Washington for further talk when he arrives U.S. on way to New Zealand.5
Similar conversation took place with Australian Ambassador on May 10.6
Wellington repeat to Canberra.
- Sent also to Geneva as Tosec 121 and repeated for information by pouch to London and Paris.↩
- For text of Bonbright’s memorandum of conversation, dated May 8, see vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1512.↩
- For text of the Secretary’s radio and television address, “The Issues at Geneva”, see Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954, p. 739.↩
- According to Bonbright’s memorandum, the Secretary had stated that the United Kingdom feared that such discussions would have undesirable implications, and that they might suggest the possibility of involvement in the Indochina war.↩
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Bonbright’s memorandum summarizes a portion of the conversation not included here concerning organization as follows:
“The Secretary then said we should now be making concrete studies in order to see what all of us might agree on together. Should we have an organization like NATO or should the arrangement be more informal? What countries should be included in it? He felt that if Indochina went down the drain it would be difficult to insulate the rest of the area unless we had plans in advance of what we would do.” (751G.00/5–854)
The memorandum does not indicate response by Ambassador Munro to these questions.
↩ -
Raynor’s memorandum of this Conversation is filed under 751G.00/5–1054.
In telegram 262 from Canberra, May 10, the Embassy informed the Department of State of the current Australian position concerning a regional grouping and five-power talks:
“5–power staff agency should be used; talks to begin soonest; Washington believed best location; Asians should be kept informed per reference telegram; any public announcement should refer only to support of conference settlement but actually talks should go further.
“Australians have seen draft UK statement re keeping informed countries participating Colombo Conference plus Siam. Australians think addition Philippines essential.” (396.1 GE/5–1954)
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